Global green growth: Clean energy industrial investments and expanding job opportunities by United Nations Industrial Development Organization
GLOBAL GREEN GROWTH:
Clean Energy Industrial  
Investments and Expanding 
Job Opportunities
Experiences of Brazil, Germany,  
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea  
and South Africa
Copyright © 2015
The Global Green Growth Institute
United Nations Industrial Development Organization
 
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of 
any opinion whatsoever concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or 
concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
Designations such as “developed”, “industrialized” and “developing” are intended for statistical convenience 
and do not necessarily express a judgment about the state reached by a particular country or area in the 
development process.
The mention of firm names or commercial products does not imply endorsement by UNIDO nor by GGGI.
Material in this publication may be freely quoted or reprinted, but acknowledgement is requested, together 
with a copy of the publication containing the quotation or reprint.
For reference and citation, please use: UNIDO and GGGI (2015). Global Green Growth: Clean Energy Industry 
Investments and Expanding Job Opportunities. Volume II: Experiences of Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea and South Africa. Vienna and Seoul.
COVER: www.http://constructionreviewonline.com
3April 2015
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)
GLOBAL GREEN GROWTH:
Clean Energy Industrial  
Investments and Expanding 
Job Opportunities
Volume II
Experiences of Brazil, Germany,  
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea  
and South Africa

Foreword
 
It has become abundantly clear that fossil fuel powered industrialization as we have known 
it has had unanticipated adverse environmental impacts. One of the most significant 
challenges faced by global leaders today is how to achieve inclusive and sustainable industrial 
development, hereby creating jobs and reducing poverty, while combating climate change and 
resource depletion. As the world gears up for common actions to meet this end, one must 
ask whether current ‘green growth’ eﬀorts towards low-carbon resource-eﬃcient industrial 
development will lead to the sustained generation of new jobs.
The present paucity of policy-related information on the impact of green industrial investment 
on employment prevents policy makers and businesses from obtaining a full picture of 
the potential benefits of such investments, and thus to undertake investments that will be 
successful in terms of achieving both environmental protection and job creation. The absence 
of this information might cause the great expectation for green industries to dwindle. Indeed, 
it might jeopardize the global eﬀorts to meet the emission reduction targets set by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to control climate change. 
This project comes at a time when policy makers are focusing their national strategies on 
employment creation while they face a still faltering global economy with slow and uneven 
recovery. Against this background, there is a pressing need to combine the objectives of green 
growth with the broader targets for economic development in order to achieve a sustainable, 
low-carbon trajectory. Developing countries in particular will have to balance these objectives 
so as not to sacrifice opportunities to expand decent employment opportunities and reduce 
poverty. Designing and implementing eﬀective industrial policies within all countries at all 
levels of development and eﬀective international coordination will be critical for expanding 
green investments and hence facilitating the transformation to a global low-carbon economy. 
The project has resulted in two reports. Volume I focuses on the employment generation 
opportunities of measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions through investments in 
renewable energy and energy eﬃciency, and reviews some of the main considerations with 
respect to advancing eﬀective industrial policies. The report concludes that if most countries 
devote about 1.5 percent of their economy’s GDP to such investments each year, it will be 
possible for the global economy to meet the IPCC’s 20-year intermediate emission reduction 
target, while also enjoying energy security for supporting sustainable growth rates. 
Volume I also shows that there are clear net-gains in employment generation in shifting from 
conventional energy sources to renewable energy sources and enhancing energy eﬃciency. 
These gains have wider societal implications, as decent job opportunities are likely to open 
up for people in the informal sector with low educational attainment levels. Targeted industrial 
policies will need to help these groups realize such opportunities as well as providing the 
training and skill acquisition needed for other positions created through green investments. 
Volume II examines the specific industrial policy measures promoting a low-carbon transition 
in five focus countries, specifically Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and South 
Africa, through a compilation of expert review studies. Across all levels of development, major 
attention is being paid to the threats of climate change and opportunities of pursuing a low-
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carbon development path, and dedicated eﬀorts are presented to operate eﬃcient industrial 
policies to enhance green growth. However, it is clear that the major focus in developing 
countries will need to be on green investments and on creating an enabling environment for 
such investments if the global economy is to eﬀectively combat climate change.    
It is our pleasure to note that the reports are the result of a major eﬀort that has brought 
together the expertise of UNIDO and GGGI as well as experts from around the world. We hope 
that the findings of this project will provide policy makers, other global actors and businesses 
with a bigger picture of the employment generation opportunities of investing in green energy 
sources. At the same time, we hope that the specific attention to industrial policy will inspire 
countries when they formulate their own industrial development strategies and approaches, 
so that they are prepared to make their own eﬀective contributions to the transformation to a 
global clean energy economy.  
Li Yong
Director General of UNIDO
Yvo de Boer
Director General of GGGI
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction
This report, Volume II of the joint research project “Global Green Growth: Clean Energy 
Industrial Investments and Expanding Job Opportunities”, examines the policy framework in 
place in a selected group of countries, specifically Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, the Republic of 
Korea (the ROK) and South Africa, for promoting green industrial growth through clean energy 
investments, and investigates the potential for employment creation of such investments. 
Following the signing of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in 1992 and the increasing voluntary commitments to climate change targets by 
both developed and developing countries in subsequent international environmental treaties, 
the green growth agenda has gained momentum in national policy settings. This has been a 
reaction to the dual challenge of economic growth and climate change becoming more evident. 
On the one hand, the world faces increasing demand for energy from growing populations and 
expanding economic opportunities as people are lifted out of poverty; on the other hand, the 
need for energy implies a growing environmental pressure, which may compromise countries’ 
ability to realize these opportunities (OECD, 2011). Therefore, “transforming economic 
activity to improve eﬃciency and management of natural resources is vital to the stability and 
sustainability of the future economy – a green economy” (GGBP, 2014). The development of 
a global green economy will allow for these objectives to go hand in hand. This involves a 
push towards green structural change, reflecting “the growing importance of shifting towards 
sectors – and within them, activities – that eﬃciently use not only capital and labour but also 
natural resources to minimize environmental impact.” (UNIDO, 2013) 
Crucial to this process is the replacement of fossil fuels with clean energy sources. A green 
industrial growth path will be realized through the promotion of investment and innovation 
that will foster new economic opportunities and secure sustained, green growth. Investments 
in clean energy technologies, in both conventional and new, alternative clean energy sources, 
allow for job creation, and as countries move up the productivity and technology ladder even 
more jobs may be created. This report will contribute to the green growth literature by, for the 
five selected countries, 1) highlighting the importance of green industrial growth to achieve 
inclusive and sustainable industrial development; 2) reviewing policy frameworks in place to 
promote the development of clean industrial sectors; and 3) evaluating how such frameworks 
have contributed to green employment creation as well as examining studies linking clean 
energy investment with jobs.
Figure 1.1 conceptualizes green growth, as it is understood in this report. It illustrates 
interrelations between the three dimensions - environmental, social and economic - of green 
growth. The blue nuanced circles highlight the areas, which are key to the country reviews but 
it also inevitable to touch upon the topics of the grey-tone areas.
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Figure 1.1: Conceptualizing green growth 
Source: UNIDO and GGGI’s adaption from the HoB Initative, www.hobgreeneconomy.org/en/a-better-future-envisioning-and-modeling (accessed 
August 31, 2014) and the Climate and Development Knowledge Network (Low, 2011). 
 
The five countries have been chosen partly because each of them has a major economic and 
environmental impact in a regional and global setting. Another reason is the availability of 
national five-digit input-output (I-O) tables oﬀering detailed information about their economic 
activities. Access to such information is rare, especially in developing countries, and the 
informational value is tremendous as it oﬀers insight to deep economic and industrial structures 
and developments. The I-O tables served as a basis for calculating employment potentials of 
clean energy investment in Volume I. These calculations along with the underlying methodology 
are used as a point of comparison for similar country specific estimates throughout this Volume. 
In total, the five countries make up 11.9 percent of the world’s total greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions (WRI, 2011) and 9.4 percent of the world’s total energy use. Getting the ‘growth 
story’ right in these countries will be crucial for the global eﬀorts to control climate change 
and hence to meet the required targets set by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
who estimate that global emissions will need to fall by about 40 percent by 2030 and by 80 
percent by 2050. As we will learn throughout this report, and which is shortly summarized 
below, important steps have already been made in each of the reviewed countries but much is 
still to be improved. Monitoring their process and learning from their policy experiences oﬀer 
valuable lessons for both developed and developing countries. 
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1.2 Overview 
Country experiences: frameworks for green industrial growth 
This report’s review of country experiences in Brazil (Chapter 2), Germany (Chapter 3), 
Indonesia (Chapter 4), the ROK (Chapter 5) and South Africa (Chapter 6) will illuminate the 
relations described above. In particular, they will oﬀer evidence of rapidly evolving national 
policy frameworks under which green industrial strategies are emerging, of the potential and 
realized benefits harvested from clean energy investments, specifically the positive eﬀect on 
net-employment, and of the progress towards fulfilling national emission target commitments.
The following summarizes key findings and lessons learned from the country reviews:
Brazil has earned a unique role in the context of global climate change due to the significant 
progress it has made in reducing GHG emissions within a short period of time, while still 
expanding its economy and reducing poverty. In the course of 15 years, the country’s total 
emissions dropped by approximately 52 percent, mainly due to forest concessions and the 
expansion of renewable energy sources. Brazil’s current per capita emissions level is half the 
world average of 4.6 mt and therefore already achieved the global target of 2.4 mt necessary 
to reach the IPCC-defined 2030 targets. This has been possible due to the implementation of 
national policy framework that includes a set of industry-specific GHG mitigation and clean 
energy promotion policies with implications for job creation. Literature suggests that a vast 
number of green jobs have been created with the growing renewable energy industry and 
from forest concessions. The study also emphasizes the great prospects for job creation in 
alternative renewable energy, especially in biofuel; an important development as the sector 
historically has been linked to precarious working conditions. Conservative figures for total 
potential job creation amounts to approximately 189,000 between 2012 and 2021. Should 
appropriate technologies and enabling policy instruments be implemented, especially for the 
wind energy sector, the potential increases to more than 429,000 jobs. The case of Brazil serves 
as a good example of environmental stewardship for many developing countries. However, the 
future is not without challenges: hydro energy, historically a significant driver of the greening 
of Brazil’s energy matrix, is under threat to become scarce, and the realization of the enormous 
potential of pre-salt exploitation will increase the weight of the energy sector in the emission 
inventories. Therefore, technological innovations and targeted policy incentives that promote 
the use of unconventional renewable energy will become particularly important if Brazil is to 
stay on track towards a green economy pathway. 
As the only developed country in the report, Germany represents the experience of an economy 
at a high development level with a sophisticated industrial structure, a flexible, dynamic labor 
market and advanced institutional settings. Germany, who previously was an energy intensive 
manufacturer, has made important progress in the transformation of its energy system (the 
so-called “Energiewende”): GHG emissions have been reduced by 25 percent since 1990, 
renewables have reached a share of over 12 percent in gross final energy consumption 
(more than 25 percent in gross electricity consumption), and primary energy consumption 
has dropped by nearly five percent since 2008. These developments have spurred large 
employment generation: While overall employment in green technologies is close to 2 million 
persons, renewables make an important contribution to total employment with around 
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370,000 jobs. Also energy eﬃciency generates employment in Germany though this is more 
diﬃcult to describe quantitatively. In the macroeconomic projections up to 2030, additional 
net employment through clean energy technology lies in the range of 360,000 additional 
jobs compared to today. After 2030 and up to 2050, however, the current pace should be 
maintained to reach at least 80 percent reduction in GHG emissions and a halving of primary 
energy consumption as envisaged by the German government, generating further employment. 
By 2030, a share of renewable energy well in excess of 50 percent in gross should be reached. 
With the measures taken so far and the changes initiated in the frame of the “Energiewende”, 
Germany has made an important head start into the development of a “green economy” which 
has provided detailed knowledge to many other countries in Europe and worldwide on how to 
transform their energy systems. Further, the scope for a country like Germany to further expand 
through the export of technology to other countries is large. These eﬀects have not been 
considered in the country review, but the experiences in Germany’s wind sector demonstrates 
that it is possible to generate even more jobs through exports.
With an outlook of rapid economic growth and industrialization in the years to come, Indonesia 
experiences an immense pressure to quickly introduce an eﬀective policy framework that can 
steer industrial development towards more sustainable practices and encourage a shift from 
fossil fuel dependence towards renewable energy usage. Indonesia has more than 28 million 
people living below the international poverty line, who are extremely vulnerable to climate 
change as agriculture is a vital sector in the Indonesian economy. This poses a significant 
challenge for policymakers to integrate climate change and green industrial growth strategies 
into the country’s development policy framework. In response, the government has adopted 
a 4-track development strategy based on the pillars “pro-growth, pro-poor, pro-job and pro-
environment”. These plans include investment measures to create green jobs and hereby 
alleviate poverty through the advancement of green skill development. An increase in green 
investments is estimated to result in the growth of the biofuels, bioenergy and forestry 
industries, which would be a quick solution for the Indonesian government to resolve the 
problems of energy security and poverty alleviation. It is suggested that more than 8.3 million 
jobs potentially could be created from clean energy investments in Indonesia of which the 
majority are in the agricultural sector. However, as does developing countries in particular, 
Indonesia faces a number of barriers to realize such investments. Two of the most urgent 
challenges are the lack of technological improvements in the industrial sector and the presence 
of high subsidies on electricity and fossil fuels that distorts the energy pricing mechanism in the 
domestic market. The development of clear policies that are coordinated among stakeholders 
will be critical for sustainable low-carbon economic growth in Indonesia. 
Among the emerging economies included in this report, the ROK stands out as an extraordinary 
example of a country that in short time has done significant advancements in achieving its 
2020 target to reduce GHG emissions to 30 percent below its Business As Usual (BAU) level 
through the introduction of various policies that have promoted clean energy investments. 
Since the introduction of Former President Lee Myungbak’s “Low Carbon, Green Growth” as 
a national agenda, the ROK has undertaken concerted eﬀorts to commercialize and support 
the development of new and renewable in the ROK hereby enabling the transition from a fossil 
fuel based economy towards a low carbon, green industrial growth pathway. When examining 
the eﬀects of government spending into the new and renewable energy sector on employment 
generation in the ROK, it is found that such spending has increased employment in the new 
and renewable as well as in other sectors. The initial stage of the ROK’s green industrial growth 
21
eﬀorts has resulted in a number of achievements and established the country en route to a new 
clean energy economy. Nationally developed environmental indicators oﬀer useful guidance 
to policymakers on the impacts of implemented policies. The existing policies to promote 
clean energy investment and pursue green industrial growth will help the ROK adopt and 
expedite the economy-wide transition. Although it is possible that the ROK will reach its 2020 
emission targets, the country’s biggest challenge will be to prepare the economy for the major 
transformation eﬀects as it transitions into a low carbon economy progresses. Some industries 
will feel the economy-wide shock more severely, and worker displacement could exacerbate 
the on-going problem of unemployment in the ROK. 
Finally, the largest emitter in the African region, South Africa has, despite the legacy of apartheid 
and the resulting public debt burden, achieved a remarkably widespread buy-in to the national 
green industry agenda and hence presents a good case study of a South-South developing 
country. The country uses the term “climate change resilient development” as it designs its 
response strategies to climate change, which it acknowledges may undermine many of the 
positive advances made so far in meeting the nation’s development goals and the MDGs. Two 
central elements of the response strategies are: 1) prioritization of mitigation interventions that 
hold the potential of positive job creation due to the concern that decarbonization may have 
financial and potential political implications; and 2) recognition of inherent interdependencies, 
namely the acknowledgment that South Africa’s high level of energy use and emissions 
per capita reflect the country’s exploitation of its comparative advantage in the low cost 
production of electricity. However, the Government of South Africa has so far succeeded in 
managing the country’s competing demands in a manner that has essentially morphed the 
agenda for a low-carbon economy into a positive change agent for economic transformation. A 
range of labor-intensive opportunities may arise from the introduction of appropriate industrial 
policies, particularly for the poor as well as low and low-middle income earners, to participate 
in the proactive energy management measures. Ultimately, financing constraints represent the 
biggest challenge to realize such benefits, regardless of whether all technological requirements 
have been adequately addressed. To reduce the risk of derailing the international community 
must support the transition process.
Policy lessons
The country reviews oﬀer some valuable lessons from green industrial growth policy 
experiences. For many countries, their ecosystem represents a significant resource factor and 
source of national income and local livelihood. The eﬀects of climate change can therefore be 
devastating for such economies. Experiences with forestry in Brazil and Indonesia exemplify 
the importance of a consistent and strong policy framework to enable continuous utilization 
of the rich resources in a sustainable, environmentally responsible manner. Whereas Brazil 
successfully decreased its deforestation rate and correspondingly its GHG emissions, a weak 
legal basis and upcoming governmental changes pose a significant risk for Indonesia’s plans 
to safeguard its forests (Norad, 2014). 
Moreover, poverty alleviation is still a dominating policy objective in most developing countries, 
and as the potential economic benefits of investing in clean energy sectors become evident (in 
terms of output and jobs), the drive to realize these may happen in ways that are environmentally 
unsustainable. Another driver for renewable energy development in many countries is energy 
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security. Both drivers pose a challenge to the policy framework in place to ensure that the 
clean energy industries are developed in an environmental-friendly manner and hereby that 
defined climate change objectives are respected. Recent years’ policy eﬀorts in Brazil serve 
as a positive example; strict forestry concession control, among other policies, has allowed 
for renewable sectors to emerge, ensuring the country one of the cleanest carbon electricity 
matrices in the world, while simultaneously lifting millions out of poverty and satisfying the 
country’s demand for energy.1 On the other hand, more ambitious renewable energy targets 
are voided in South Africa, as the associated costs are considered an inappropriate additional 
domestic burden in light of its costly quest to tackle poverty.  
However, presently available clean energy sources do often not suﬃce to meet current and 
future domestic demand for energy to accommodate economic growth. Energy policy plans 
in place in many countries include incentives that promote fossil fuel production still as such 
sources often carry the economies. Mitigation strategies therefore include plans to encourage 
energy eﬃciency investments and to identify and promote sub-industries in the fossil fuel 
industry that have a potential competitive advantage but are less emission intensive. One 
example is South Africa, who has turned to opportunities in platinum, uranium and copper 
resources as an alternative to coal, which accounts for over 60 percent of the countries GHG 
emissions. In Germany and the ROK, the governments are explicitly targeting the development 
and commercialization of new advanced technologies to lower the costs for the end-users. 
The quest to secure suﬃcient energy supplies through fossil fuel subsidies is a source of 
conflict as it discourages the development of renewable energy sources. This is especially 
a problem in Indonesia, where a sizeable oil subsidy makes electricity-based power plants 
incapable of competing with fossil fuel-based power plants even though a feed-in tariﬀ has 
been eﬀective in the electricity sector since 2002. Other countries have been more successful 
with feed-in tariﬀs and renewable energy subsidies in general. All of the case countries in this 
report have this particular type of subsidy in place and with good results on investments. In the 
ROK, the impacts of a feed-in tariﬀ introduced to compensate the diﬀerence between the cost 
of electricity produced by generators with new and renewable energy and the market price of 
electricity was so eﬀective in bringing renewable energy closer to the market that it was turned 
into a portfolio standards.
In the countries reviewed in this report, the development of clean energy sectors is generally 
explicitly targeted in national policy frameworks and programs. In few cases, polices are 
linked directly to green job creation but the increasing eﬀorts to steer government regulation 
environmental management in a selected sectors have implicitly promoted the generation 
of green jobs in all countries. Germany and the ROK stand out as employment creation has 
been made a clear long-term objective of their comprehensive green industrial growth policy 
frameworks. 
This leads to a final and general policy observation across the country studies. Although all 
countries have dedicated climate change and energy policies promoting the development of 
clean energy industries and energy eﬃciency, in most cases the policies are formulated and 
implemented isolated from the overall economic development framework. It is also clear that 
the relative weight of green industrial growth policies depend on the development stage of the 
1 ‘Brazil Soars in Clean Energy Rankings’, www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/09/brazil-sets-the-pace-in-clean-energy 
(Accessed September 9, 2014).
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economies and the diﬀerent challenges and opportunities they face related to their national 
circumstances (social, economic and political). 
1.3 The Way Forward
Pathways to a global green economy 
Common for all countries in pursuit of a low-carbon growth path is the challenge of mainstreaming 
green industrial growth strategies into national development policies in a way that complements 
and enhances country-specific economic, social and political objectives. Experiences with 
policy planning tell us that there are no one-size-fits-all solutions. Rather, policy design 
will need to take into account country-dependent factors related to settings and quality of 
institutions, stage of economic development, industrial structure and sophistication, natural 
resource constraints, and environmental protection and particular pressure points (OECD, 
2011). While green industrial policies, on their own or as an element of other policy areas, 
can be instrumental to economic growth and job creation, a sound and flexible economic 
environment along with a dynamic labor market will heavily influence the likelihood of a green 
transition taking place and the speed with which it will occur (ibid, 2011).
For countries to succeed they will need to establish quantified and achievable targets for 
GHG emissions, energy consumption and energy composition that allows for sustainable 
economic growth rates. As also exemplified in this report, an increasing number of countries 
have voluntarily committed themselves to nationally defined targets. To evaluate sectoral 
performance and to be able to support sectors with potential for improvement, benchmarking 
and monitoring are important tools when designing targeted policies and instruments. 
Through laws and legislation as well as negotiated agreements between government and 
industry, countries will be able to create an enabling framework for realizing their targets, and 
tackle country-dependent barriers that may hamper the investment-flow needed to finance the 
transition from fossil fuel energy sources to a clean energy matrix as well as green structural 
change in industry and industrial energy eﬃciency improvements. 
Finally, countries must be open to information exchange and international coordination, 
i.e. international collective action, as many of the climate change related problems they are 
exposed to are systemic and involve global public goods and externalities (UNIDO, 2011). 
For developing countries in particular, besides committing to international environmental 
targets and standards, it includes establishing monitoring and reporting mechanisms of 
production and emission data on a detailed industry level, preferably I-O tables, that can 
be used in international comparisons. Especially for developed countries, collective action 
includes pioneering or engaging in international eﬀorts that facilitate technological and 
structural change, transfer of knowledge and knowhow, and either direct or indirect support to 
international finance projects.
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CHAPTER 2: BRAZIL 
2.1 Introduction 
This study examines the relationship between clean energy and employment in Brazil and aims 
to identify the job creation potential through investments in clean industries that contribute 
to the mitigation of GHG emissions. The focus is placed on investments in renewable energy, 
energy eﬃciency and other green activities. 
Brazil has earned a unique role in the context of global climate change due to the significant 
progress it has made in reducing GHG emissions within a short period of time. Between 1995 and 
2010, total emissions dropped by approximately 52 percent, mainly due to forest concessions 
and the expansion of renewable energy sources, especially in biofuels and hydroelectricity. At 
the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, Brazil committed itself to reduce GHG emissions by another 36 
to 39 percent by 2020, compared to BAU projections.
Brazil’s commitment to climate change mitigation has been long-standing, dating back to the Rio 
Earth Summit in 1992, and the country is among the leading voices at international negotiations. 
This pledge is manifested in Brazil’s national policy framework, which has been continuously 
updated to rise up to the twofold challenge of rapidly catching-up economically while controlling 
emission increases. Although never explicitly promulgated as a component of Brazil’s growth 
agenda, the country’s eﬀorts have brought it closer to a low carbon trajectory. The case of 
Brazil therefore serves as a good example of environmental stewardship for many developing 
countries. 
Literature suggests that a vast number of green jobs have been created with the growth of 
the renewable energy industry and the increasing number of forest concessions. Brazil has 
implemented a set of industry-specific GHG mitigation and renewable energy promotion policies, 
which has had implications for job creation. However, there are few studies that establish an 
explicit link between employment and low carbon emissions in Brazil. According to Volume I 
of the UNIDO/GGGI research project “Global Green Growth: Clean Energy Industry Investments 
for Expanding Job Opportunities” more jobs are created within clean energy industries in Brazil 
than in conventional energy industries. The study also points towards immense job creation 
potential in alternative renewable energies, which is of particular political importance in Brazil 
as activities related to ethanol biofuel have historically been linked to precarious working 
conditions.
Section 2.2 of this study presents the development of the renewable energy sector to date. 
Section 2.3 then uncovers the current national policy framework to promote renewable energy 
and to mitigate climate change in the country. Building on this, Section 2.4 explores possible 
GHG scenarios up to 2030 based on the commitments made in Copenhagen. Section 2.5 
explores the job creation potential of investments in a selected range of clean energy industries 
considered particularly prone to growth. Subsequently, based on the trends in the Brazilian 
clean energy industries and their surrounding policy framework, Section 2.6 discusses the 
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methodology and projections in Volume I, in which a future net increase in Brazil’s green 
employment is foreseen. Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 GHG Emissions and Clean Energy
Brazil’s emission profile gives it a unique role in the global eﬀorts to eﬀectively combat climate 
change. The rapid exploitation of the country’s abundant forested areas for the key purposes 
of crops cultivation and grazing has been the driver of Brazil’s economic development. While 
emissions from deforestation has placed Brazil among the six most polluting countries, the 
same process has enabled the rapid development of low carbon agriculture and renewables 
including hydropower and biofuels, leaving Brazil with one of the cleanest energy matrixes in 
the world. This section provides an overview of Brazil’s emission profile and energy matrix, and 
examines the development of the renewable energy industry in the country. 
The special case of Brazil
Brazil’s GHG emission profile diﬀers from that of developed countries, where the majority of 
emissions usually arise from the burning of fossil fuels. Over time, the transformation of the 
agricultural and livestock industries, such as cattle ranching and soybean cultivation, led to 
accelerated deforestation of the Amazon, the world’s largest rainforest, and the Cerrado. In the 
1970s, the forest occupied over 4 million km2, an area equivalent to nearly half of continental 
Europe; however, today, less than 80 percent remains of its original size. According to an 
inventory produced by the Brazilian government (MCTI, 2013), the forestry and other land 
use industry (FOLU) has historically been the main source of GHG emissions. Setting aside 
land use change and the FOLU from GHG emission reporting, Brazil contributes 2.3 percent of 
emissions in the world (World Bank, 2010). Introducing eﬀective solutions for the sustainable 
development of the Amazon forest, which represents a carbon reservoir of 47 billion tons 
(World Bank, 2010 in Philips et al., 2009), have been instrumental in reducing Brazil’s overall 
emission levels. 
The rate of deforestation in the Amazon rose in the 2000s, peaking at 27,772 km2 in 2004, but 
fell sharply to about 4,571 km2 in 2012 (MMA, 2013). Between 2004 and 2012, the reduction of 
deforestation was around 84 percent. 2 During the same period, the country’s economy grew at 
an unprecedented rate, with GDP increasing by more than 300 percent. There is no direct cause-
eﬀect relationship, nevertheless, this shows that it is possible to balance economic growth 
and development with the preservation of the Amazon. However, it is interesting to note that 
the regional GDP is more dependent on timber activities than on national economic activities. 
Figure 2.1 shows the reduction in deforestation resulting from satellite control systems, the 
Amazonian Deforestation Calculation Programme (Programa de Cálculo do Desflorestamento 
da Amazônia) and the Real Time System for Detection of Deforestation, accompanied by more 
intensive inspections by environmental agencies.
2 Deforestation in the Amazon region is not homogenous and varies in the diﬀerent parts of the region and over time.
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Figure 2.1: Annual deforestation in Brazil, 1988-2012
Source: Author’s calculations based on MMA (2013) and World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries/BR?display=graph.
Brazil’s GHG emission level dropped to approximately 72 percent between 1995 and 2010, 
mainly reflecting the substantial eﬀorts to cope with emissions from deforestation (MCIT, 2013). 
Figure 2.2 below illustrates that the energy industry and the farming and livestock industry, 
a subsector of the agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) sector, are the leading 
economic activities in the inventory. 3 By 2010, the share of these two first categories in terms 
of total GHG emissions had increased from 9 percent to 32 percent and from 13 percent to 35 
percent, respectively. At the same time, emissions from the FOLU industry remarkably dropped 
from 75 percent to 22 percent. Emission levels from industrial processing and waste treatment 
have increased sharply. This compositional change in Brazil’s emission profile reflects a shift 
towards that of developed nations. 
Figure 2.2: GHG emissions in Brazil, 1990-2010 
Source: Author’s calculations based on MCTI (2013).
3 AFOLU is consistent with the definition of Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) (Penman et al., 2003).
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In 1995, CO2 emissions largely dominated total GHG emissions, with the FOLU industry’s share being the 
largest (87 percent), followed by the energy industry’s (9 percent). The use of fertilizers, sugar cane burning, 
fossil fuel-powered agricultural equipment and beef cattle digestive processes belong to the key drivers 
of such emissions (ESMAP, 2010). Table 2.1 summarizes the composition of GHG emissions in Brazil’s key 
industries and sectors in 2000 and 2010. In this period, the energy industry’s emissions level surpassed 
that of the FOLU industry.   
Table 2.1: Brazil’s GHG emissions profile, by sector or industry, 2000 and 2010 
GHG emissions Share of CO2 emissions to GHG emissions
Change GHG 
emissions
Contribution to sectoral 
GHG reduction
(TgCO2eq) (Percentage) (Percentage) (TgCO2eq)
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000-2010 2000-2010
Land use and 
forestry 1,324.4 279,2 63.6 22.4 -78.9 -1.045.20
Farming and 
livestock 347,9 437,2 16.7 35.1 25.7 89.30
Energy 301,1 399,3 14.5 32.0 32. 98.20
Industrial 
processes 71,7 82,1 3.4 6.6 14.5 10.40
Waste treatment 38,6 48,7 1.9 3.9 26.2 10.10
Total (Tg) 2,083.70 1,246.5 100.0 100.0 -40.2 -837.20
Source: Author’s calculations based on MCTI (2013).
 
In contrast to overall GHG emissions, non-CO2 emissions increased between 2000 and 2010, 
although not substantially. In 2010, the farming and livestock industry was responsible for 78.2 
percent of total CH4 emissions, followed by the FOLU industry, with 5.8 percent, and emissions 
from the waste treatment industry with 12.5 percent. The two most important sub-sectors were 
enteric fermentation of livestock (63 percent) and conversion of forests for other uses in the 
Amazonian biome (12 percent). The agricultural and livestock industry was responsible for 
86.3 percent of total N2O emissions. Within this subsector, emissions from agricultural soils 
accounted for 84 percent, including, amongst others, emissions from animals in pasturage, 
which accounted for 40 percent of the total (MCTI, 2010). 
The emission factors used in the Brazilian inventories proposed by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to a great extent reflect the conditions of developed countries 
with temperate climate, and are not necessarily suitable for Brazil’s reality. Hence, Brazilian 
technicians working on the National Communication to the UNFCCC try to use national emission 
factors derived from sectoral research studies.
Despite the tremendous decline in Brazil’s carbon footprint, it is still the sixth largest emitter 
in the world. The per capita carbon intensities for Brazil’s overall economy and energy sector 
are more than one-fifth of the OECD average (World Bank, 2014). Historically, large investments 
have contributed to keeping Brazil’s energy matrix relatively clean, without which total 
emissions would have been 17 percent higher (World Bank, 2010).  
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Even with the accommodation of sub-sectors and sectors on account of the reduction of the 
share of AFOLU, it is clear that the tremendous weight of increased emissions is concentrated 
in the use of energy despite the renewable energy component. 
Renewable energy influx
Brazil’s renewable energy industry has undergone an unprecedented development over 
the past decades, which has given the country a relative clean energy matrix in a global 
comparison. Between 2004 and 2012, renewable energy investments increased with an annual 
rate of 34 percent (compound annual growth rate), 8 percentage points more than the world 
total (Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre and BNEF, 2013). In 2012, renewable energy made up 47.2 
percent of Brazil’s total energy mix (Figure 2.3). According to the Brazilian Energy Balance (EPE, 
2013), renewable energy sources consisted of 17 percent sugar cane ethanol, 14 percent hydro 
energy and 5 percent from other renewable energy. Petroleum and natural gas constituted the 
other key industries with a share of 42 percent and 10 percent, respectively. 
Renewable energy investments peaked in 2008 at $12.5 billion and fell gradually to $5.4 
billion in 2012 due to the international economic crisis. A considerable part of the inversion 
came from external sources. Due to expanding oil and gas production and rapid GDP growth in 
recent years, a tendency for increased usage of non-renewable energy sources is observable. 
Investors have become increasingly interested in massive pre-salt areas from the Libra deep-
sea oil field, which was discovered in 2007 and potentially is one of largest pre-salt reserves 
in the world. In 2012, 91 percent of all oil production in the country was oﬀ-shore (EIA, 2011). 
Figure 2.3: Brazil. Share of renewable energy in domestic energy supply, 2003-2012
Source: Author’s presentation based on EPE (2013).
Nevertheless, renewable energy sectors on the edge of becoming competitive have continued 
to grow. Wind power, for example, increased by 86.7 percent within just a year, with electricity 
production reaching 5,050 GWh in 2012 (EPE, 2013). Domestic electricity generation is 
predominantly produced by renewable energy sources (Figure 2.4). In 2012, 84.5 percent of 
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total electricity supply originated from renewable energy, with hydropower and biomass being 
the main sources. The contribution of renewable energy, especially hydropower, in Brazil’s 
electricity matrix is a special case among global experiences. If the Brazilian reservoirs are full 
and the tributary rivers dry up, the stored energy will be equivalent to approximately six months 
of the load of the national grid.4 In comparison, the world’s and the OECD’s share of renewable 
energy in the electricity matrix was 19.4 percent and 17.7 percent in 2010, respectively (IEA, 
2012b).  
Figure 2.4: Domestic electricity supply in Brazil, 2012
Source: Author’s calculations based on EPE (2013).
The architecture of Brazil’s electricity system influences the conditions of analysis of any type 
of renewable energy source, since its coherence revolves around the management of energy 
reserves. Other renewable energy sources as well as energy eﬃciency have been gaining 
ground in Brazil due to the complementary role they can play with regard to variations in hydric 
tributaries. The more complementary they are, the greater the capacity they have to aggregate 
energy to the system. 
As a result, the growth and reliability of alternative renewable energy sources has become 
crucial and qualified human labour has become a fundamental variable for the expansion and 
consolidation of these sectors in Brazil. The creation of posts for trained professionals and 
the maintenance of quality standards of services to consolidate ongoing innovation with the 
introduction of these alternative renewable energy sources and energy eﬃciency in Brazil’s 
electricity matrix is a central element in their long-term sustainability. The perspectives for an 
increase in the use of alternative renewable energy sources in Brazil are related to questions of 
employment creation and qualification as well as to risks associated with the lack of specialized 
labour. 
The remainder of this paper focuses on the national policy framework that has fostered the 
green transition in Brazil and explores the opportunities for future job creation in several 
renewable energy sectors.   
4 ‘O que é o SIN - Sistema Interligado Nacional’, http://www.ons.org.br/conheca_sistema/o_que_e_sin.aspx (Accessed 7 September, 2014). 
■ Hydro¹ 76,75%
■ Wind 0,90%
■ Biomass2 6,81%
■ Oil Products 3,31%
■ Natural Gas 7,92%
■ Coal and Coal Products3 1,60%
■ Nuclear 2,71%
Notes: 1) Includes electricity imports; 2) Includes firewood, 
sugarcane bagasse, black-liquor and other primary sources;
3) Includes coke oven gas.
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2.3 Policy Framework for Climate Change and Renewable Energy
As the largest tropical country in the world, Brazil is presented with a unique set of opportunities 
and challenges associated with its economic development and GHG emissions. Even though 
Brazil - due to prudent policy planning - has achieved a competitive clean energy matrix in 
global comparison, its emission level is still unsustainably high. Section 2.2 indicated that 
renewable energy is losing weight in the overall energy balance. This section explores the 
government’s historical eﬀorts to create a green policy landscape in Brazil and provides an 
overview of its commitments to reduce GHG emissions.
Brazil’s long-standing commitment to climate change
In 1992, Brazil demonstrated its commitment to fight climate change when it hosted the Rio Earth 
Summit and became a signatory of the resulting agreement, the UNFCCC, and subsequently, 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
With the 2008 National Plan on Climate Change (approved in 2009), Brazil implemented a 
national framework to guide the country’s eﬀorts of reducing carbon emissions and promoting 
green growth. The plan was approved by Presidential Decree and was presented to the 
international community during the COP14 in Poland. The National Plan on Climate Change 
regulates the integration and harmonization of public policies on climate change in Brazil. 
Even without quantified emission reduction obligations under the UNFCCC, Brazil is seeking to 
find a path where the primary objectives are the eﬀectiveness of its eﬀorts to mitigate climate 
change and the guaranteed welfare of its citizens. In the National Plan on Climate Change, 
the Government of Brazil expressed the following on the country’s mitigation and adaptation 
eﬀorts:   
 “…Brazil’s eﬀorts are based on the commitment to reduce social inequality and to 
increase income by seeking an economic dynamic with a low emissions trajectory, not 
repeating the pattern and the standards of the countries that have already industrialized. 
There are two challenges: the diﬃcult task of significantly reducing emissions from land 
use change and the requirement of continuously increasing eﬃciency in the use of the 
country’s natural resources.”
The National Plan on Climate Change seeks to maintain a high share of renewable energy 
in the energy matrix, preserving Brazil’s spotlight position on this industry and proposing 
an increase in the number of energy eﬃciency programs to reduce GHG emissions and to 
foster a sustainable increase in the share of biofuels in the national transportation system. 
It furthermore aims to achieve a sustained reduction of deforestation in all biomes until zero 
illegal deforestation is reached.
In 2009, the Brazilian Congress (Law 12.187) approved the National Climate Change Policy 
(Política Nacional de Mudança Climática), which had been guided by the 1st National 
Communication to the UNFCCC and the questions discussed by the Brazilian Forum of 
Climate Change. The National Climate Change Policy was presented at COP15 in Copenhagen, 
representing Brazil’s voluntary commitment conveyed by the government at the conference. 
Article 12 of the National Climate Change Policy, stipulating Brazil’s voluntary commitment to 
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reduce projected GHG emissions by 36.1-38.9 percent below the 2005 BAU projected emissions 
level of 3,236 MtCO2e in 2020 (corresponding to 1,168 to 1,259 MtCO2e), was reported as part 
of Brazil’s 2nd National Communication to the UNFCCC in 2010. Figure 2.5 compares Brazil’s 
emission targets with actual historical developments and the BAU projections. 
Figure 2.5: GHG emissions, BAU and target levels in Brazil, 1990-2025 
Source: Author’s presentation based on MCTI (2013) and Government of Brazil (2010).
Note: The value for 2025 is added by the author and estimated based on the 2005 BAU rate. 
The 2020 ceiling of 3,236 MtCO2e was based on the 2005 GHG emission inventories, and the law 
furthermore introduced more specific mitigation commitments, including annual reductions 
on account of a reduction in total deforestation (668 MtCO2e), an increase in energy eﬃciency 
(12-15 MtCO2e), increased usage of biofuels (48-60 MtCO2e), and an increase in energy supply 
through hydropower (79-99 MtCO2e) and alternative energy sources (26-33 MtCO2e) (Gebara 
and Thuault, 2013). 
Law 12.187 stipulates the principles, objectives and guidelines to manage GHG emissions 
and requested a decree to be drafted stipulating the responsibility of diﬀerent industries 
in the economy in reducing these emissions. In 2010, the government approved Decree 
7.390 to regulate the National Climate Change Policy and streamline mitigation targets into 
existing industrial plans. Subsequently, mitigation plans for other industries were formulated 
and more are yet to come; each plan must, among other things, define the 2020 targets for 
emission reductions in three-year intervals. 5 Table 2.2 depicts how the 2020 targets were to be 
distributed across industries according to the decree.
5 The plans must also include “specific actions to be implemented; indicators for monitoring and evaluation; proposed regulatory tools and incentives 
for implementation; and cost benefit analyses of the mitigation plans’ impact on sectoral competitiveness” (King et al., 2012 via Rovere, 2011).
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Table 2.2: Brazil. Projections for 2020 and sector-specific GHG reduction estimates 
according to Decree 7.390
Sector
2020 
projectionsa 
(MtCO2e)
Policy actions
GHG 
reductionsb 
(percent)
Land use, land 
use change, 
and forestry 
1,404
80 percent reduction in the annual rates of deforestation 
in the Amazon compared to the average between 1996 
to 2005; 40 percent reduction in the annual rates of 
deforestation in the cerrado biome compared to the average 
between 1999 and 2008.
24.8
Energy 868
Expansion of hydroelectric supply; expansion of alternative 
renewable energy sources, notably wind farms, small 
hydropower and bioelectricity; increased supply of biofuels; 
improved energy eﬃciency.
5.3-7.7
Agriculture 730
Recovery of 15 million hectares of degraded pastures; 
greater use of integrated crop-livestock-forest practices on 4 
million hectares; expansion of the practice of direct planting 
on 8 million hectares; adoption of biological nitrogen 
fixation on 5.5 million hectares of cultivated land, replacing 
the use of nitrogen fertilizers; growth of forest plantations 
on 3 million hectares; development of technologies for 
treatment of 4.4 million m
3 of animal waste.
5.0-6.0
Industrial 
processes 
and waste
234
Institutionalize carbon management in industry; promote 
increased recycling and the use of co-products; promote 
energy eﬃciency and cogeneration in industry; strengthen 
emissions reduction from voluntary associations and 
private sector companies; facilitate the development and 
dissemination of sustainable technologies.
0.3-0.4
Source: Adapted from Gebara and Thuault (2013).
Notes: a) Without implementation of actions; b) From baseline.
 
Article 2 of the Law clearly denotes that the revision of the National Plan on Climate Change and 
the preparation of a set of industrial plans were intended to form the basis of the upcoming third 
Brazilian National Communication to the UNFCCC. The sector-based plans applicable as of 2013 
are: I) Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Amazon (PPCDAm); II) 
Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation and Fire in the Cerrado (PPCerrado); 
III) Ten-Year Energy Expansion Plan; IV) Plan for Low Carbon Agriculture (ABC Plan); V) Sectorial 
Plan for Mitigation of Climate Change for the Consolidation of an Economy of Low Carbon in the 
Manufacturing Industry; V) Plan for Low Carbon Mining; VI) Sectoral Plan for Transportation and 
Urban Mobility for the Mitigation of Climate Change; VII) Health Sector Plan for Mitigation and 
Adaptation to Climate Change; and VIII) Plan for Reducing Emissions from the Steel Industry. 
Plans such as the PPCDAm were instrumental in connecting and promoting synergies between 
sector-based public policies such as agriculture, agrarian reform, biodiversity or industry, with 
the aim of promoting economic development yet reducing deforestation. A 2013 study by the 
Climate Policy Initiative indicates that Brazil’s successful end to deforestation is attributable to 
command-and-control type policies such as PPCDAm. 
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Renewable energy policies
Several incentive policies to promote the use of alternative renewable energy sources exist, 
such as reductions in transmission fees. Among the most notable incentives is the Programme 
of Incentives for Alternative Sources of Electrical Energy (PROINFA or Programa Brasileiro de 
Incentivo às Fontes Alternativas de Energia Elétrica), established by Law 10.438 in 2002, with 
the purpose of encouraging the development of renewable energy and raising the share of 
renewable energy in the primary consumption matrix to 10 percent by 2020 (ABB, 2011; EPE, 
2011; Procel Info, 2006). PROINFA is an important example of feed-in tariﬀs. Its costs are 
divided among all final consumers who are part of the national grid, in proportion to individual 
consumption, excluding some groups of low income consumers, through a special additional 
tariﬀ in accordance with the regulations stipulated by the National Electricity Agency (ANEEL or 
Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica).
Through this mechanism, a specific amount is included in the price paid by the consumer to 
promote the inclusion of alternative renewable energy sources of energy into the country’s 
energy matrix. Feed-in tariﬀs allow for the inclusion of such sources without introducing a 
specific tax or subsidy. In the more modern feed-in systems, tariﬀs are diﬀerentiated based 
on technology. Tariﬀs for new projects can also be regularly revised and varied in accordance 
with the objectives established at the time. These mechanisms should also take research and 
development (R&D) and staﬀ training into account to ensure an appropriate development of 
the typology of alternative renewable energy sources for a tropical country like Brazil.
As noted in Section 2.2, hydro energy makes up the bulk of renewable energy in Brazil. There 
are, however, environmental limitations to the construction of hydroelectric plants that can 
no longer rely on reservoirs covering large areas, a unique feature of the Brazilian system. 
Furthermore, conditions not yet considered may alter the feasibility of these sources, such as 
the simple consideration of the relationship of complementarity between alternative renewable 
energy sources and conventional ones, leading to comparative advantages without incentive 
policies. The large-scale dams have had social and environmental impacts, and disapproval of 
them has been very widespread due to the extensive exploitation of forested and indigenous 
areas. Incentives to promote alternative renewable energy sources have therefore become 
increasingly important. 
In general, Brazil is considered to have a “very well well-structured environmental legislation 
and institutional mechanisms to implement” a transition to a low-carbon economy (Caruso, 
2010, p. 40). Both the National Climate Change Policy and National Plan on Climate Change have 
been instrumental in Brazil’s mitigation and adaptation eﬀorts to date, and the government’s 
ongoing sectoral plans and policies will continue to contribute to the country’s green policy 
platform. Climate change has also been integrated into Brazil’s overall economic development 
framework with the second phase of the 2011-2014 Brazil’s Growth Acceleration Programme, 
a substantial infrastructure investment program combining social development and energy 
aspects.6
6 ‘Brazil Announces Phase Two of the Growth Acceleration Program’, http://blogs.worldbank.org/growth/brazil-announces-phase-two-growth-
acceleration-program (Accessed June, 2014).  
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2.4 Prospects and Challenges towards a Green Economy
This section discusses Brazil’s potential for green growth development given the country’s 
emissions, energy supply and policy framework trends. By means of a scenario analysis, 
the section also explores the direction certain sectors and technologies may take and their 
mitigation potential.  
The policy challenge
Despite its extraordinary story on emission reduction and its powerhouse position within renewable 
energy, Brazil still has a long way to go to decouple natural resource use and environmental 
impacts from economic growth. When excluding the FOLU sector, the country’s emission level has 
in fact increased over the past 15 years and emissions per capita remain comparably poor at the 
international level. 
One pressing question is whether the current policy framework for energy and climate change 
will create an enabling environment in Brazil for the realization of a low carbon economy, given 
the expectation of a surge in economic progress, the exploration of fossil fuels and the continued 
growth of a population, which is becoming increasingly consumerist. Annual consumer demand 
is expected to grow by 4.9 percent in the coming decade (Cote and Langevin, 2013). Hence, 
Brazil will need to expand its energy generation to accommodate this development and enable 
economic growth.
Future policy design will need to take the contradictory imperatives Brazil faces on its pathway 
towards green growth into account (Allen, Travers and Travers, 2011); several of Brazil’s most 
important and fastest growing industries, particularly farming and livestock and the renewable 
energy industry, are highly dependent on land use, and legal restrictions on cultivation, 
grazing and land clearing therefore pose a challenge. At the same time, the climate eﬀects 
of continued deforestation associated with the growth of these industries, such as changing 
rainfall patterns and extended periods of drought, can severely damage the ecosystem and 
harm the same industries’ economic sustainability.7 Changing to clean energy sources will be 
key to preventing further environmental degradation and to ensure the Brazilian economy’s 
sustainability. It is therefore argued that “the potential for divergence between “greenness” 
and “growth” in the Brazilian case is particularly great” (Allen, Travers and Travers, 2011, p.3).
The Brazilian energy industry’s central planning instruments are based on the mid-term 
(2020/2021) Ten Year Energy Plan PDE 2021 and the 2030 National Energy Plan PNE 2030. Brazil 
expects its energy demand to rise by more than 60 percent over the next decade. To accommodate 
such growth, the government plans to double energy supply by 2030. The Brazilian government 
plans investments of $121 billion on energy sources in the years up to 2021, of which $44.5 
will be invested in renewable energy, $60.7 in large hydro plants and $15.8 billion in fossil 
fuel projects.8 A substantial part of the energy expansion is expected to come from Brazil’s 
7 In this context, it is important to further underline the climate change risks Brazil faces. The country has already felt the economic and social consequences 
of droughts in years not associated with El Niño. For example, in 2001, an energy crisis resulting from a 40 percent rainfall deficit isolated local communities 
and suspended a vast line of economic activities in large parts of the country (Marengo, 2009; Marengo et al., 2011 via King et al., 2012). Less water and 
smaller crop yields following more frequent periods of droughts could severely aﬀect the capacity to generate hydroelectricity and biofuels - the main sources 
of renewable energy in Brazil (ESMAP, 2010).
8 Brazil to Triple Renewable Energy by 2020 (Focus on Wind), http://cleantechnica.com/2011/06/09/brazil-to-triple-renewable-energy-by-2020-
focus-on-wind/ (Accessed July 2014). 
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oﬀshore, pre-salt basins, which hold the world’s largest oil discoveries in recent years. As of 
January 2013, Brazil allegedly had 13 billion barrels of proven oil reserves,9 and production 
is expected to reach over 5 million bbl/d by 2021 (EIA, 2013). The share of fossil fuels in the 
energy matrix is estimated to reach 14 percent by 2030 (EPE, 2011; McKinsey & Company, 2009). 
67 percent of the country’s energy demand will be met by hydroelectricity in 2030, an increase 
that is considered “essential if domestic electricity generation is to meet growing demand over 
the coming decades” (IEA, 2006). Hydropower will, nevertheless, gradually lose weight against 
other renewable energy sources, including biomass, small-scale hydro-plants and wind (EPE, 
2011).
These trends are likely to pose a threat to Brazil’s GHG emissions. First, emissions from the 
expanding energy sector are expected to increase to 868 MtCO2e by 2020 (King et al., 2012). At 
the same time, investments in the expansion of energy supply, be it from hydroelectric dams 
or sugar cane-derived ethanol and other biofuels implies a greater burden for land, which in 
turn could result in deforestation causing higher emissions (Allen, Travers and Travers, 2011). 
To estimate the 2020 GHG emissions level for the energy sector under Decree 7.390, various 
hypotheses were considered for the energy matrix under a scenario in which the implementation 
of the GHG emission reduction measures included in the Ten-Year Energy Expansion Plan (Plano 
Decenal de Expansão de Energia) were not realized. The Ten-Year Energy Expansion Plan can be 
considered a low carbon scenario that includes policy initiatives aiming to mitigate emissions. 
Table 2.3 shows the emission levels for the energy industry’s 2020 emission projections (see 
also Table 2.2), the Scenario 2020 and the policy-influenced Ten-Year Energy Expansion Plan 
Scenario results, as well as the emission increase that would occur if no emission reduction 
measures were implemented. 
Table 2.3: Scenarios for GHG emissions in the Brazilian energy industry 
Scenario GHG emission projections 
Percentage of 
Scenario 2020 
Ten-Year Energy Expansion Plan Scenario 634 MtCO2eq 73%
Emission increase (without mitigation actions of the Ten-Year Energy 
Expansion Plan) 234 MtCO2eq 27%
Scenario 2020 868 MtCO2eq 100%
Source: Author’s presentation based on EPE (2010) and Government of Brazil (2010).
 
The scenarios suggest that only 27 percent of the estimated emissions increase in the energy 
industry will be prevented insofar as no other mitigation measures are undertaken. On the 
other hand, up to 73 percent of the estimated emissions increase can be partially reduced if 
the mitigation measures under the Ten-Year Energy Expansion Plan Scenario are implemented. 
Hence, in order for Brazil to meet its National Climate Change Policy emission targets, it will be 
crucial for the government to identify a catalog of policy initiatives and actions that will continue to 
reduce emissions in the AFOLU sector, especially by fighting deforestation, and at the same time 
keep emissions from the growing energy industry in check as stipulated in the Ten-Year Energy 
Expansion Plan. 
9 According to the EIA (2013), “Brazil’s pre-salt announcements immediately transformed the nature and focus of Brazil’s oil sector. The potential 
impact of the discoveries upon world oil markets is vast. However, considerable challenges still must be overcome to produce these reserves.”
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Brazil’s emissions reduction potential
The Comparative Study of Three Greenhouse Gas Emission Scenarios in Brazil and a Cost Benefit 
Analysis prepared for the Ministry of the Environment and the United Nations Development 
Programme (La Rovere et al., 2011) is of particular relevance. The study develops three scenarios 
assuming an annual growth in GDP of 5 percent until 2020, and 4 percent in the period 2021 to 
2030. It also assumes an increase in population to 207.7 million by 2020 and 216.8 million by 
2030. Capturing the above-discussed tendencies in the energy mix, the study expects a drop in 
emissions by 2020 due to a decrease in deforestation but increased deforestation post-2020 
as changes in land use policy loses its relative importance. In other words, Brazil’s emissions 
profile becomes very similar to that of developed countries, implying that the energy industry 
and industrial processes will dominate the emission inventories from 2020 onwards. Figure 2.6 
illustrates the three scenarios defined in the study. 
Scenario A is the baseline case, which excludes any expansion of generation capacities based 
on renewable energy sources as of 2010 (including large hydroelectric plants). For Scenario 
B, the composition of energy sources until 2020 was taken from the Ten-Year Energy Plan. 
The composition of energy sources for the period after 2020 was based on the developments 
outlined in the 2030 National Energy Plan. Scenario C was constructed by adding further 
measures to Scenario B. An expansion of wind power was, for example, considered suﬃcient 
to substitute the increase in coal-fuelled generation from Scenario B or an additional energy 
eﬃciency program was forecasted as saving more energy. Figure 2.6 illustrates how the 
measures introduced under Scenario B would lead to zero-growth in emissions between 2015-
2025, after which emissions would start to increase again, albeit at a lower rate than under 
Scenario A. Scenario C, on the other hand, declines in emissions would be achieved throughout 
the entire period 2015-2030. 
Figure 2.6: Brazil. Mitigation scenarios study, 2005-2030 
Source: Author’s presentation based on data from 2005 to 2010 from MCTI (2013); scenarios between 2010 and 2030 are taken from La Rovere et al. (2010).
La Rovere et al. (2010) find that the industries with the highest potential for growth in the 
2020s are energy, industrial processes and agriculture (a conclusion supported by a 2010 
World Bank study, which suggests that GHG emissions could be cut by up to 37 percent by 
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2030 without compromising social and economic growth aspects). The mitigation possibilities 
in these industries are reflected in Scenarios B and C, insofar as the adopted premises are 
verified on the abatement costs calculation (see Figure 2.7 below).  
Figure 2.7 compares the relative abatement costs of Scenario B and Scenario A. The curve shows 
the set of emission reduction measures that are possible with the technologies available under 
Scenario B as compared with Scenario A (the BAU case), and reveals the relative importance 
of clean sectors. The width of the bars signifies the (relative) potential emission reduction 
in MtCO2eq per year, while the height of the bars denotes the costs (in dollars) associated 
with avoiding one ton of emissions. The abatement cost in this case refers to the additional 
cost to society when implementing measures to reduce emissions in comparison to the cost 
of the activity in Scenario A. The abatement cost of biofuel, for example, hinges on the extra 
generation cost exceeding the average energy generation cost in Scenario A, plus the amount 
of emissions prevented with every unit of energy produced. Figure 2.7 clearly shows that there 
is a considerable margin for reduction in many industries, which may reach less than half of 
the baseline scenario. 
Figure 2.7: Brazil. Marginal abatement cost curve, Scenario B versus Scenario A, 2011-2030 
Source: La Rovere et al. (2010).
Notes: 1. Hydroelectricity, 2. Energy eﬃciency, 3. Use of recycled material (cement), 4. Cement, 5. Energy eﬃciency (electricity), 6. Methane destruction 
in landfills, 7. Methane destruction in sewage treatment plants, 8. Biological fixation in nitrogen, 9. Zeo tillage, 10. Pasture recovery, 11. Crop-livestock 
integration, 12. Increased use of ethanol, 13. Reduction of deforestation (Amazon); 14. Reduction of deforestation (Cerrado); 15. Increased use of 
charcoal in metallurgy; 16. Expansion of planted forests; 17. Increased use of biodiesel.
 
The study by La Rovere et al. (2010) provides valuable reference on mitigation measures in 
specific industries, although it does not deal with specific economic activities. Renewable 
energy assumes an important position, both in terms of hydroelectricity and other alternatives. 
Activities to conserve the forest and rationalize livestock raising stand out as major drivers 
of emissions mitigation and employment creation, since they are labor intensive activities. 
In addition, planted or standing forests can be a source of biomass for the generation of 
energy as can animal waste from livestock raising, considering the emissions avoided when 
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manufacturing synthetic fertilizers, which can be replaced by bio-fertilizers derived from 
confined cattle. One compelling strategy therefore is the promotion of innovative techniques 
on livestock and adequate forestry use by exploiting timber and non-timber products, energy 
from biomass waste, tourism and biodiversity. Unconventional renewable energy such as solar 
and wind power could also be used to reduce carbon dioxide emissions after 2020. 
Brazil was listed in Ernst & Young’s 2014 issue of Attractiveness Index for Renewable Energy 
Investments, ranking number 12 in the world. Since 2010, Brazil has held five renewable energy 
auctions, including a first auction exclusively for solar energy, which resulted in six projects 
totaling 123 megawatts (MW) at an average of $96 per megawatt-hour (MWh). In November 2013, 
39 wind projects were approved totaling 830 MW and the auction secured over 2.3 gigawatts 
(GW) at an average cost of $51 per MWh. In total, auctions have attracted 35 GW of proposals in 
renewable energy. According to the Brazilian government, the energy matrix will be more or less 
unchanged by 2021 (Cote and Langevin, 2013). If the hydro and biofuel potentials are realized, 
the energy matrix can either maintain the percentile of renewable energy or even increase it.
Figure 2.7 shows that energy eﬃciency also represents an area with potential. In the Brazilian 
inventories, energy eﬃciency refers to various types of actions to reduce the energy required 
to meet the demands of society in the form of light, heat/cold, switching equipment on/oﬀ, 
transport and for use in processes. Energy eﬃciency actions entail technological modifications 
or improvements in each energetic chain and can also result in better organization, conservation 
and administration by the group that are part of these chains (EPE, 2012a,b). In the 2030 
National Energy Plan, an energy eﬃciency gain through autonomous progress was established 
in demand projections. In the case of the electricity industry by 2030, an additional target of 5 
percent from induced progress was included in addition to a reduction of 5 percent in demand, 
a result of autonomous progress. Energy eﬃciency is obviously considered an investment 
option to meet energy demands. 10
Based on the above identification of industries with noteworthy potential for emission mitigation 
and green job creation, the next section will take a closer look at such opportunities in specific 
renewable energy and green activity sub-industries. 
2.5 Job Creation through Investments in Renewable Energy  
and Green Economy Activities  
Brazil has demonstrated that it has undertaken considerable eﬀorts to build an enabling 
policy framework for the transition to a low carbon economy. The industrial plans described 
in Section 2.3 aﬃrm technology and investment-inducing incentives in Brazil’s key industries, 
which have the potential to create green jobs. This section explores the growth opportunities 
in selected renewable energy and green economy industries in Brazil. More specifically, 
focus is placed on wind and photovoltaic (PV) energy, solar heating and biomass. Each of the 
industries presented entail certain specificities and new innovative policy arrangements are 
10 Energy eﬃciency gains are achieved in one of two ways: either through autonomous progress or through induced progress. Autonomous 
is understood as resulting from market initiatives without any interference from public policies, in other words, through the natural replacement 
of equipment by similar and more eﬃcient or new equipment, which produce the same service in a more eﬃcient manner. Induced progress is 
understood as requiring stimuli through public policies. The country thus has a set of opportunities to meet social needs through energy eﬃciency 
programs, which create new employment positions.
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introduced to encourage activities that have a direct impact on GHG emissions. The industries 
were chosen based on criteria of relevance and medium-term prospects for job creation. 
Wind
Although the generation of wind energy still constitutes less than 2 percent of Brazil’s electricity 
matrix, it has in recent years emerged as the fastest growing source of power generation in the 
country and has the potential to become a critical market for the international wind power 
industry (GWEC and ABEEolica, 2011). By 2020, the wind energy component is expected to 
make up 7 percent of the electricity matrix (EPE, 2011). The rapid expansion of wind farms 
is possible due to Brazil’s vast natural resource endowments (large areas of land with a low 
population density and a 9,600 km long coastline), well-designed policies targeting the 
wind energy industry and lower project costs on account of an oversupply of wind turbines 
on the international market (IRENA and GWEC, 2012). The targeted capacity goal of 16 GW 
set by the Ten Year Energy Plan for the industry is expected to be exceeded by 4 GW or more 
(Brazil Windpower, 2014). Brazil’s total wind energy potential is estimated at 143 GW, with the 
possibility of increasing it by well over 300 GW by using better turbine technology (IRENA and 
GWEC, 2012). 
The import index in the industry is still high, primarily due to components with a high 
technological value, which has made Brazil an attractive consumer market for international 
suppliers of wind power machinery and equipment. To become a net exporter of raw materials 
for the industry, it will be necessary for Brazil to achieve further advancements in technology 
within the industry. This entails the necessity and opportunity to foster the development of 
national skills, especially in the industry’s productive chain.
Brazil’s wind power industry began developing in 2002 with the implementation of the PROINFA 
program (see Section 2.3). This feed-in tariﬀ program involved 54 wind farms with a total capacity 
of 1.4 GW and an average price of $170 per MWh. At the time, there was no competition in the man-
ufacturing of Brazilian wind turbines due to the requirement for a high level of component nation-
alization (60 percent) and a devalued currency, which prevented the entrance of these farms into 
commercial operation (scheduled for 2012). Only when the government lifted the nationalization 
requirement and began organizing project-specific contract auctions after 2009 for new energy 
exclusively did wind power become attractive to investors, who started competing with conven-
tional sources of electric energy (CGEE, 2013). The power plants auctioned in 2009 had added 
1,555.5 MW to the system by the end of 2012.11 If we consider all wind farms that commenced their 
operations in 2012, the total value generated increases to more than 1,800 MW (ANEEL, 2012). 12 
Figure 2.8 shows the auction results for wind energy prices between 2009 and 2011. Reductions 
in the average investment cost from $2,334 to 2,223 per kW installed over the period led to a 
drop in the energy prices negotiated in the auctions. According to the Brazilian Windpower 
Association, the costs of building a wind power plant decreased by 70 percent between 2004 
11 Information from the Brazilian Wind Energy Association, ABEEólica, at www.portalabeeolica.org.br (accessed Anno 2012).
12 ANEEL data shows that between 1998 and 2012, 213 wind power projects were licensed with a total potential of 5,723,543 kW. These numbers 
represent 27.9 percent of the total licensed projects, and this is only lower than the figure for thermoelectric power plants. See ‘Matriz de Energia 
Elétrica’, www.aneel.gov.br/aplicacoes/capacidadebrasil/operacaocapacidadebrasil.asp (Accessed Anno 2012). 
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and 2011 (Castano, 2011). 13 By the end of 2012, Brazilian wind had become the cheapest in the 
world at around $38.7 MWh. 
Figure 2.8: Brazil. Prices and volumes for wind projects awarded in power auctions, 2009-2011
Source: Author’s calculations based on ‘Matriz de Energia Elétrica’, www.aneel.gov.br/aplicacoes/capacidadebrasil/operacaocapacidadebrasil.asp 
(Accessed Anno 2012).
Notes: LER = Reserve Energy Auction; LFA = Energy Alternative Sources Auction; LE =Renewable Auction.   
According to the Brazilian Wind Energy Association (ABEEólica), employment created by the 
industry along the entire production chain amounts to 15 labor positions for each MW added to 
Brazil’s electricity system. Compared to other clean energy sectors, for example hydropower, 
wind power creates relatively more jobs. The production and distribution of one terawatt (one 
trillion watts) of wind power an hour requires between 918 and 2,400 workers. For the same 
amount of electricity, hydroelectric power plants require only 250 workers. Based on the total 
volume of wind energy contracts in 2013, ABEEólica expects that more than 70,000 jobs could 
be generated in the industry.14 
Solar energy
Photovoltaic (PV)
Due to advancements in technology, a drop in the price of solar panels and a subsequent 
reduction in project costs, the PV industry’s growth rate is significant. By 2020, it is projected 
that global installed capacity of PV energy will reach 330,424 MW, growing at an average annual 
rate of 23.7 percent between 2011 and 2020. With estimated solar irradiation rates being 
among the highest in the world, Brazil’s PV energy potential is substantial and the government 
is undertaking considerable eﬀorts to ensure that the industry takes root in the country (Pereira 
et al., 2006). The opening of the first factory for assembling Brazilian PV modules in 2010 was 
13 Increases in the height of windmill towers from 50 meters to 100 meters have significantly contributed to the generation/cost equation of 
windmills in recent years (see ‘Wind Could Become Brazil’s Second Power Generation Source in 2015’, www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/
article/2011/11/wind-could-become-brazils-second-power-generation-source-in-2015 (Accessed 7 September, 2014)). 
14 ‘ABEEólica Celebrates Record Levels of Wind Power in Brazil’, www.gwec.net/abeeolica-celebrates-record-levels-wind-power-brazil (Accessed 7 
September, 2014).
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an important milestone According to ANEEL data, 15 there is currently 1.4 GW in PV plants in 
licensing processes and each has a potential of 30 MWp.
In 2012, ANEEL introduced new regulations to promote the integration of solar power generation 
into the country’s distribution planning process as well as into utility procurement.16 REN 482 
is a net metering program (Sistema de Compensação de Energia), i.e. a compensation system 
for energy billing, that allows owners of small-scale power production generators such as 
residential and commercial entities to install micro- and mini solar generators of 1 MW or less 
to oﬀset their own electricity expenses with credits acquired from the energy they deliver to 
the electrical grid. 17 If the power consumed exceeds the generated capacity, the owner will 
only have to pay the diﬀerence. One advantage of consumer investments in solar power is 
that it does not require the construction of long-distance transmission lines. On the basis of 
this incentive, ANEEL implemented a conjunctionary resolution, the REN481, which provides 
discounts of 80 percent on transmission and distribution usage charges for solar systems up 
to 30 MW. 18 These regulations, along with simplified procedures to access the network and 
advancements in the PV production chain that have resulted in a large number of challenges 
being overcome, are expected to strengthen the national PV market and create an attractive 
environment for foreign companies.
Large-scale PV projects are likely to be realized over the next few years, as the government has 
announced its intention to auction 3.5 GW of PV capacity by 2018 through so-called ‘reserve 
capacity auctions’. 19 PV was first auctioned at the A-3 and A-5 electricity auction in 2013 in 
regular new capacity auctions that included multiple renewable power technologies but largely 
fell short of the cheaper wind energy and no projects were awarded tenders. The new auctions 
plan to introduce a special category for PV projects, with project prices low enough to compete 
with other types of renewable energy.20 
Earlier estimates (2012/2013) set the number of jobs created through the anticipated expansion 
of the industry at between 7 and 11 jobs per megawatt peak and noted that these numbers 
might be smaller as various parts of the production chain are still lacking in Brazil, despite the 
country being one of the largest producers of silicone in the world (CGEE, 2012; Cidades Solares, 
2013). However, the most recent forecasts for annual PV installations in the country following 
the introduction of the new government’s plans may ensure more employment opportunities. 
By 2018, annual installations are expected to reach about 1,023 MW, a sharp contrast to the 
mere 167 MW that were installed in 2013.21  
Solar heating
Even though the usage of thermal solar energy is still limited in Brazil, the market has grown and 
has consolidated itself in recent years. Estimates suggest that by 2009, more than 798,000 m2 
15 ‘Matriz de Energia Elétrica’, www.aneel.gov.br/aplicacoes/capacidadebrasil/operacaocapacidadebrasil.asp (Accessed Anno 2012).
16 ‘Brazil’s Attempt at Distributed Generation: Will Net Metering Work?’, www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/07/brazils-attempt-
at-distributed-generation-will-net-metering-work (Accessed 7 September, 2014). 
17 Ibidem.
18 Ibidem.
19 ‘Solar Expectations Rise for Brazil as Auctions Announced’, http://press.ihs.com/press-release/design-supply-chain/solar-expectations-rise-
brazil-auctions-announced (Accessed 4 August, 2014). 
20 ‘Brazil to Hold First Federal PV Auction this Year. PV Magazine’, www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/brazil-to-hold-first-federal-pv-
auction-this-year_100014770 (Accessed 7 September, 2014).
21 ‘Brazil’s 3.5 GW PV Plan to Catalyze Solar Growth in Latin America’, www.opticslatinamerica.org/en-us/home/news/news-articles/articles/brazil-
s-3-5-gw-pv-plan-to-catalyze-solar-growth-i/ (Accessed 4 August, 2014).
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of solar collectors had been installed, increasing to 6.4 million m² of solar collectors in 2010 
(Rejman, 2012). 22 70 percent of thermal solar equipment producers in Brazil have witnessed 
a production increase of more than 20 percent during that period (Rejman, 2012). Thermal 
power accumulated to 3,641 MWth, placing Brazil among the top ten producers in the world. 
The National Plan on Climate Change has set out to triple the total area of installation by 2015.23
The potential to develop the industry is considered tremendous, as the climate makes it 
possible to use solar energy almost all year round (Federal University of Pernambuco, 2000), 
and thermal solar equipment could substitute electric showers, the main mode of residential 
water heating. Today, more than 30 million such showers are installed in Brazil with only 
2 percent of households using solar heaters (Procel Info, 2006). In total, these facilities consume 
about 6 percent of the country’s entire electricity production and account for approximately 
18 percent of the national electricity system during periods of peak demand (ABRADE, 2012). The 
actual potential can be better understood by comparing Brazil’s current penetration of thermal 
solar technology for heating water with that of other countries. According to the Solar Heating 
and Cooling Programme at the IEA (2012a), the world24 average is 0.04 m² per inhabitant. For 
Brazil to reach a similar level, the area of installed solar heaters must increase to between 
35 million and 167 million m² of collectors, corresponding to 0.87 m² per inhabitant.
Several incentive programs, which are mainly part of the Strategy for Energy Eﬃciency in the 
2030 National Energy Plan, have been introduced to promote the use of solar water heating 
systems in Brazil. Finding new models of financing and business that can penetrate vertical 
condominiums and the commercial and service sectors has been and remains the greatest 
challenge for Brazil’s thermal solar market. ‘My Home My Life’ (Minha Casa Minha Vida) is 
a social housing program under the Growth Acceleration Programme, and aims to build 
1 million homes for low-income families, who can benefit from subsidized mortgages oﬀered 
by the state-owned bank, Caixa Econômica Federal.25 While the first phase of the program has 
provided homeowners the possibility of adding the costs of a solar water heating system to 
their mortgage, the second phase made the installation of such a system a requirement.26 An 
estimated 500,000 houses had been equipped as of 2011, which is expected to have created 
up to 30,000 green jobs over a 5-year period (not including the jobs created in the construction 
sector) (ITUC, 2012). Moreover, well-designed labeling programs have ensured high quality 
equipment in the industry and thus the sustainability of the market. 
Studies suggest that thermal solar heating poses numerous environmental, social, and often, 
economic advantages compared to electricity used to heat water. Thermal solar systems are 
advantageous on account of the modularity of their applications, the decentralization of 
their production, the possibility of being developed by small- and medium-sized companies, 
and the capacity to generate more employment per transformed unit of energy. Data from 
the Department of Solar Energy and the Brazilian Association of Cooling, Air Conditioning, 
Ventilation and Heating, suggests that the annual production from 1 million m² of collectors 
22 72 percent of the total area of solar collectors in the country is residential, with 66 percent installed in single-family buildings and 6 percent in 
buildings with central heating systems (Rejman, 2012).
23 ‘The Use of Thermal Solar Energy in Brazil’, www.altenergymag.com/emagazine/2010/04/the-use-of-thermal-solar-energy-in-brazil/1487 (Ac-
cessed 7 September, 2014).
24 Understood as the countries aﬃliated with the agency.
25 ‘Minha Casa Minha Vida’, www.caixa.gov.br/habitacao/mcmv/index.asp (Accessed 7 September, 2014).
26 ‘Brazil: How the “My Home my Life” Programme Can Help the Solar Water Heater Sector’, http://solarthermalworld.org/content/brazil-how-my-
home-my-life-programme-can-help-solar-water-heater-sector (Accessed 7 September, 2014).
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could generate approximately 30,000 direct jobs and 30 indirect jobs (8,000 in industry, 
including micro and small industries of aggregated and related products, 14,000 installers, 
4,000 salespersons and distributors and 4,000 technical workers). 
Energy eﬃciency (building certificates)
Estimates by certificate programs, such as the LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
Design), AQUA (international certification for sustainable building constructions) and PROCEL 
(National Energy Conservation Program), suggest that energy eﬃciency measures have the 
potential to reduce energy consumption by 30 percent and 50 percent in old and new residential 
buildings, respectively. 
For a building to use energy eﬃciency, a number of aspects have to be incorporated in its 
design. For example, the building must be properly positioned to the solar trajectory and needs 
properly dimensioned openings to take better advantage of natural light. The materials used 
must be of high quality, both for the roof and the sealing of the façades, taking account of the 
crossed ventilation and the winds at the location to minimize the use of air conditioners and 
heaters, forced exhaustion and artificial light. The lighting system should include movement 
sensors with long-life and low consumption bulbs, such as LEEDs (Green Building Council 
Brazil, 2013), which are more eﬃcient than incandescent and fluorescent bulbs. The façades 
and roofing should include solar protection adapted to the type of glass used and the regional 
climate. The direction of winds has to also be verified and combined with the position of the 
building and the rooms to benefit from natural ventilation. All aspects that involve the use 
of energy, such as lighting, cooling, heating and ventilation, must be considered in terms 
of eﬃciency and user comfort (Tello and Riberio, 2012). Various other programs have been 
introduced in addition to the My House, My Life program. These are primarily funded by the 
labor funds, as the building industry is a major source of job creation in Brazil.
Although the workers involved in the construction of energy eﬃciency buildings continue to 
use the knowledge and conventional skills they have acquired in recent years, new knowledge 
and skills need to be developed. Workers have to learn to use the new machinery, equipment 
and construction techniques being introduced. The new techniques being used, as well as the 
speed of the assembly process of pre-molded pieces have an impact on skilled workers who 
now face abrupt changes and are left without any reference point. Another problematic factor 
is that the information introduced in new processes is not always suﬃcient to ensure that tasks 
are adequately carried out (SINDUSCON RIO, 2013).
According to a study of the ILO’s Green Employment Initiative (Jarvis, Varma and Ram, 2011), 
more than 33 percent of workers working in civil construction perform work that requires little 
or no specialization. Although noticeable improvements have been observed in recent years, 
there is still much room for improvement. The number of workers engaged in energy eﬃciency 
projects has been increasing considerably and estimates suggest that 0.5 percent of all posts 
are related to this type of activity.
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Biomass
The Brazilian biomass industry is one of the most sizeable in the world. Together with the U.S., 
Brazil accounts for 95 percent of worldwide ethanol production and is one of the only countries 
in which biofuels make up a relatively large share of total transportation fuel use. In 2006, 
approximately 500,000 people were employed in the industry (UNEP et al., 2008). Forestry 
and palm culture are highlighted below as two industries with significant potential for growth 
and employment generation. However, the Worldwatch Institute (2007) notes that biofuel 
production is often characterized by poor pay and dangerous working conditions, meaning 
that special scrutiny must be demonstrated when estimating the number of decent jobs in the 
industry. 
Forestry 
The depths of the Brazilian forests oﬀer a major commercial potential that has not yet been 
fully explored.27 The activities associated with forest use are numerous. The forest industry 
produces a broad number of key goods such as construction materials, sanitary products, 
chemicals, papers, and entails both watershed and soil conservation (World Bank, 2008). The 
forest use sector provides millions of jobs and sustains many local communities. 
In pursuit of a viable equation for balanced development between economic growth and social 
and environmental responsibility, Brazil grants forestry concessions to private sector partners 
with long-term harvesting rights and responsibilities as an economic instrument for territorial 
administration. In 2006, the government introduced the Public Forest Management Law (Law 
11.284 as a supplement to Law 6.938 of 1981), which includes forestry concessions as one of 
the economic instruments of the National Environmental Policy. Forestry concession grants are 
developed within the structures of the Ministry of Environment, the Brazilian Forestry Service 
(SFB or Serviço Florestal Brasileiro) and the National Forest Development Fund (Fundo Nacional 
de Desenvolvimento Florestal). The concessions have proven to be a powerful instrument for 
sustainable forest use by discouraging illegal logging and have significantly contributed to the 
previously described reduction in deforestation in the country. 
Law 11.284 contains the principles for administration of public forests, which make up a large 
part of the Amazon. Among these is the establishment of activities that promote eﬃcient and 
rational use of forests and contribute to the meeting of targets for local, regional and national 
sustainable development. The promotion of local processing and value addition to forest 
products and services, as well as industrial diversification, technological development and the 
use and training of local entrepreneurs and regional labour are also covered in the law.
A continuous focus on incentives to promote innovative management and conservation 
measures will be crucial if Brazil is to preserve its forests as economic development proceeds. 
Sabogal et al. (2006) highlight land problems as one of the principal obstacles to the adoption 
of a sustainable forest administration plan (Plano de Manejo Florestal Sustentável) in the 
Amazon. 
Table 2.4 presents the number of jobs that could be created if all estimated concession areas, 
corresponding to approximately 37 million hectares, were auctioned by the state and federal 
27 ‘Sustainable Development and Challenging Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, www.fao.org/docrep/011/
i0440e/i0440e03.htm (Accessed 7 September, 2014).
CHAPTER 2 :  BRAZIL
GLOBAL GREEN GROWTH EXPERIENCES
46
governments. It is clear that the industry plays a key role in reducing poverty in Brazil. Currently, 
the federal concession area is around 233,000 hectares (mainly in the Amazon region). If the 
rate of forestry concessions per year is maintained at 400,000 hectares/year for the next ten 
years, the total number of jobs created will amount to 401,000. The investments needed to 
create a job from forestry concessions varies between $11,500 and $23,500, and secondly, the 
concessionaires that are already operating in the Amazon Region.
Table 2.4: Potential employment generation through forestry concessions per state in Brazil
State People living in poverty, 2012 
Potential jobs 
through concessions
Jobs potential if all available 
lands were concessioned 
Acre 78,855 3,612 15,210
Amazonas 345,350 198,216 737,546
Amapá 52,254 19,976 74,331
Maranhão 1,165,380 959 3,835
Mato Grosso 61,279 8,352 40,495
Pará 672,323 133,924 522,631
Rondônia 69,681 15,838 74,533
Roraima 28,550 15,379 63,094
Tocantins 87,998 5,218 23,852
Total 2,482,815 401,474 1,555,526
Source: Author’s presentation based on IPEA Data (2014) and on an interview with Sergio Bomfim (2013).
 
According to Bomfirm (2013), a relationship exists between the number of potential jobs and 
plans for sustainable forest administration. The third line in Table 2.5 represents the ratio of the 
number of hectares managed and the number of jobs generated. In this case, every 95 hectares 
managed generated 1 job. 
Table 2.5: Brazil. Relationship between areas of eﬀective management, employment 
generation and tax revenues
Relations hectares/job
Eﬀective management area/directs jobs 290.8
Eﬀective management area/indirect jobs 141.0
Eﬀective management area/jobs (direct and indirect) 95.0
Source: Author’s presentation of interview with Sergio Bomfim (2013). 
Palm culture
According to a report by the United States Department of Agriculture (Ash, 2012), palm oil 
production was responsible for 39 percent of the global supply of vegetal oils in 2012, and 
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is the most produced vegetal oil in the world (55.3 Mt). Brazil is the tenth largest palm oil 
producer, accounting for 0.5 percent of world production. The industry oﬀers great potential for 
growth in Brazil.
In 2010, the Brazilian agricultural research agency, Embrapa, published a comprehensive study 
with the objective to “evaluate and spatially distribute the potential of land for palm growing 
based on of the sustainable use of land in harmony with biodiversity”. 28 The study concluded 
that deforested land in the Amazon region, excluding areas with full protection (national and 
state parks and indigenous reservations), includes approximately 30 million hectares that are 
suitable for palm oil plantations (Embrapa, 2010). This is double the currently used area for the 
cultivation of palm oil worldwide (FAO, 2013). Around the region of Belém, where 85 percent 
of Brazilian palm oil production is concentrated, over 1 million hectares of preferential areas 
with low climatic risks were identified for cultivation. The local government of Pará expects 
palm oil plantations to cover 700,000 hectares by 2022 as a consequence of private expansion 
projects, which would make Brazil the third largest producer in the world.29 
The Brazilian government has implemented several programs to accelerate the country’s palm 
oil production. In 2004, the Programme of Biodiesel Production and Use was established 
to promote a sustainable domestic market for biodiesel incorporating both family farms 
and large-scale cooperatives into the production chain. A key aspect of the program was to 
foster social inclusion by compelling biodiesel producers to buy predetermined amounts of 
raw materials from family farms and small producers, which are then sold to distributors on 
auctions organized by the National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (Agência 
Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis). In return, the producers are certified 
with the so-called ‘Social Fuel Seal’ by the Ministry of Agrarian Development and benefit from 
a 100 percent tax exemption for biodiesel certified with the seal (OECD and ITF, 2008).30 The 
programme has been deemed largely successful as a national policy framework by achieving 
its production goals and at the same time delivering environmental and social benefits.31
The Programme for the Sustainable Production of Palm Oil (O Programa de Produção 
Sustentável de Óleo de Palma) emphasizes the role of palm oil as a major feedstock for the 
planned expansion of biofuel. The program determines which degraded areas of the Amazon 
are suitable for oil palm planting, including previously cultivated land used for other crops, 
and exclusively funds sustainable farmers. Hence, the program prohibits any expansion of the 
industry at the expense of native forests and is a response to recent social and environmental 
concerns on the sustainability of palm oil production (for example, Fitzherbert et al., 2008; 
Butler and Laurance, 2009 via de Andrade and Miccolis, 2011).  
Assessments by IPEA (2010) and Villela (2013) suggest that palm oil compared to other oil-
seeds suitable for biomass production oﬀers the greatest productivity with 5 tons generated 
per hectare annually in comparison to castor beans or peanuts, for example, which reach 
an annual productivity of 0.47 and 0.45 tons per hectare, respectively. In terms of income 
28 The specific objectives of the study were also to a) provide assistance for the restructuring of the Brazilian energy matrix through the production 
of biofuels; and b) oﬀer sustainable economic alternatives to rural producers in the region operating in enterprises or engaged in family farming.
29 ‘Oil Palm Expands on Deforested Land in Brazil’s Rainforest’, www.ipsnews.net/2013/11/oil-palm-expands-on-deforested-land-in-brazils-
rainforest (Accessed 7 September, 2014).
30 ‘The Brazilian Biodiesel Program’, http://ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=273:brazilian-biodiesel-program&catid=11
2:energysecuritycontent&Itemid=367 (Accessed 7 September, 2014).
31 Ibidem.
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generation, palm oil provides a monthly income of $56 for each worker per hectare, while the 
corresponding monthly income for castor beans workers is only $21 per hectare. 
In terms of job creation, the palm culture industry creates significantly more jobs than 
deforestation-intensive industries including ranching, mechanized soy farming or logging. 
Brazil’s largest palm oil producer, Agropalma, employs one worker per 8 hectares of plantation.32 
Job creation in an industrial soy farm or on a cattle ranch, on the other hand, typically amounts 
to only one worker per 202 hectares and 405 hectares, respectively. 
The Brazilian company Ecodendê finds that the initial investment for palm oil production per 1 
hectare is $3,000 and every 11 hectares creates one direct and three indirect jobs (D’Avignon, 
2013). This amounts to 4 jobs per $33,000 invested in total jobs or $8,250 in direct jobs. Table 
2.6 presents figures for the estimated job creation potential in the palm culture industry. 
Table 2.6: Employment in the Brazilian palm culture industry, 2010 and 2013
Year Total area Area for family farming Family farming Jobs
2010 70,000 hectares 1,800 hectares 270 4,900
2013 (mid) 156,000 hectares 10,150 hectares 1,450 19,500
Source: D’Avignon (2013). 
2.6 Job Creation Potential of Renewable Energy Investments
The findings of the previous section are evaluated against the findings presented in Volume 
I, which compare the employment return from investments in renewable and conventional 
energy sources. This approach is particularly interesting for Brazil, as the country will need to 
significantly expand its energy supply in the years to come and vast opportunities are present 
in both dimensions of the energy matrix. The estimates in Volume I oﬀer useful insights on 
the job creation potential per $1 million spent in both renewables and fossil fuels and can 
therefore serve as guidance for policymakers when evaluating which industries to formulate 
targeted incentives for. 
Table 2.7 shows the estimated number of direct and indirect jobs created in selected energy 
industries and sectors in Brazil in 2005. The table presents two sets of estimates, the column 
‘Domestic content stable’ assumes that the country relies on the expansion of domestic 
economic activity to accommodate an annual 0.3 percent of GDP investment – a share assumed 
necessary in Volume I for Brazil to meet the IPCC-defined 2030 goals. In the estimates presented 
in the column ‘Domestic content declines’, the country’s reliance on imports is increasing. It 
is clear from Table 2.7 that the biggest potential for job creation lies in renewables industry. 
On average, renewables create 38.2 jobs per $1 million invested, whereas the corresponding 
number for fossil fuels is 21.2 – both under the stable content scenario. Under the ‘domestic 
content stable’ scenario, Volume I finds that total employment in the renewables industry in 
Year 1 of the projection period will amount to 180,800 jobs, which is 78,400 more jobs than in 
the fossil fuel industry. 
32 ‘In Brazil, Palm Oil Plantations Could Help Preserve Amazon’, http://e360.yale.edu/feature/in_brazil_palm_oil_plantations_could_help_preserve_
amazon/2415/ (Accessed 7 September, 2014).
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Table 2.7: Brazil. Employment creation through investments in alternative  
energy industries, 2005 
Jobs per $1 million
 
 
Domestic content stable Domestic content declines
Direct jobs Indirect jobs Direct + indirect jobs Direct jobs Indirect jobs
Direct + 
indirect jobs
Renewables            
Bioenergy 73.1 8.7 81.8 73.1 8.5 81.6
Hydro 13.9 11.7 25.5 13.7 11.5 25.2
Wind 18.9 10.3 29.2 18.5 10.1 28.6
Solar 14.0 11.7 25.7 13.5 11.6 25.1
Geothermal 17.7 11.1 28.7 17.5 10.9 28.4
Weighted average for 
renewables 27.5 10.7 38.2 27.3 10.5 37.8
Weighted average for 
energy eﬃciency 23.7 12.2 35.9 23.1 12.1 35.2
Weighted average for 
fossil fuels 10.3 10.8 21.2 NA NA NA
Source: Adapted from Volume I, p. 147. 
Given Brazil’s special circumstances of low levels of energy eﬃciency and emissions per capita, 
and high GHG emission levels in sources other than the burning of oil, coal and natural gas, it 
is asserted in Volume I that “a reasonable strategy for Brazil at present is to spend relatively 
less money on clean energy investments while focusing on reducing emissions from methane 
and nitrous oxide and on preserving the Amazon” (p. 188). However, after 2020, when the 
commitments signed in Copenhagen will have been achieved, the energy industry will play a 
decisive role in the realization of the mitigation policies adopted. The hydro alternatives will be 
scarce and the use of unconventional renewable energy will be crucial.
This study validates the findings in Volume I by comparing its results with scenarios created 
through a process of data collection, interviews with industry managers and information derived 
from oﬃcial planning documents on Brazil’s energy industry published by public enterprises. 
It is noteworthy that Volume I makes use of the I-O tables produced by the Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and Statistics in 2007 as the basis for determining the number of jobs created 
through alternative energy industry spending. This study attempts to use a methodology to 
analyze the data obtained in the field with the actors for specific benchmark industries. These 
results cannot be directly compared with the results in Volume I, but serve as an updated 
reference for jobs generated globally by the industry. 
Looking at the number of jobs created in the selected industries alone, we see that the 
employment creation potential is substantial. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show estimated employment 
creation between 2012 and 2021 based on industry-related premises. From a very conservative 
perspective, this figure rose to 189,000 within nine years (Table 2.8). Building on the estimates 
of the Brazilian Wind Energy Association (ABEEÓLICA), this figure would double if we consider 
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15 jobs per installed MW in the wind power industry (Table 2.9). From a conservative perspective, 
around 10 percent of the two million jobs created in 2011 were established in the industries 
selected for this study. It was, however, an atypical year as a significant share of these jobs was 
the result of the legalization of labor relations through the registration of workers. 
Table 2.8: Brazil. Estimated job creation in selected industries, 2012-2021 (conservative)
Accumu-
lated jobs 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Average 
jobs / 
year
Total of 
jobs
Photovol-
taic1 480 576 691 829 995 1,194 1,433 1,720 2,064 2,477 222 1,997
Solar  
heating2 30,000 33,000 36,300 39,930 43,923 48,315 53,147 58,462 64,308 70,738 4,526 40,738
Energy 
eﬃciency 
building 
(certifica-
tion)3
14,546 15,273 16,037 16,838 17,680 18,564 19,493 20,467 21,491 22,565 891 8,019
Wind4 12,000 45819 48111 50514 53040 55692 58479 61401 64473 67695 2673 55,695
Forrestal 
manage-
ment5
2,300 6,512 10,724 14,936 19,148 23,360 27,572 31,784 35,996 40,208 4212 37,908
Palm oil 
cultiva-
tion 6
10,914 15,861 20,808 25,755 30,702 35,649 40,596 45,543 50,490 55,437 4947 44,523
Total base 117,041 132,671 148,802 165,488 182,775 200,720 219,376 238,822 259,120 17,471 188,880
Source: Prepared by the author based on sectorial information (see notes).
Notes: 1) Jobs generated per installed MW based on Jarvis, Varma and Ram (2011) - 15 jobs/MW and a regular growth rate of 20 percent p.a.; 2) Estimate 
based on figures from the industrial association. The rate of increase is 10 percent p.a. and the number of workers is estimated by the association 
and supported by the number of collectors assembled per year. This generates about 16 posts/collectors; 3) Based on the number of employees in 
the construction industry in 2012 and its relation to building weatherization/certification; 4) Number obtained by annual increments of power defined 
in the Ten Year Energy Plan and jobs generated per MW installed based on international documents; 5) Number of direct jobs/hectares identified by 
Serviço Florestal Brasileiro based on forestry concessions already realized discussed with technicians; 6) Based on the number of jobs/hectares 
created based on current activity.
 
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 above demonstrate the potential job creation in selected industries. The 
variation between the two scenarios is quite significant due to the distortions in Brazil’s wind 
industry (including price disturbances created by the 2002 national wind power program 
PROINFA and requirements to the national component content). The divergence in the number 
of jobs generated per MWh is considerable when we compare the figures found in the literature 
with those proclaimed by ABEEÓLICA. This divergence is not evident in the other industries 
studied. Nonetheless, it is important to point out the diﬀerence between ABEEÓLICA’s scenario 
and those described in the literature - ABEEÓLICA refers to the number of jobs generated in 
the entire production chain based on the nationalization machinery index, established by 
Brazilian law.
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Table 2.9: Brazil. Estimated job creation in selected industries, 2012-2021 
Accumu-
lated jobs 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Average 
jobs / 
year
Total of 
jobs
Photovol-
taic1 480 576 691 829 995 1,194 1,433 1,720 2,064 2,477 222 1,997
Solar 
heating2 30,000 33,000 36,300 39,930 43,923 48,315 53,147 58,462 64,308 70,738 4,526 40,738
Energy 
eﬃciency 
building 
(certifica-
tion)3
14,546 15,273 16,037 16,838 17,680 18,564 19,493 20,467 21,491 22,565 891 8,019
Wind4 12,000 64,875 78,375 91,125 102,525 116,025 128,775 143,775 158,775 225,795 23,755 213,795
Forrestal 
manage-
ment5
2,300 12,830 23,360 33,890 44,420 54,950 65,480 76,010 86,540 97,070 10530 94,770
Palm oil 
cultiva-
tion 6
10,914 18,692 26,470 34,248 42,026 49,804 57,582 65,360 73,138 80,916 7778 70,002
Total base 145,246 181,233 216,860 251,569 288,853 325,910 365,793 406,316 499,561 47,702 429,321
Source: Developed by the author based on industrial information.
Notes: 1) Jobs generated per installed MW based on Jarvis, Varma and Ram (2011) - 15 jobs/MW and a regular growth rate of 20 percent p.a.; 2) 
Estimation based figures from the industrial association. The rate of increase is 10 percent p.a. and the number of workers is estimated by the 
association and supported by the number of collectors assembled per year. This generates about 16 posts/collectors; 3) Based on the number of 
employees in the construction industry in 2012 and its relation to building weatherization/certification; 4) Number obtained by annual increments 
of power defined in the Ten Year Energy Plan and jobs generated per MW installed – 15 jobs/MW according to Abeeólica; 5) Number of direct jobs/
hectares identified in the Serviço Florestal Brasileiro based in forestry concessions already realized discussed with technicians and 1 million hectares 
with concessions by year based on 37 million available public hectares; 6) Based on the number of jobs/hectares created based on current activity 
and the 1 million hectares available for the production of palm oil. 
It is noteworthy that the figures, despite their variation, indicate considerable potential for 
employment generation. The results validate the findings in Volume I; in the conservative 
scenario, Volume I’s Year 1 estimates are met in 2018 and as early as 2013 in the ‘wind’ scenario. 
Over a 20-year period and assuming, among other things, an annual GDP growth rate of 3.7 
percent, Volume I concludes that annual employment generated from energy eﬃciency and 
renewable energy investments could reach between 229,500 and 308,000 depending on labor 
productivity growth. These estimates are only matched in the ‘wind’ scenario presented above. 
Nevertheless, the scenario is realistic due to the large unexploited potential of windmills higher 
than 100 meters and the possible intensification of wind energy in the northeastern region of 
Brazil as a result of the eﬀects of climate change on wind directions. 
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When assuming an equal amount in funding as a share of GDP, the number of jobs estimated 
in this study and in Volume I are equally plausible. Moreover, the benefits generated, which 
in Brazil extend to environmental services, are significant. From both the environmental 
perspective (e.g. the mitigation of GHG emissions) and from a social perspective (e.g. poverty 
alleviation in remote and impoverished regions such as the Brazilian Amazon), the creation of 
green jobs oﬀers huge potentials.
2.7 Conclusion
Brazil’s abundant forest areas, rich biodiversity, ample water resources and large, undiscovered 
continental and coastal areas epitomize the country’s natural wealth. Brazil’s natural capital has 
proven to be a tremendous asset to the benefit of social and economic development and has 
laid the foundation for the advancement of an energy matrix with a heavy weight of renewable 
energy – especially in terms of hydropower and biofuels.33 While Brazil’s natural resources have 
enabled this progress, they have also contributed heavily to environmental degradation in the 
country; an eﬀective policy framework has reduced illegal deforestation while still stimulating 
economic growth. The application of innovative policies and technological solutions has, to a 
large extent, reconciled growth and sustainability.34 
Although Brazil belongs to the six largest GHG emitters in the world, its successful eﬀorts to 
diminish deforestation have placed it on a fast track to resolving its emission problems. Brazil’s 
current per capita emissions level is half the world average of 4.6 mt and it has therefore 
already achieved the global target of 2.4 mt necessary to reach the IPCC-defined 2030 targets 
(see Volume I). A comprehensive study by the World Bank from 2010 suggests that Brazil 
could reduce its overall emission level by 37 percent within that year without jeopardizing 
employment and economic and social progress. Volume I finds that Brazil would be able to 
meet the IPCC target by lowering its emissions by just 30 percent. The Brazilian experience 
therefore seems to debunk the allegory that low-carbon economic growth is incompatible with 
economic and social development. 
According to Volume I, emission reductions are possible, with Brazil devoting a mere 0.3 
percent of its GDP, or $234 billion, to clean energy investments in the period up to 2030, an 
amount considerably less than that stated in the government’s Accelerated Growth Plan, which 
calculated an amount of approximately $500 billion between 2007-2010. The new relatively 
low level of spending will free up resources otherwise reserved for clean energy investments 
that can be used to “definitively control emissions from methane and nitrous oxide, as well 
as undertaking positive measures for preserving the Amazon” (Volume I, p. 184). The central 
message of both studies is that the prevention of further deforestation is Brazil’s safest way of 
reducing GHG emissions – and this is a major challenge given the vast amount of additional 
land needed to mitigate emissions and take up carbon reduction (World Bank, 2010).35 
 
33 ‘Winds of Change – the Shifting Balance of Brazil’s Power Matrix’, http://gbroundup.com/2013/09/18/winds-of-change-the-shifting-balance-of-
brazils-power-matrix/ (Accessed July 2014).
34 ‘Brazil Can Take the Lead in Green Growth, says the World Bank’, web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/0,,contentMD-
K:22631623~pagePK:146736~piPK:64909335~theSitePK:258554,00.html (Accessed 28 July 2014). 
35 More than 53 million hectares of land is needed to secure the World Bank’s (2010) low-carbon scenario that will bring about a 37 percent decrease 
in GHG emissions. This is particularly due to the large cattle raising industry, which requires extensive areas. It is crucial that modernizing changes are 
introduced in the industry to increase land-use eﬃciency and to foster a technological and cultural change in the way cattle is raised. 
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Targeted industrial policies to promote clean energy investments have the potential to steer 
the Brazilian economy onto a low-carbon, energy-resilient growth path, securing the country’s 
record share of renewables in its energy matrix and promising the generation of approximately 
180,000 domestic jobs. These estimates in Volume I are validated by the literature review 
conducted for this study, which sets their job figures at a lower bar should the high potential in 
the wind industry not be realized. On the other hand, should the wind industry develop, over 
429,000 domestic jobs could be created. Other substantial employment engines would be the 
forestry and biofuel industries in combination with a more intensive use of unconventional 
renewable energy in the Brazilian energy matrix. Regional endowments should be indicators 
for investments, which can create more employment. The northern and north-eastern regions 
are the poorest and the need for proper and legal employment is particularly high.
A number of challenges must be addressed by elaborating specific policies. Once the 2020 
mitigation target is achieved, emissions are likely to begin to rise again, as the energy industry 
will play a decisive role in the realization of mitigation policies adopted (MCTI, 2013), especially 
due to the potential of pre-salt exploitation. Hydro alternatives will be scarce and the use of 
unconventional renewable energy will become particularly important. Moreover, the expansion 
of renewable energy in the energy matrix will depend on higher technologies such as PV, fuel 
cell or electric cars, which still face considerable barriers. 
For Brazil to continue its track towards becoming a low-carbon economy, it will need to develop 
appropriate industrial policies and incentives for gradual substitution in heavy-emitting 
industries.36 Moreover, creating a link between emissions and jobs in Brazil is fundamental to 
achieving inclusive and sustainable industrial development. This study has demonstrated that 
such a link oﬀers a tremendous opportunity for the country to further advance its renewable 
energy matrix and significantly reduce GHG emissions associated with job creation.
36 ‘Brazil Can Take the Lead in Green Growth, Says the World Bank’, http://go.worldbank.org/4FCZ2LFQW0 (Accessed 4 August, 2014).
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CHAPTER 3: GERMANY
3.1 Introduction
Clean energy technologies are considered a major contributor to the development of an 
economy based on sustainable development (“green economy”). This country study explores 
the employment eﬀects from clean energy technologies in Germany, specifically renewable 
energy and energy eﬃciency technologies. 
With the “Energiewende” (transformation of the energy system), Germany has introduced 
an intensive process to transform it’s energy system towards sustainable energy supply and 
energy demand. It aims for complete transformation by 2050 which entails large shares of 
renewables (at least 80 percent), highly eﬃcient use of energy resources by halving primary 
energy consumption and a reduction of GHG emissions by 80-95 percent (from 1990 baseline). 
Although the inception of the “Energiewende” is generally associated with a turning point 
in German energy policy after the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, the process of 
transforming the country’s energy system already started more than 20 years ago. 37 
The “Energiewende” comprises five key objectives, which reiterate Germany’s old and new 
energy policy goals. The objectives of reducing dependance on energy imports, phasing out 
nuclear energy and protecting the climate have been important constants since the turn of 
the century or even earlier. The latter in particular has manifested itself in the formulation of 
both national targets and international commitments. This included the German Kyoto target 
of a 21 percent reduction in GHG emissions by 2012 compared to 1990; an objective that has 
been reached. More recent policy developments are also captured by the “Energiewende”. 
The government is explicitly targeting the development of new, green technologies and the 
generation of jobs, and aims to inspire other countries to move in the same direction by 
demonstrating that the transition process is feasible in a highly industrialized country such 
as Germany and that it simultaneously promotes economic growth. 38 Furthermore, important 
technologies such as on-shore wind and PVs will continue to undergo cost digression in 
Germany and lead to lower costs for less developed countries. Section 3.2 of this study presents 
an overview of the main climate and energy policies of the “Energiewende”, as well as the EU’s 
role to support renewable energy and energy eﬃciency in its Member States.
Section 3.3 provides an overview of the eﬀorts to evaluate present employment eﬀects from 
clean energy technology in Germany. We first consider the general employment eﬀects from 
green technologies, of which energy technologies are an important element. We then focus 
on current employment eﬀects from renewable energy sources and compare this empirical 
evidence with the general employment eﬀects calculated in Volume I of the UNIDO/GGGI 
research project “Global Green Growth: Clean Energy Industry Investments for Expanding Job 
Opportunities”. 
37 When the term was first used in a publication by the German Öko-Instititut in 1980, it referred only to issues of climate protection, specifically to the 
complete transition away from nuclear and petroleum energy.
38 Designing the Future of Germany (“Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten“), Coalition Agreement between the conservative parties CDU, CSU and the 
socialdemocrate party SPD, November 2013.
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Section 3.4 presents the results of a macroeconomic evaluation of future employment eﬀects 
from clean energy technology in Germany. 
Finally, Section 3.5 concludes and looks at the long-term perspective of the “Energiewende”.
3.2 Policies Driving Employment in Clean Energy Technologies
This section briefly describes the German energy and climate policy as a main driver for the 
employment eﬀects discussed later on in this study. It focuses on the “Energiewende” as 
a major cornerstone of German energy policy, which has multiple objectives, including the 
creation of green jobs, and has assumed a crucial role in Germany’s international and national 
climate policy. It is manifested at the national level through specific targets for GHG reduction 
including a 40 percent reduction 40 percent by 2020 and at least 80 percent by 2050 compared 
to 1990. At the international level, besides being committed to the 2012 Kyoto targets as already 
mentioned, Germany is contributing to the EU’s 2020 GHG target of -20 percent compared to 
1990 and to the envisaged target of -40 percent by 2030. It is also committed to facilitating 
the stabilization of the rise in global temperature at plus 2C compared to pre-industrial levels. 
The road towards the “Energiewende”
The “Energiewende” aims at a complete transformation of the energy system towards, among 
other things, large shares of renewables in the final energy mix (at least 60 percent) and in 
the electricity mix (at least 80 percent) by the middle of the century. Table 3.1 summarizes 
these targets and presents a number of intermediate and sectoral goals. Although this set of 
objectives was oﬃcially and comprehensively formulated in 2011, some of the targets have 
been pursued for a decade, such as the long-term GHG target.
The most important of these sectoral targets are the reduction of electricity consumption by 25 
percent, of transport energy consumption by 40 percent and of primary energy consumption 
in buildings by 80 percent by 2050. The values provided for past achievements in Table 3.1 
show the substantial progress Germany has made on some of the targets in particular in terms 
of renewable energy expansion and GHG emission reduction, and less so in terms of energy 
eﬃciency improvements. renewable energy and GHG emission reduction than through energy 
eﬃciency.
Figures for 2013 indicate, however, that without strong eﬀorts, development may slow down, 
which is already evident in the figures for 2011 and 2012 in Table 3.1. Below, we provide the 
main progress indicators for 2013 (all in percentages using the same metric as for the indicators 
in Table 3.1) and describe the distinct development for each indicator (unless otherwise stated, 
the main source for these figures is AGEB (2014)):
?? GHG emissions (UBA, 2014): further increase of GHG to 951 mmt CO2- equivalent (+1.2 
percent compared to 2012 or -23.8 percent compared to the base year 1990). This is 
influenced in the short term by the availability of cheap coal on the international market 
due to the use of non-conventional gas in the U.S. market. Estimates for 2014 indicate 
that GHG are lower by 40 mmt CO2- equivalent compared to 2013.
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Table 3.1: “Energiewende” targets in Germany, 2011-2050
Past achievement Targets
2011 2012 2020 2030 2040 2050
GHG emissions
GHG emissions  
(compared with 1990) -25.6% -24.7% min. -40% min. -55% min. -70%
min. -80% 
to -95%
Renewable energies
Share in gross electricity 
consumption 20.3% 23.6% min. 35%
min. 50% 
(2025: 40% 
to 45 %)
min. 65% 
(2035: 55% 
to 60 %)
min. 80%
Share in gross final energy 
consumption 11.5% 12.4% 18% 30% 45% 60%
Eﬃciency
Primary energy consumption 
(compared with 2008) -5.4% -4.3% -20% -50%
Gross electricity consumption 
(compared with 2008) -1.8% -1.9% -10%  -25%
Share of electricity from 
combined heat and power 
generation
17.0% 17.3% 25%
Energy productivity  
(final energy consumption)
1.7% per 
annum  
(2008-2011)
1.1% per 
annum  
(2008-2012
2.1% per annum for the whole period 
(2008-2050)
Buildings
Primary energy requirement    around -80%
Heat requirement   -20%  
Rate of modernization about 1.0%
about 
1.0% doubling of levels to 2% per annum
Transport
Final energy consumption
(compared with 2005) -0,7% -0,6% -10% -40%
Number of electric vehicles
(units for historic years; 
million units for projections)
6.547 10.078 1 million 6 million -
Source: Adapted from BMWi (2014).
?? Primary energy consumption (change compared with 2008): -3.3 percent. One main 
reason for this increase is that 2013 was a comparatively cold year within the 10-year 
time frame.
?? Gross electricity consumption (change compared with 2008): -3 percent.
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?? Share of renewables in gross electricity consumption: 25.3 percent. Estimates for 2014 
indicate a share of 27.3 percent.
?? Share of renewables in gross final energy consumption: 11.9 percent.
?? Share of electricity from combined heat and power generation: increase from 91.9 TWh 
in 2012 to 93.5 TWh in 2013 (+1.7 percent).
The energy transition process in Germany started long before the “Energiewende” became an 
oﬃcial part of the national energy policy. The most important dates of the transition are: 
?? In 1990: the first feed-in tariﬀ law (“Stromeinspeisungsgesetz”) was introduced for 
renewable energy sources, and has been continuously updated and improved to bring 
renewable energy closer to the market. A major milestone of that law was the fact that 
renewable energy were given priority over fossil fuels. Utilities were allowed purchase 
electricity generated from renewable energy suppliers at a percentage of the prevailing 
retail price of electricity. The percentage oﬀered for solar and wind power was set at 90 
percent of the residential electricity price, while other technologies such as hydro power 
and biomass sources saw percentages ranging from 65–80 percent. The maximum 
capacity for which the subsidies were oﬀered was 5 MW per project. While the law did 
not strongly promote more costly technologies such as PVs, it led to the expansion of 
lower-cost technologies such as wind, resulting in the deployment of 4,400 MW of new 
wind capacity between 1991 and 1999 (corresponding to one-third of the global capacity 
at the time).
?? In 2001, the decision to phase out nuclear energy was taken by the then present 
Social Democrat/Green coalition government. Although this decision, along with the 
expansion of renewable energy, received wide public approval and continues to do so, 
there was no consensus on this policy among the political parties until 2011. 
?? In 2002, the Renewable Energy Law (“Erneuerbaren Energien Gesetz”) was introduced 
and has been continuously updated until the current discussion to reform the promotion 
scheme for renewable energy sources (see below). The law has been regularly amended 
to take account of the latest technological developments and the better understanding 
of how renewable energy perform in electricity markets. Given the success of the 
Renewable Energy Law, it has been taken up by the majority of EU Member States, but 
has also inspired renewable energy promotion schemes on a global level, replacing 
or complementing alternative concepts such as quota systems or Renewable Portfolio 
Systems (RPS) long used in the United Kingdom and the U.S., which have had much less 
success in spurring technologies in their early development phase.
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Energy Concept 
was adopted in September 2010, which included the following key elements: 1) A strategy 
for the decarbonization of the energy sector with the two main pillars to significantly 
increase energy eﬃciency and meet the energy demand mainly for renewable energy; 
2) Extend the use of nuclear energy by ten years. The revenues were to be partly used to 
support the use of renewable energy sources.
59
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
of public opinion and state elections in which the governing parties did not fare well, 
the government took the decision in July 2011 to accelerate the transformation of the 
energy system by introducing the “Energiewende” with its ambitious targets for energy 
eﬃciency, renewable energy and decarbonization. The second decision was taken 
to phase out nuclear energy by 2022, which was supported by all important political 
parties.
?? ??? late 2013, the new coalition government (Conservatives/Social Democrats) 
reiterated the long-term goals of the “Energiewende”. Though the new government 
did not explicitly underscore all initial objectives, the quantitative targets of Table 
3.1 continue to remain valid. The Coalition Agreement of 2013 focuses primarily on 
measures rather than targets, and emphasizes, in particular, that the transformation 
must be manageable from a financial perspective. Figure 3.1 shows that electricity 
has, for various reasons, become quite expensive for German households. While the 
promotion of renewable energy sources is one reason for this increase, other factors 
such as the general rise in fossil fuel prices have contributed even more. In 2013, 
the cost for electricity was 5.3 Euro-cents/kWh (6.9 dollar-cents), with an expected 
rise of another Euro-cents in 2014 to 6.24 Euro-cents/kWh (8.1 dollar-cents). The 
promotion of renewable energy made up 3.5 Euro-cents of the consumer’s electricity 
prices 4.5 dollar-cents or 12 percent and exemptions from the charge defined by the 
Renewable Energy Law, such as exemptions for self-generated electricity and for 
energy-intensive industries, constituted another 1.8 Euro-cents (2.3 dollar-cents 
or 6 percent). These exemptions have recently been challenged by the European 
Commission prompting the German government to reform the Renewable Energy Law. 39 
 
Coalition Agreement encourages the use of direct marketing measure as to bring 
renewable energy closer to the market. It also defines sets growth targets for renewable 
energy sources (40-45 percent by 2025, 55-60 percent by 2035) with an annual 
monitoring of the progress with respect to target achievement, grid expansion as well as 
cost-related factors. Technology-specific limits, e.g. for wind oﬀshore, have also been 
determined: a maximum of 6.5 GW by 2020 and 15 GW by 2030. For PVs, a tender model is 
to be developed by 2016. This shall ensure a steady growth of renewable energy sources 
while preventing the corresponding increase in costs that may result in distributional 
eﬀects among diﬀerent parts of the population. 
Public acceptance of the “Energiewende” is a major factor in the Agreement. Any 
exemptions from the electricity price increase related to the promotion of renewable 
energy shall be reformed in conformity with requirements of the European Commission 
including the exceptions granted to industry. Finally, the Agreement aﬃrms energy 
eﬃciency as the second major pillar of a German energy system and focuses on 
instruments to promote energy eﬃciency such as a top-runner program to enhance the 
39 On 8 April 2014, the reform of the Renewable Energy Law was decided by the Cabinet of the German Chancellor. By the end of June 2014, the German 
Parliament agreed on the reform. The regulation for the exemptions of energy-intensive companies is still to be added to the draft (currently the subsi-
dies in form of exemptions to industries represent $6.6 billion). The reformed Renewable Energy Law shall enter into force on 1 August 2014. However, 
there are still substantial discussions ongoing between the German government and the European Commission in how far the Renewable Energy Law 
represents state aid and in how far the national promotion scheme need to be opened to other European countries or in how far the imported green 
electricity has to pay the subsidy defined by the Law. The European Commission considers that if a foreign producer cannot profit from the national 
subsidy scheme he should also be exempted from paying the subsidy. Otherwise, the European Commission considers this as import duty, which is 
forbidden by the treaties. The average subsidy for all renewable energy is according to the present Renewable Energy Law about 22 dollar-cents/kWh. 
After the reform, this shall drop to about 15.6 dollar-cents/kWh.
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impact of the European Ecodesign Directive 2009/125/EC, which is a program that aims 
to increase the market share of the most energy eﬃcient appliances in the market (see 
the section below on the EU’s role in promoting energy eﬃciency and renewable energy 
sources in its Member States).
Figure 3.1: Germany. Development of (nominal) electricity prices for households and the role 
of charges for renewable energy sources, 2000-2013
Source: Author’s presentation based on BDEW (2012); BNetzA (2011); 50hertz et al. (2012). 
Note: Numbers for 2012 and 2013 are estimates.
 
The transformation of the energy system is monitored on an annual basis. The following graphs 
illustrate selected developments under the “Energiewende” from the Monitoring Report 
2012/13 (BMWi and BMU, 2012):
?? ??? ???????????? ??? ??????? ????? ???? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ?????????????? ????? ?????
(24.4 percent between 1990 and 2013). However, the 2050 target is still far afield, and 
the average annual rate by which emissions currently decrease needs to be raised to 
meet this target. In the initial phase after 1990, following the reunification process 
with Eastern Germany, emissions decreased rapidly. Approximately half of the initial 
decrease resulted from the restructuring of the industry in Eastern Germany. Emissions 
also decreased due to the introduction of climate and energy policies, including the 
building programs by the government-owned development bank KfW to renovate the 
thermal elements of buildings in Eastern Germany (Schleich et al., 2001). 
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particular to energy eﬃciency and renewable energy policies, a slight increase in GHG 
emissions has been observed. This trend is partly a consequence of the artificially low 
level of emissions during the economic crisis in 2009-2011, and partly due to the fact that 
2012/13 were comparatively colder years than the previous ones (albeit warmer than the 
long-term average over the last 30 years). Another recent development is cheap gas prices 
in the U.S., which, unlike the drop in coal prices did not influence European markets. This 
trend is, however, temporary, as prices in the U.S. are expected to rise from their currently 
low levels that which do not even cover the cost of unconventional shale gas.40 
?? ???????????? ??????????????????????? ????????????????????? ???????????????? ????????????
consumption will take quite some time (Figure 3.3). Besides colder winters, the recent 
increase in consumption can be explained by a lack of more ambitious energy eﬃciency 
policies compared to past ones and to those stipulated in the “Energiewende”. The 
most striking developments in the structure of gross domestic energy consumption are 
the strong penetration of renewable energy, the decrease in nuclear energy and coal 
and the penetration of gas (Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.2: Development of GHG emissions and targets in Germany, 1990-2013
Source: Author’s illustration based on UBA (2014a, 2014b). Estimates for 2012 and 2013 are from AGEB (2014). 
Note: Numbers for 2012 and 2013 are estimates.
40 Fracking, as a technology, is also mentioned in the Coalition Agreement mentioned above, but rather from the perspective as a risky technology for 
the environment, in particular the water resource in a relatively small and densly populated area such as Germany. The Agreement cautiously argues 
for restricted research to investigate possible impacts of the fracking technology.
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Figure 3.3: Development of primary and final energy consumption in Germany, 1990-2013
Source: Author’s presentation based on AGEB (2014). 
Note: Final energy consumption in 2013 is estimated from primary energy consumption.
Figure 3.4: Structure of Germany’s primary energy consumption by energy carrier,  
1990 and 2012
Source: Author’s presentation based on AGEB (1990, 2014).
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?? ???? ?????? ??? ?????????? ??????? ??? ?????? ????? ??????? ???????????? ?????????
considerably in 2012 to 12 percent and, is expected to increase to 18 percent by 2020 
(Figure 3.5). The most remarkable development was recorded in gross electricity 
generation, where a level of over 25 percent was reached in 2013 from an initial level of 
only 5 percent, and it is very likely that the 35 percent target for 2020 will be achieved 
before then, even though the present reforms of the Renewable Energy Law is likely 
to slow down the development. Overall, it will take quite some eﬀort to reach the 60 
percent renewable energy target by 2050.
Figure 3.5: Share of renewable energy sources in Germany’s final energy consumption,  
1995-2020
Source: Author’s presentation based on BMU (2013). 
 
The second Monitoring Report was published in April 2014 (BMWi, 2014) concludes that 
further progress has been achieved in the attainment Energiwende targets. An expert 
commission  estimates that the 18 percent target for renewable energy in 2020 is within reach 
(Expert Commission, 2014) but also emphasizes the importance of energy eﬃciency for the 
“Energiewende” calling for further policy action.
The EU’s role in supporting energy eﬃciency  
and renewable energy sources in its Member States
Germany’s energy policy is strongly interlinked with the EU’s energy policy, which has an important 
impact on the national implementation process. Germany, like all other EU Member States, must 
comply with Community laws, and the EU as a whole has become a major actor in developing 
eﬀective instruments for energy and climate policy such as eco-design standards for appliances 
in the residential, service and industry sectors as well as CO2 standards for cars. While the EU 
has assumed a strong role in bringing forward individual instruments such as emissions trading 
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(which are sometimes even more far-reaching than the national instruments and thus advance 
the development of national policies), it is still weak and fragmented in terms of developing a 
strategy for a common European energy policy, since energy policy still widely belongs to the 
national realm. Member States’ visions on their future energy system diﬀer significantly as do 
their energy mixes. While countries such as France struggle with their dependence on nuclear 
energy and lack of diversification of energy sources, other Member States including Poland 
emphasize the unabated impact of Germany’s renewable energy policy on other their electricity 
grid. For example, renewable energy generated in northern Germany currently transits Poland to 
get to southern Germany, because of poor North-South electricity interconnections in Germany. 
Even though renewable energy is pursued in all Member States, considerable eﬀorts will need 
to be made to find common ground on an overall energy policy in the EU. Energy eﬃciency is 
generally accepted as the most important pillar of EU-wide targets, but national approaches to 
concrete policy design its weight in national policy diﬀer widely.
A brief overview of the EU’s legislation to improve energy eﬃciency and to promote renewable 
energy in the Member States is provided below:
?? ???????????????????????Energy Labeling Directive 2010/30/EU:
 ◊  Energy labels for white appliances and other energy-using equipment. This directive 
had a tremendous impact in Germany as it gave consumers an easy means to select 
energy eﬃcient technologies.
?? ???????????????????????Energy Performance of Buildings (EPBD) Directive 2010/31/EU:
 ◊ This directive sets requirements for new buildings and those undergoing major ren-
ovation.
 ◊ By 2021, Member States must ensure that all new buildings are so-called ‘nearly ze-
ro-energy buildings’. The Directive will most likely have a considerable impact on the 
energy performance of new buildings in Germany, but implementation is slow. The 
issuance of such building certificates, in particular, is far less successful in Germany 
than that of energy labels due to the complexity of energy performance labels and 
the fact that a building’s energy consumption is influenced by consumer behavior.
?? ???????Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) was introduced in 2005. Thus far, the scheme 
has only had a minor impact due to the generally low carbon price since 2005 and the 
many exceptions for industry on account of the carbon leakage status.
?? ????Ecodesign Directive 2009/125/EC was launched in 2005, implementing additional 
product standards:
 ◊ Implements minimum energy performance standards for many energy-using and en-
ergy-related products. Over 15 standards are now applicable and up to 40 additional 
standards are currently being developed.
 ◊ This, together with the Labeling Directive, is one of the most successful EU-wide 
instruments, and has a considerable impact on electricity consumption. At the same 
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time it allows producers in the EU to take advantage of their industrial capability to 
produce energy eﬃcient appliances.
?? ?????????????Energy Services Directive 2006/32/EC was issued:
 ◊ It sets an indicative target to reduce final energy demand by 9 percent in the period 
2008-2016. However, as progress at the national levels and early action (i.e. policy 
impacts between 1995 and 2007) was accounted for in the Directive’s targets, the 
Directive’s major impact is attributable to the requirement for Member States to 
regularly publish National Energy Eﬃciency Action Plans (NEEAPs).
 ◊ Its objective is to support the energy services market and to develop business op-
portunities for energy eﬃciency.
?? Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC): According to the Directive, every Member 
State must achieve individual targets for the overall share of renewable energy in gross 
final energy consumption. Germany, for example, has to attain a renewable energy share 
of 18 percent by 2020 (European Commission, 2014a). In 2010, Germany had reached 
11 percent (see Table 3.2), exceeding the interim target by far, and has passed the 12 
percent threshold in 2012 (see Figure 3.5). Germany is among the top countries in terms 
of increasing the share of renewable energy, but the current pace must be maintained 
to achieve to the 2020 target. The EU as a whole reached 12.7 percent in 2010 of the 
initial 20 percent target. 41 To this end, Member States will have to agree on regulations 
to improve grid access for electricity from renewable energy, the administrative and 
planning procedures and information and training of installers.
Table 3.2: Overview of EU Member States’ progress under the Renewable Directive 2009/28/EC
Renewable energy sources (RES) as a percentage of gross final energy consumption
Member State RES share  2005
RES share  
2010
RES share  
2012
1st interim  
target
2020 RES  
target
Austria 23.3 30.1 32.1 25.4 34 
Belgium 2.2 5.4 6.8 4.4 13 
Bulgaria 9.4 13.8 16.3 10.7 16 
Cyprus 2.9 5.7 6.8 4.9 13 
Czech Republic 6.1 9.4 11.2 7.5 13 
Germany 5.8 11.0 1) 12.4 8.2 18 
Denmark 17 22.2 26.0 19.6 30 
Estonia 18 24.3 25.8 19.4 25 
Greece 6.9 9.7 13.8 9.1 18 
Spain 8.7 13.8 14.3 10.9 20 
41 Comparisons across countries with respect to achievement in renewable energy sources depend on a variety of variables such as the original level 
of renewables, the renewable energy potentials etc. Despite the fact that Germany in 2012 had just reached the EU average, the statement holds that 
there was a rather strong development in Germany in the field of renewable energy as compared to other Member States (see performance indicators 
for renewable energy in Held et al. 2010).
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Member State RES share  2005
RES share  
2010
RES share  
2012
1st interim  
target
2020 RES  
target
Finland 28.5 33.0 34.3 30.4 38 
France 10.3 13.5 13.4 12.8 23 
Hungary 4.3 8.8 9.6 6.0 13 
Ireland 3.1 5.8 7.2 5.7 16 
Italy 5.2 10.4 13.5 7.6 17 
Lithuania 15 19.7 21.7 16.6 23 
Luxembourg 0.9 3 .0 3.1 2.9 11 
Latvia 32.6 32.6 35.8 34.0 40 
Malta 0 0.4 1.4 2.0 10 
Netherlands 2.4 3.8 4.5 4.7 14 
Poland 7.2 9.5 11.0 8.8 15 
Portugal 20.5 24.6 24.6 22.6 31 
Romania 17.8 23.6 22.9 19.0 24 
Sweden 39.8 49.1 51.0 41.6 49 
Slovenia 16.0 19.9 20.2 17.8 25 
Slovakia 6.7 9.8 10.4 8.2 14 
UK 1.3 3.3 4.2 4.0 15 
EU27 8.5 12.7 14.1 2 ) 10.7 20 
1) The numbers diﬀer slightly from those of Figure 3.5, as they have been revised in the latest analysis for that figure.
2) EU28 
Source: Adapted from the European Commission (2013). Figures for 2012 are from Eurostat.
?? ???????????????????????????????“20-20-20 targets” for 2020: 
 ◊ Reduction in GHG emissions by 20 percent compared to 1990 levels (or by 30 per-
cent, given that other countries commit to this target as well).
 ◊ 20 percent renewable energy share in (gross) final energy demand.
 ◊ 20 percent increase in energy eﬃciency compared to the baseline projection.
?? ??? ?????????????????? ?????????? ?????????????Roadmap for a Low Carbon Economy by 
2050. The Roadmap details how the eﬀort to reduce GHG emissions should be divided 
cost eﬀectively among diﬀerent economic sectors. All sectors will have to contribute 
according to their technological and economic potential (see Table 3.3). Although no 
specific targets have been specified for individual EU Member States, countries must 
target a reduction in GHG emissions of at least 80 percent and, hence, similar sectoral 
reductions. Furthermore, it is not excluded that when policy is developed in the course 
leading up to 2050, mandatory targets may be developed for Member States. This was 
the case for renewables up to 2020 and is presently being debated for energy eﬃciency 
and renewable energy for 2030.
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Table 3.3: GHG reductions in the EU
Percent
GHG reductions compared to 1990 2005 2030 2050
Power (CO2) -7 -54 to -68 -93 to -99 
Industry (CO2) -20 -34 to -40 -83 to -87 
Transport (incl. CO2 aviation, excl. maritime) +30 +20 to -9 -54 to -67 
Residential and services (CO2) -12 -37 to -53 -88 to-91 
Agriculture (non- CO2) -20 -36 to -37 -42 to -49 
Other non-CO2 emissions -30 -72 to -73 -70 to -78 
Total sectors -7 -40 to -44 -79 to -82 
Source: Adapted from the European Commission (2011).
 
?? ?????????????Energy Eﬃciency Directive 2012/27/EU was introduced:
 ◊ It aims to support the energy services market to achieve the 2020 targets by intro-
ducing energy eﬃciency obligations, for example by 30 April 2014, and every three 
years thereafter, Member States will have to submit National Energy Eﬃciency Ac-
tion Plans (NEEAPs) to the European Commission:
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Energy to amend the 20-20-20 target framework in terms of the time horizon and entails 
the following objectives:
 ◊ Reduction in GHG emissions by 40 percent in 2030.
 ◊ Increasing the share of renewable energy to at least 27 percent.
 ◊ Indicative energy savings of at least 27 percent as compared to a reference develop-
ment (lower from the 30 percent originally proposed by the European Commission).
 ◊ Reform of the EU emission trading system: market stability reserve at the beginning 
of the next emission trading system trading period in 2021. The reserve will address 
both the surplus of emission allowances, which has built up in recent years, and the 
improvement of the system’s resilience to major shocks by automatically adjusting 
the supply of allowances to be auctioned.
 ◊ New governance system: the 2030 framework proposes a new governance frame-
work based on national plans for competitive, secure and sustainable energy. The 
plans will be prepared by Member States under a common approach to ensure co-
herence at the EU level.
 ◊ Report on energy prices and costs: the European Commission Communication set-
ting out the framework is accompanied by a report on energy prices and costs (Euro-
pean Commission, 2014b), which assesses the key drivers and compares EU prices 
with those of its main trading partners. These findings inform the 2030 framework.
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3.3 Evaluation of Present Employment Eﬀects from  
Clean Energy Technology in Germany
This section introduces a number of important studies on the eﬀects the policies described in 
Section 3.2 have had on employment in Germany. The studies introduced here are comprehensive 
in that they are carried out regularly (that is, they serve to monitor the employment eﬀects of 
clean energy technology) and because they serve oﬃcial purposes, e.g. within the scope of 
national reporting, reporting of climate policies to the European Commission or international 
reporting obligations within the scope of the UNFCCC. These studies allow a comparison with 
the results in Volume I on Germany, which shows that a shift towards a clean energy sources 
framework will generate an increase in employment in the country of between 299,900 and 
404,500 per year over the next 20 years. The studies also provide empirical insights on the 
conclusions of the analysis in Volume I. Other studies such as Ragwitz et al. (2009) examine the 
broader employment impacts of renewable energy sources in the EU, with Germany assuming 
an important position in these studies. 
Employment eﬀects from green technologies
Every two years since 2002, the Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU) and the Federal 
Environment Agency (UBA) surveys (gross) employment in the environmental protection 
sector. The most recent survey “Report on the Environmental Economy 2011. Facts & Figures 
for Germany” presents total employment of green technologies in Germany, of which clean 
energy technologies represent an important part. It only includes 2008 data, and does not 
cover some of the latest developments in the field of renewables in terms of employment. 
However, separate evaluations for employment in this particular field are available up to 2013.
Clean energy technologies are defined in BMU and UBA (2011) as comprising 
“all companies that supply environmental goods and services. … Their range covers 
such widely diﬀering fields as waste management and recycling, water conservation 
and wastewater treatment, air quality control, noise abatement, renewable energy 
sources, environmentally sound products, eﬃcient use of energy, climate protection, 
and instrumentation and control (I&C) technology. The spectrum of goods manufactured 
is correspondingly broad … Also of great importance are environment-related services: 
examples include energy consulting, trade in environmentally sound products, or 
product support services in the service and maintenance sector.” 42 
The concept of potential environmental protection goods originates from a convention that was 
developed by research institutions in the 1990s in collaboration with the Federal Statistical 
Oﬃce. Since then it has been used for studies on the technological capacity of German indus-
try. It is based on a list of goods that are (capable of being) used for environmental protection 
purposes. In 2006, this concept was expanded at the request of the UBA to include climate 
protection goods.
42 The definition of the sector of Green Technologies follows OECD/Eurostat-Classifikation, see OECD/Eurostat (1999).
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The BMU and UBA (2011) combine two approaches to estimate the impacts on employment: 43
?? Supply-oriented estimates use data such as sales revenue or employee numbers. 
Conventional statistical surveys exist in industries such as recycling and other waste 
management services, whereas analyses of the environmental economy are based on 
company surveys, panel surveys by the Institute for Employment Research (Institut für 
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung) or association statistics. This makes it possible 
to determine the impact of environment-oriented services and, to some extent, of 
renewable energy on employment.
?? Demand-oriented estimates use data from oﬃcial statistics on domestic demand and 
on exports of environmental goods as a basis for calculating employment eﬀects. 
Model calculations based on I-O analyses are used to identify direct and indirect 
employment eﬀects. Data on the eﬀects of investments, material expenses and exports 
on employment are based on demand-oriented estimates.
The main results from the BMU and UBA’s 2011 survey are:
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
was well above average and reached a volume of nearly $99 billion (corresponding to 5.7 
percent of total industrial production) in 2008, while the production volume decreased 
to $78 billion in 2009 due to the impacts of the economic crisis (see Table 3.4). In the 
field of green technologies for climate protection, the volume of renewables and energy 
eﬃciency is about equal, with the former, however, growing much more rapidly. Note, 
nevertheless, that categories such as “cleaner/eﬃcient processes” or “cleaner/eﬃcient 
products” are more diﬃcult to accurately define than renewable energy technologies.
?? ????????????????????????????? ???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
exports of environmental goods. Germany was followed by the U.S. (13.6 percent) and 
China (11.8 percent), ahead of Japan, the United Kingdom and France.
?? ??? ?????? ???? ???????? ???????? ????? ????????? ??? ???? ????? ??? ?????? ??????????????
corresponding to 4.8 percent of total employment in Germany. 
?? ?????????????????????????? ???? ??????????? ?????? ???????????????? ???????????????????
sources (see the development of the production figures in Table 3.2) and by the export 
of environmental goods and services. By 2011, employment in the field of renewables 
comprised around 380,000 persons, up from 320,000 persons in 2008 (see Figure 3.8).
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of waste, noise, air and water pollution, etc. decreased, on the other hand. 
Hence, the BMU and UBA (2011) study show that the production of environmental goods from 
2002 to 2009 has generated a substantial number of jobs.
43 The combination of the two approaches yields a sound overview of employment in the environmen tal protection sector – though it also requires 
careful analysis and the elimination of double counting.
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Table 3.4: Production of potential environmental protection goods in Germany, by 
environmental protection purposes, 2002-2009
Billion dollars (converted from the original source in Euro with an exchange rate of 1.3 dollars/Euro)
Environmental protection purpose 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Waste 3.6 4.0 4.6 5.3 6.1 6.6 5.1
Wastewater 12.9 13.9 14.8 16.4 18.6 20.0 15.3
Air 19.0 20.2 20.5 23.1 25.6 27.7 20.9
Instrumentation and control 17.4 18.9 19.9 21.8 23.8 24.6 18.6
Climate protection 1) 11.7 12.2 13.0 13.0 16.0 18.3 22.0 20.4
of which:
- Goods for eﬃcient use of energy 7.8 8.3 8.2 8.3 9.4 10.3 10.8 9.2
- Goods for eﬃcient conversion of energy 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.0
- Goods for use of energy eﬃciency sources 2.2 2.7 3.6 3.4 4.9 6.2 9.1 9.2
Total 2) 61.6 63.1 68.4 71.0 80.7 90.4 98.7 78.3 3)
For information: Share of total industrial 
production in percent 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.8 5.1 5.3 5.7 5.7
Source: BMU and UBA (2011) based on Federal Statistical Oﬃce, Fachserie 4, Reihe 3.1, and special analyses for the Lower Saxony Institute for Eco-
nomic Research (NIW); calculations and estimates by NIW.
 
Methodological review of employment eﬀects from renewable energy 
technologies
This section briefly introduces methodological aspects in the discussion of employment eﬀects 
and discusses the definition of gross and net employment generation.
The study “Review of Approaches for Employment Impact Assessment of Renewable Energy 
Deployment” by Breitschopf, Nathani and Resch, published in 2011 and updated in 2012, 
focuses on methodological aspects to determine employment eﬀects and includes quite an 
extensive review of gross and net employment studies up to 2010 at the global level and in 
Germany. The objective of the study is to provide an overview of existing impact assessment 
studies that analyze the impact of renewable energy deployment on employment, and to 
identify methodological approaches that are best suited to assess employment eﬀects in 
the field of renewable energy electricity. This study fills a gap by presenting a structured and 
transparent approach to measuring employment eﬀects and helps countries pursuing clean 
technologies to adequately measure the impacts of such technologies.
The study classifies the assessed studies on employment eﬀects into two groups: gross 
employment studies and net employment studies. They answer diﬀerent policy questions and 
capture diﬀerent eﬀects:
?? Gross employment studies focus on the number of jobs generated in the renewable 
energy industry and the structural analysis of employment in the renewable energy 
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industry. Furthermore, employment in supplying industries is also included as indirect 
or induced impacts. The aim is to provide transparency on employment in an industry 
that is of public interest, but that is not adequately represented in oﬃcial statistics, and 
to enable monitoring of the industry in the course of renewable energy promotion. Gross 
studies take positive eﬀects of renewable energy deployment into account. 
?? Net employment impact studies seek to assess the change in the number of jobs in 
the total economy. They consider the negative and positive eﬀects of renewable energy 
deployment on employment in all economic sectors and provide a full picture of the 
impacts of renewable energy deployment on the total economy, covering all economic 
activities like production, service and consumption (industries, households) (see 
Table 3.5). To determine the number of additional jobs generated by renewable energy 
deployment, a situation without renewable energy (baseline or counterfactual) is 
compared to a situation with strong renewable energy deployment.
Table 3.5: Positive and negative eﬀects caused by the economic impulses of clean energy 
technologies
Abbreviation Positive eﬀects Negative eﬀects
Investment eﬀect Direct and indirect
1) eﬀects by 
investment in renewable energy
Direct and indirect eﬀects by avoided invest-
ment in conventional generation technology
Operation & Mainte-
nance (O&M) eﬀect
Direct and indirect eﬀects by O&M in 
renewable energy
Direct and indirect eﬀects by avoided O&M in 
conventional generation
Fuel eﬀect Direct and indirect eﬀects by fuel demand
Direct and indirect eﬀects by avoided fuel 
demand
Price eﬀect Induced eﬀect through compensation of additional costs2
Induced eﬀect due to additional generation 
costs for households (budget eﬀect) and 
industry (cost eﬀect)
Renewable energy 
income eﬀects
Induced eﬀect by renewable energy 
incomes in renewable energy industry
(Avoided income in conventional generation 
industry3)
Trade eﬀect Trade of renewable energy technology and fuel
Avoided trade of conventional technology 
and fuel
Dynamic eﬀects Reinforcing eﬀects: changes in productivity, learning eﬀects, multiplier eﬀects
1) Indirect eﬀects include eﬀects on upstream and downstream industries and services, while direct eﬀects only refers to the industry producing 
renewable energy equipment or servicing the operation of renewable energy plants or producing fuels;
2) Hitherto additional generation costs of renewable energy are positive and CO2-pricing or merit-order-eﬀects partially have compensating eﬀect;
3) In many studies not discussed.
Source: Breitschopf, Nathani and Resch (2011).
The updated 2012 version of the study investigates employment eﬀects from renewable 
electricity in a number of countries. The results are diﬀerentiated by technology and life cycle 
phase as well as by direct, indirect and total employment related to renewable energy use. For 
Germany, the study finds that the renewable electricity industry directly employ approximately 
150,000 persons in 2009. Wind technology and PVs account for the largest share of employees 
in the renewable electricity industry, with 60,000 and 45,000 employees, respectively. 
Approximately 120,000 employees are indirectly related to renewable electricity use. They 
work in upstream industries supplying the renewable electricity industry. Thus, in total, over 
270,000 employees are linked to renewable energy use. The largest share of total employees by 
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far (215,000 persons) is linked to the installation of renewable electricity facilities in Germany 
and abroad. Over 32,000 employees are linked to the operation and maintenance of renewable 
electricity facilities in Germany and nearly 23,000 employees to the supply of biomass fuels. 
Current employment eﬀects from renewable energy sources in Germany
As already mentioned, climate policies and, by extension, renewable energy policies, have 
made a substantial contribution to employment generation in Germany. This section focuses 
more specifically on employment triggered by the promotion of renewable energy.
The study “Gross Employment from Renewable Energy Sources in Germany in 2013 – a First 
Estimate” by O’Sullivan et al. (2014) focuses on (gross) employment eﬀects from renewables in 
Germany. This is the most recent report in a series of eight reports (see, for example, O’Sullivan 
et al., 2013) and provides a very comprehensive overview on potential employment from 
renewable energy sources in Germany. 
The report ascertains the turnover of companies in Germany that produce plants for the use of 
renewable energy sources, corresponding to the demand from within and outside of Germany. 
Based on investments in Germany as well as on the development of foreign trade in 2012, the 
investments are diﬀerentiated by technologies. Starting from turnover by technology (which 
delivers the direct employment triggered by renewable energy sources through production and 
services), gross employment is determined with the help of a static I-O analysis (tables from 
2010, while the previous report was based on 2007; this has led to some revisions of the 2012 
results compared to the previous year). The latter delivers indirect employment, upstream in 
the value chain. The representation of the renewables industry is based on an analysis using 
technology-sharp vectors, which are derived from primary surveys in the base years 2004 
and 2007. Important parameters such as labour productivity in the diﬀerent industries are 
adapted to the actual development. A comparable methodological approach is carried out for 
employment in the operation and maintenance of plants installed in Germany. This is estimated 
from the share of operational costs in investments in the plant stock. Employment in the supply 
of biogenic fuels and motor fuels is determined with an I-O approach. In addition, jobs are 
created in publicly funded research and administration.
The study finds that plant investments in Germany for the use of renewable energy 
sources was $20.9 billion in 2013 (down from $26.3 billion in 2012 and $29.8 billion 
in 2011) (Figure 3.6), decreasing in comparison to previous years. While in 2012 this 
was mainly attributable to the impact of decreasing unit costs for PVs (the installed PVs 
power of 7.6 GW in Germany kept installers and project planners busy), there was also 
a decrease in production in 2013, as the present reform of the renewable energy law aims 
at a production “corridor” that is lower than this figure. In the medium and long term, 
this may, however, impact the technology base and hence the industry’s export ability. 
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Figure 3.6: Investment in plants for the use of renewable energy sources in Germany,  
2012 and 2013
Billion dollars (converted from the original source in euro with an exchange rate of 1.3 dollars/euro)
Source: Adapted from O’Sullivan et al. (2013, 2014).    
■  Wind 5,070 19.3%
■  Geothermal/
 Environmenal heat 1,274 4.8%
■  Solarthermal 1,287 4.9%
■  Biomass heat 1,599 6.1%
■  Hydro 325 1.2%
■  Photovoltaics 14,521 55.3%
■  Biomass electricity 2,197 8.4%
$26,3 billion
2012 
$20,9 billion
2013 
■  Wind 9,178 43.9%
■  Geothermal/
 Environmenal heat 1,326 6.3%
■  Solarthermal 1,144 5.5%
■  Biomass heat 1,573 7.5%
■  Hydro 325 1.6%
■  Photovoltaics 5,512 26.4%
■  Biomass electricity 1,859 8.9%
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Figure 3.7: Turnover of active producers of plants for the use of renewable energy sources in 
Germany, including component exports of companies based in Germany, 2012 and 2013
Billion dollars (converted from the original source in Euro with an exchange rate of 1.3 dollars/Euro)
Source: Adapted from O’Sullivan et al. (2013, 2014).     
Figure 3.7 shows the turnover of companies producing plants for the use of renewable energy 
sources in Germany, including their exports. The total figure of $28.7 billion in 2013 ($33.8 
billion in 2012 and $32.4 billion in 2011) exceeds the total investments in plants for the use 
of renewable energy sources, in particular wind energy. PVs, on the other hand, contributes 
less in relative terms due to heavy imports of cells and modules. The turnover of PVs was $8.3 
billion (down from $10.6 billion in 2012 and $14.3 billion in 2011).
In 2013, employment in renewable energy sources based on this turnover was 371,400 
employees, down by about 7 percent compared to 2013. The main reason was the job cuts in 
the PV industry were not fully counterbalanced by jobs in other industries such as wind energy 
(Table 3.6). 74 percent of jobs are linked to the installation and use of plants for electricity 
generation, 19 percent to plants for heat generation and 7 percent to the production of biofuels. 
About 70 percent of jobs in renewable energy can be attributed to the Renewable Energy Law. 
About 56 percent of jobs were generated by the domestic expansion or renewable energy 
capacities, while 44 percent are linked to the export of plants and components. 
■  Wind onshore 11,843 41.6%
■  Wind oﬀhore 2,171 7.6%
■  Hydro 468 1.6%
■  Deep Geothermal 117 0.4%
■  Surface Geothermal 962 3.4%
■  Photovoltaics 8,281 29.1%
■  Solarthermal 1,053 3.7%
■  Solarthermal power plants 208 0.7%
■  Biomass small plants  1,079 3.8%
■Biomass heating/power plants  247 0,9%
■  Biogas  2,041 7.2%
  Liquid biomasse (stationary use) 0 0%
■  Wind onshore 13832 48,1%
■  Wind oﬀhore 2509 8,7%
■  Hydro 1183 4,1%
■  Deep Geothermal 156 0,5%
■  Surface Geothermal 1560 5,4%
■  Photovoltaics 4628 16,1%
■  Solarthermal 1222 4,3%
■  Solarthermal power plants 130 0,5%
■  Biomass small plants  1235 4,3%
■Biomass heating/power plants  247 0,9%
■  Biogas  2041 7,1%
  Liquid biomasse (stationary use) 0 0,0%
$33,8 billion
2012 
$28,7 billion
2013 
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Table 3.6: Employment from renewable energy sources in Germany, 2012 and 2013 
By investment 
(incl. export)
By operation 
and 
maintenance
By provision 
of biogenic 
fuels
Total 2013
Total 2012
(for 
comparison)
Wind onshore 100,800 18,200 119,000 104,000 
Wind oﬀshore 17,500 1,300 18,800 17,800
Photovoltaic 45,100 10,900 56,000 100,300
Solarthermal 10,100 1,300 11,400 12,200
Solarthermal power 1,100 1,100 1,400
Hydro power 8,300 4,800 13,100 12,900
Deep geothermal 1,300 200 1,500 1,400
Surface geothermal 13,300 2,500 15,800 15,000
Biogas 17,200 11,800 20,200 49,200 50,400
Biomass small plants 10,100 3,900 14,600 28,600 28,800
Biomass heating/
power plants 6,000 8,600 8,400 23,000 22,900
Biofuels 25,600 25,600 25,400
Total 230,800 63,500 68,800 363,100 392,500
Publicly funded research/
administration 8,300 7,300
Overall total 371,400 399,800
Source: O’Sullivan et al. (2014).
 
Figure 3.8 illustrates the development of gross employment from renewables in Germany from 
2004 to 2013.
Figure 3.8: Development of gross employment from renewables in Germany, 2004-2013
Source: Adapted from O’Sullivan et al. (2014).
■ 2004
■ 2007
■ 2010
■ 2011
■ 2012
■ 2013
2004: arround 160.500 employment
2007: arround 277.300 employment
2010: arround 367.400employment*
2011: arround 381.600 employment*
2012: arround 399.800 employment
2013: arround 371.400 employment
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The qualifications required to work in the environmental protection sector are as varied as the 
jobs in that sector. Whereas the majority of jobs in the renewable energy industry call for a 
high level of qualifications, most jobs in the recycling and waste management industry require 
lower level qualifications. An analysis of job oﬀers relating to renewable energy shows that 
they mostly require technical qualifications, i.e. engineers, technicians and construction trade 
personnel (see Figure 3.9). This is partly due to the high demand for skilled personnel in the 
fields of installation and service. Moreover, the analysis of available jobs also suggests that 
the industry is increasingly turning to (non-academic) technicians to compensate for the lack 
of specialized staﬀ.
Figure 3.9: Germany. Basic qualifications required for jobs relating to renewable  
energy, 2006-2010
Note: Multiple responses possible.
Source: Adapted from BMU and UBA (2011) (based on Ostenrath (2010)).
Comparison of employment multipliers with the findings in Volume I
The results of O’Sullivan et al.’s study (2013) are detailed enough to be directly compared 
with those from Volume I. Germany is one of the few countries, which already has an empirical 
foundation for the evaluation of employment generated by renewables. These are not simply 
ex-ante estimates. A comparison on estimated employment figures based on investment in 
clean energy technologies from Volume I answers the question whether employment actually 
materializes; hence, the estimates for future employment are tested against the empirical 
findings. 
The analysis provides the following results presented in the country section of Volume I (Table 
3.7): with stable domestic content (that is, under the assumption that the share of technologies 
produced in Germany and the share that is imported remains at present levels), 9.3 jobs are 
created in Germany, on average, per $1 million invested through direct and indirect jobs from 
renewable energy sources, with some variation across diﬀerent technologies. Wind and solar 
lie slightly below that average with 8.4 and 8.8 jobs, respectively, per $1 million invested.
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Table 3.7:  Germany. Employment creation through investment in alternative energy 
industries, 2007
Jobs per $1 million; numbers reflect direct and indirect jobs.  
Domestic content stable Domestic content declines
Type of renewables
Bioenergy 11.0 9.5
Hydro 8.8 7.8
Wind 8.4 7.5
Solar 8.8 7.9
Geothermal 9.7 8.9
Weighted average for renewables 9.3 8.4
Source: Volume I, p. 154.
To compare these figures with the employment analysis carried out in Section 3.2, we establish 
the following investment figures for renewable energy technology from O’Sullivan et al. (2013) 
(for previous years, see Table 3.8). Table 3.9 summarizes the (direct and indirect) employment 
generated from renewable energy technology in Germany between 2004 and 2012.
Table 3.8: Germany. Investment in renewable energy technology, 2004-2013
Million dollars (converted from the original source in Euro with an exchange rate of 1.3 dollar/Euro)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Wind 2,860 2,730 3,770 2,860 2,990 3,445 3,250 3,835 5,070 9,178
Hydro 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 325 325
Geothermal/
Environmenal heat 130 338 767 781 1,430 1,300 1,105 1,248 1,274 1,326
Total solar 2,860 6,825 6,747 7,053 9,945 14,235 26,585 20,865 15,808 6,656
Photovoltaic 5,564 6,110 8,060 12,480 25,350 19,500 14,521 5,512
Solarthermal 1,183 943 1,885 1,755 1,235 1,365 1,287 1,144
Biomass total 2,340 3,380 3,731 3,055 2,600 3,900 3,510 3,744 3,796 3,432
Biomass electricity 1,755 1,300 650 2,145 2,015 2,600 2,197 1,859
Biomass heat 1,976 1,755 1,950 1,755 1,495 1,144 1,599 1,573
Total 8,281 13,364 15,106 13,840 17,056 22,971 34,541 29,783 26,273 20,917
Source: Adapted from O’Sullivan et al. (2014) and earlier studies. 44 
44 For an overview of the more recent studies on employment eﬀects from renewable please consult http://elib.dlr.de (search for Bruttobeschäftigung)
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Table 3.9: Absolute employment generated from renewable energy technology in Germany, 
2004 and 2013
2013 2004 2004-2013
Wind 137,800 63,900 73,900
Hydro 13,100 9,500 3,600
Geothermal/Environmenal heat 17,300 1,800 15,500
Total solar 68,500 25,100 43,400
Total biomass 126,400 56,800 69,600
Total 363,100 157,100 206,000
Source: Adapted from O’Sullivan et al. (2014) and earlier studies.
 
Table 3.10 presents the resultant creation of jobs per $1 million. No deflation has been applied. 
We also assume a factor of 70 percent of investment implying job creation, while the remainder 
is used for capital service as in Volume I.
Table 3.10: Employment generated from renewable energy technology in Germany, 2004-2013 
Million dollars (converted from the original source in Euro with an exchange rate of 1.3 dollar/
Euro)
Investment (million dollars)
Average per year for the 
period 2004-2013
Million dollars
70 percent for job creation
Jobs/million dollars
Ratio to employment per year
Wind 3,423 2,396 30.8
Hydro 117 82 44.0
Geothermal 930 651 23.8
Total solar 12,325 8,627 5.0
Biomass total 3,340 2,338 29.8
Total 20,135 14,094 14.6
Source: Adapted from O’Sullivan et al. (2014) and earlier studies.
he analysis indicates that both sources come up with approximately the same number of jobs. 
However, the result based on O’Sullivan et al. (2014) is somewhat higher. This is primarily due 
to job creation in wind technology, where the number of jobs was also strongly linked to exports 
and to bioenergy (both around 30 jobs per $1 million), while the number of jobs created in the 
solar energy industry was 5 jobs per $1 million lower as in Volume I. The solar energy industry was 
dominated by heavy investments in PVs which recorded quite a substantial amount of imports 
due to the high demand of domestic PV installations in Germany as compared to installed PV 
plants during that period. The lower figure for PVs compared to Volume I was essentially the 
result of the year 2013, which witnessed a very strong restructuring of the German PV industry. 
Up to 2012, employment generation was similar in the two sources.
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3.4 Evaluation of Future Employment Eﬀects from Clean Energy 
Technology in Germany from a Macroeconomic Perspective
 
Overview of macroeconomic evaluation studies of employment eﬀects due 
to clean energy technologies
Numerous macroeconomic evaluation studies on clean energy technologies in Germany have 
been carried out in recent years. A summary of the most recent and comprehensive studies in 
the field is provided in Table 3.11 (based on Lehr, Lutz and Ulrich (2014a, 2014b)). 
The authors point out the diﬃculty of comparing these studies, namely:
?? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and climate change technology.
?? ???? ??????????? ?????????? ???????????????? ??????? ????? ??? ?????? ???????? ????????????
a reference development and measures additional climate impacts and employment 
from clean energy scenarios compared to the reference development. The reference 
development may, for example, be based on a higher amount of fossil fuels. Table 3.11 
briefly describes the reference development for the studies on employment cited here, 
but it goes beyond the scope of this report to explain the logic behind these reference 
developments.
?? ???? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
The most comparable studies are Jochem et al. (2008) and Schade et al. (2009), Studies 3 
and 4 in the table. An ambitious climate package, the so-called “Meseberg” package, which 
achieves the German government’s 2020 and 2030 GHG targets, is compared with a reference 
development starting in 2005. The studies from 2008 and 2009 are based on a “Meseberg 
plus” package (an extension of the original package) which, in addition to the measures 
decided in 2008, discusses additional measures to achieve Germany’s GHG reduction target 
of 40 percent by 2020. The “Energiewende” or Energy Transformation Scenario (ETS) from the 
project “Policy Scenarios for Climate Protection VI” (PSzVI) (Matthes et al., 2013), which the 
German government uses to report on climate policy developments to the EU Commission, also 
leads to similar GHG reductions.
Methodological issues based on the models used have been investigated for ASTRA and 
Panta Rhei, two major models used in Germany to estimate macroeconomic impacts. More 
generalized macro models are also applied to specific issues such as the VIEW model developed 
by Prognos, which is based on dynamic I-O tables and was used to evaluate the employment 
impacts of the KfW’s sizeable thermal building rehabilitation program (see Table 3.11). 45 
The main diﬀerences between the two major models ASTRA and Panta Rhei are:
?? ??? ???? ?????? ??????? ???????????? ??? ???? ????????????? ???????? ??????? ??????????????
45 See program description on ‘Programme Energy-Eﬃcient Rehabilitation’, www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/germany/name-24665-en.php 
(Accessed 27 July 2014).
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while the impeding influence of higher capital cost is evident in the long term in the 
Panta Rhei model.
?? ????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the EU lead to higher economic activity in another EU country, which in turn increases 
the exports of all countries. Panta Rhei does not include such feedback eﬀects.
?? ?????? ???? ??????????? ??? ???? ????????? ????? ???? ??????????? ??????????? ????? ??? ????
two models. ASTRA calculations have been carried out using parameters that are 
considerably influenced by the economic crisis, while Panta Rhei uses more recent 
data. With regard to employment markets, this probably implies that wage eﬀects are 
observable in the Panta Rhei model due to higher investments, which have an impeding 
influence on multiplicator eﬀects. Hence, employment eﬀects have a stronger impact in 
terms of higher wages than in terms of higher employment. 
The employment estimates for Germany in Volume I are built on the scenarios from the Energy 
Concept (Schlesinger et al., 2010 - Study 1 in Table 3.11). These scenarios date back to 2010, 
but are oﬃcial projections for GHG emissions and environmental policies. They are still fairly 
representative of the trends compared to other scenario projections such as the “Policy 
Scenarios for Climate Protection VI” (see the comparison below in this section), which the more 
recent study by Lehr, Lutz and Ulrich (2014b) on employment eﬀects is based on.
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Macroeconomic evaluation of employment eﬀects
In this section, we focus on the specific results of the macroeconomic evaluation of employment 
eﬀects in Study 7, “Gesamtwirtschaftliche Wirkungen von Klimaschutzmaßnahmen und –
Instrumenten” (Macroeconomic impacts of climate protection measures and instruments) by 
Lehr, Lutz and Ulrich (2014b). It is the most recent macroeconomic study on climate protection 
measures and instruments determining net employment for 2020 and 2030 under certain 
scenario assumptions. The macroeconomic analysis (top-down) is based on the project “Policy 
Scenarios for Climate Protection VI” (hereafter referred to as Policy Scenarios VI) (Matthes et 
al., 2013), published by UBA, with a large number of bottom-up models (energy system models) 
being run to deliver investment impulses to the macro-model. This is the main projection tool 
used by Germany to report on the impact of climate policies to the European Commission and 
the UNFCCC. Study 1 cited in Table 3.11 also includes important projections undertaken for 
the Ministry of Economic Aﬀairs in Germany. The projections do not significantly diﬀer in their 
trends on renewable energy and energy eﬃciency from those in the Policy Scenarios VI. The 
key diﬀerence is that Study 1 was initiated with the perspective of extending the lifetime of 
nuclear power plants in Germany, which became obsolete following the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear disaster. Though these scenarios were built on extending the lifetime of nuclear 
power plants, they nevertheless implicitly incorporated a strong renewable energy and energy 
eﬃciency factor considering that the impact in terms of GHG reduction is primarily attributed to 
renewable energy and energy eﬃciency rather than to the extension of the lifetime of nuclear 
power plants. The key diﬀerence to the Policy Scenarios VI is that the role of the remaining fossil 
fuels during the transition period away from nuclear power plants is even less significant. This 
is why renewable energy and energy eﬃciency provide a suitable basis in terms of employment 
generation in the projections in Volume I and deliver results similar to those of Study 7 (Lehr, 
Lutz and Ulrich, 2014b). 
The Policy Scenarios VI cluster the policy measures into two scenarios: in the Current Policy 
Scenario (CPS), all measures that were implemented by 8 July 2011 (the date for the region-
wide agreement of the “Energiewende” in Germany) are considered. This scenario serves as 
the reference scenario to evaluate the impacts of the measures. In the Energy Transformation 
Scenario (ETS), additional measures are taken into account to achieve Germany’s climate targets 
by 2030 (40 percent GHG reduction by 2020 and 55 percent reduction by 2030 compared to the 
1990 levels, see Table 3.1). To determine the economic valuation of the measures implemented, 
the ETS and CPS are compared. The two policy scenarios basically build on the same socio-
economic assumptions, e.g. concerning international developments and demography. The 
scenarios only diﬀer in terms of climate protection measures, which are specified extensively 
in Policy Scenarios VI. Additionally, for some of the policy areas, a so-called “No Measures 
Scenario” (NMS) is defined, which only includes measures implemented until the end of 2004. 
It is used in a sensitivity analysis to calculate the macroeconomic impacts of the CPS.
The study uses the macro-model Panta Rhei based on data from the German Statistical Oﬃce 
(59 industries) and the Working Group on Energy Balances in Germany (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Energiebilanzen) as well as international databases. A detailed model description can be 
found in Lehr et al. (2011).
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Table 3.12 shows that the CPS is expected to achieve an important reduction in GHG emissions 
as compared to present levels (30 percent in 2030 compared to 2008), while the ETS reduces 
emissions by 50 percent over the same period. It is important to keep in mind that the CPS 
already induces a rather substantial reduction in GHG. The corresponding reduction in final 
energy consumption in the two scenarios is also shown in Table 3.12.
Table 3.12: Germany. GHG emissions and reduction in final energy consumption according to 
Policy Scenarios VI, 2008-2030
GHG emissions (mmt CO2 equivalent) 2008 2015 2020 2025 2030
CPS 848   788   714   677   593   
ETS 848   744   624   543   429   
Diﬀerence        44   90   135   164   
Reduction in final energy consumption 
(petajoules) 2008 2015 2020 2025 2030
ETS – CPS, of which:  -199 -501 -854 -1208
Private households  -90 -195 -344 -497
Service sector  -26 -70 -136 -203
Industry  -36 -70 -78 -60
Transport sector  
(incl. international air transport)  -47 -166 -296 -448
Source: Adapted from Lehr, Lutz and Ulrich (2014b).
 
Table 3.13 presents the additional investments necessary in the ETS compared to the CPS 
and in the CPS compared to the NMS to achieve further energy savings and GHG reductions. 
During the entire period up to 2030, measures in private households and the tertiary sector 
with a focus on the building sector are, by far, the most important investments. In 2025 and 
2030, the investments would amount to nearly $30 billion annually in the ETS compared to the 
CPS. In the CPS compared to the NMS, $10-11 billion annual investments would be required. 
Moreover, measures in transport (in particular, more eﬃcient road transport), electricity savings 
(more eﬃcient household appliances) as well as electricity and heat supply (including from 
renewables) play an important role. Concerning investments in the electricity industry, it must 
be taken into account that numerous investments have already been made in the CPS and that 
the ETS only entails a limited amount of additional investments. A shift in investments occurs 
in the CPS as compared to the NMS, particularly up to 2020, from conventional electricity 
generation to renewables. 
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Table 3.13: Germany. Additional investments in the ETS compared to the CPS (CPS-ETS) 
scenario and in the CPS compared to the NMS (NMS-CPS) scenario, 2015-2030
Million dollars (converted from Euro in the original source with an exchange rate of 1.3 dollars/Euro)
 Scenarios involved 2015 2020 2025 2030
Industry (incl. industrial CCS)
CPS – ETS 1) 2) 727 1,032 1,008 2,413
NMS – CPS 3) 4) 616 578 626 489
Private households  
(space heating/hot water)
CPS - ETS 8,511 18,391 23,235 23,235
NMS – CPS 8,726 8,727 7,928 7,928
Private households  
(electricity)
CPS - ETS 3,836 2,995 4,801 5,686
NMS – CPS 2,622 1,593 2,742 3,020
Service sector  
(space heating/hot water)
CPS - ETS 4,702 6,430 7,167 6,590
NMS – CPS 2,797 2,715 2,438 2,428
Transport
CPS - ETS 8,129 10,484 6,211 6,396
NMS – CPS 1,177 1,359 2,139 4,017
Electricity and district heat generation 
(renewables and fossil fuels)
CPS - ETS 5,365 4,024 7,234 6,710
NMS – CPS 5,029 4,926 -1262 -5842
Total
CPS - ETS 31,270 43,356 49,656 51,030
CPS - NMS 20,967 19,896 14,611 12,040
1) Additional investment in the ETS scenario compared to the CPS scenario.
2) The Current Policy Scenario (CPS) includes all measures that were implemented by 8 July 2011. This scenario serves as the reference scenario to 
evaluate the impacts. The Energy Transformation Scenario (ETS) takes account of additional measures to achieve the German government’s climate 
targets by 2030 (40 percent GHG reduction by 2020 and 55 percent reduction by 2030 compared to the 1990 level, see Table 3.1).
3) Additional investment in the CPS scenario compared to the NMS scenario.
4) For some of the policy areas, a so-called “No Measures Scenario” (NMS) is defined, which only includes measures implemented until the end of 
2004.
Source: Adapted from Lehr, Lutz and Ulrich (2014b). 
The study’s results were the following:
Total investments in the ETS compared to the CPS are $51 billion by 2030, and $12 billion in 
the CSP compared to the NMS. The investments are primarily made in energy eﬃciency with 
a focus on housing insulation. The GDP is $33-39 billion higher in the ETS compared to the 
CPS. Positive employment impacts lie in the range of 200,000 additional jobs (Figure 3.10). 
Construction investments contribute a great extent. Equipment investment also plays an 
important role. Private consumption is higher than in the CPS until 2020. If the substantial 
eﬀects that are already included in the CPS are taken into account, employment may reach 
350,000 additional jobs.
However, cost increases attributable to financing for additional housing insulation, less 
the reduced energy consumption, will partly crowd out other consumption (see Figure 3.10 
for an estimate of the impact on employment of full crowding out). In comparison to the ETS 
without massive crowding out, the positive macroeconomic impacts are low in the crowding-
out scenario at the beginning of the period. There are few positive impacts of additional 
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investments. In the longer term, however, eﬃciency improvements and the reduction in energy 
imports increasingly gain in significance. Foreign trade and private consumption drive the 
positive GDP eﬀect (Table 3.14). A similar development over time is evident for employment. 
By 2030, even on the assumption of full crowding out, around 150,000 jobs net could be 
generated. Hence, energy eﬃciency improvements increasingly contribute via reduced energy 
imports in the long term. As the number of very expensive energy imports declines (Table 3.14), 
prices for all imports also become lower on average. The higher the price of energy imports is, 
the higher the import reduction will be.
Figure 3.10: Germany. Impacts on net employment – CPS (compared to NMS) and ETS 
(compared to CPS, without and with crowding out of investments in other fields) 
Source: Adapted from Lehr, Lutz and Ulrich (2014b).
Macroeconomic impacts will improve, if the climate protection measures of the years 2005 to 
2011 are taken into account (CPS compared to the NMS). They will also bring higher investments, 
more jobs and reduced energy consumption. In the CPS scenario, annual GDP is about $26 
billion higher than in the NMS in the years 2013 to 2025 (Table 3.14). A comparison between the 
ETS and CPS scenarios reveals that private consumption is persistently more important, while 
the share of investment is reduced and significantly lower than in the comparison between the 
ETS and CPS scenarios. Construction investment plays a major role throughout the observation 
period. Imports start to clearly increase with GDP. The growing reduction of energy imports 
implies fewer total imports in the CPS compared to the NMS in 2030. Employment eﬀects are 
highest in 2013. In subsequent years, the positive impact on employment levels oﬀ at around 
150,000 to 175,000 (Figure 3.10 and Table 3.14). At industry level, construction attributable to 
additional insulation as well as trade, services and manufacturing will benefit. The employment 
eﬀect will decline over time. In the (conventional) energy and water industry, employment will 
drop due to lower energy supply.
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Table 3.14: Germany. Impacts of the ETS and CPS (compared to their respective reference) on 
the GDP components as well as total and sectoral employment, 2013-2030
ETS-CPS CPS-NMS
2013 2015 2020 2025 2030 2013 2015 2020 2025 2030
Components of GDP (change in billion dollars in real terms) 
(Converted from Euro in the original source with an exchange rate of 1.3 dollars/Euro)
GDP 20.2 31.7 38.9 36.7 38.7 26.1 24.6 24.6 28.7 32.8
Private consumption 12.4 19.1 15.2 5.6 3.5 12.1 13.0 10.4 13.1 16.8
Public consumption 0.8 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.2
Equipment 7.8 12.4 12.9 10.8 12.1 6.9 3.1 3.5 3.9 2.1
Construction 4.6 7.4 18.9 24.7 24.6 12.6 11.8 11.7 10.8 10.7
Exports 0.7 0.7 -0.4 -0.8 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.8 1.6
Imports 6.1 9.2 9.0 4.4 2.5 7.0 4.6 2.0 0.9 -0.5
Labour market (absolute change)
Employment (inland) in 
1000 123 189 218 199 190 190 175 150 155 163
Sectoral employment eﬀects (change in 1000s)
Mining 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Manufacturing sector 21.1 27.3 25.1 21.7 22.3 21.2 15.1 11.2 12.1 11.5
Energy and water supply -0.2 -0.7 -1.5 -3.0 -4.4 -0.3 -0.9 -2.0 -2.6 -3.1
Energy supply -0.2 -0.8 -1.5 -3.0 -4.4 -0.3 -1.0 -2.0 -2.6 -3.1
Construction 16.0 34.8 87.1 109.4 102.1 70.6 64.8 58.7 50.4 47.3
Trade and services 70.0 103.4 81.6 50.0 50.3 77.9 76.3 64.1 76.8 86.7
Total 164.8 192.7 178.4 170.5 169.6 155.5 132.3 136.8 142.6
Source: Adapted from Lehr, Lutz and Ulrich (2014b).
Discussion of results on employment eﬀects
Though the Lehr, Lutz and Ulrich (2014b) report provides a general overview of the 
macroeconomic perspective, there are ongoing discussions on the results of the employment 
eﬀects. A detailed analysis of the studies included in Table 3.11 is rather diﬃcult, as they diﬀer 
significantly in terms of the goals of the climate packages they analyse and the reference 
scenarios used (see the note in Table 3.11). Nevertheless, we attempt to briefly discuss the 
main results. Some of the studies in Table 3.11 focus on specific technologies and their impacts 
in employment terms.
?? ?????? ?? ???????? ??? ???????? ????????? ??????????????? ???? ??? ???? ?????????? ??? ????
eﬃciency buildings, and is an ex-post analysis that diﬀers from the other studies. It 
shows that 10.3 jobs have, on average, been generated from building rehabilitation 
per $1 million investment. The promotion of new energy eﬃcient buildings generates 
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even twice as much employment. More than half of the employment generated is in the 
construction industry. Study 6 also focuses on buildings but shows that a continuation 
of the KfW activities will generate a comparable number of jobs in the future. It must 
be noted that the KfW programs are multi-billion dollar programs which have led to 
annual employment generation in the field of energy eﬃciency similar in size to the 
employment impacts from renewable energy sources. Continuing these programs at a 
similar scale is necessary to achieve the decarbonization of the building stock by the 
middle of the century. At the same time, this will lead to an employment generation in 
the order of 200,000-300,000 jobs.
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
$1 million invested, which corresponds to the values found in Volume I. 
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
packages, including both renewable and energy eﬃciency, may produce results in 
2020 and beyond, employing between 300,000-400,000 persons annually (Studies 3 
and 7), while the most comprehensive packages may generate up to an additional 1 
million jobs in Germany by 2030 (Study 4). However, investments in the range of several 
billion euros annually are necessary to realize these impacts in terms of employment. It 
further requires a years-long stable investment climate to provide suﬃcient stability for 
potential investors.
One important question to consider is how likely the crowding out of investments is today. The 
closer an economy is to full employment or to full use of production factors, the more intense 
the crowding out will be under otherwise similar conditions. Financing has to be viewed in a 
similar way. The more attractive alternatives for capital investment there are, the more diﬃcult 
it will be to secure investments in clean energy technology. Currently, some argue that crowding 
out for clean energy investments plays a fairly minor role and is adequately represented in the 
ETS calculations:
?? ???????? ?????? ??????? ???? ?????? ???? ???????? ????????? ???? ???????? ????????? ?????????
down interest rates to very low levels. Investments that pay oﬀ are being sought eagerly. 
The real interest rates of risk-free investments are negative.
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
historic comparison.
?? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the KfW secures many clean energy investments.
?? ??????????????? ??????????? ????? ?? ????? ???? ???????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ??? ???????? ????
negative real interest rates, investments in clean energy technologies pay oﬀ even with 
very low rates of return.
There is currently a lack of attractive investment options. Non-economic barriers (IEA, 2013) 
prevent investments in clean energy technology that pay oﬀ from being made. Hence, 
investments that are economic at the micro-level do not crowd-out other planned investments.
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3.5 Can National Targets Defined in Volume I be met?
In Section 3.3, we assessed the employment multipliers as proposed in Volume I and found 
them to be consistent with the German employment study. In this section we determine, 
whether the scenarios used in Volume I and the projected investment and employment eﬀects 
are sound and consistent with the most recent studies in Germany. We also discuss whether 
the projected employment figures can be met.
Assessment of the scenarios developed in Volume I evaluation of employment 
eﬀects
As mentioned, estimates in Volume I build on the scenarios from the 2010 Energy Concept. This 
section compares those scenarios with the more recent Policy Scenarios VI from 2013 (Matthes 
et al., 2013). Table 3.15 presents the GHG developments for the two major scenarios developed, 
the CPS and the ETS scenarios. The comparison with the data presented in Volume I on 
Germany shows that the scenario set selected in Volume I results in similar levels of emissions 
by 2030. Volume I only presents energy-related CO2 emissions. In the study’s BAU scenario, CO2 
emissions amount to 577 million metric tons (mmt) in 2030, while the low carbon emissions 
case reaches 439 mmt. Both figures lie in a similar range as those in the Policy Scenarios VI 
(547 mmt in the CPS and 393 mmt in the ETS). The Policy Scenarios are slightly more ambitious 
than the scenarios developed for the Energy Concept (which had not taken account of the full 
impact of the economic crisis). 
Table 3.15:  Germany. Reference development and the Low Carbon Emissions Case in the 
Policy Scenarios VI, 2000-2030
Development of emissions in the Current Policy Scenario (CPS) 
2000 2005 2008 2009 2015 2020 2025 2030
mmt CO2 equivalents
Energy sector 361 376 368 344 340 286 271 208
Industry 119 113 119 103 115 113 112 110
Services 55 48 49 45 45 42 38 35
Households 119 112 108 103 97 89 82 74
Transport 182 161 154 153 146 138 130 120
Total energy-related emissions 835 811 797 748 743 668 632 547
Fugitive emissions from energy sectors 22 16 13 12 11 8 8 7
Industrial processes 77 81 82 73 67 67 65 62
Product use 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Agriculture 74 70 70 69 68 68 68 68
Waste 27 18 13 12 9 7 6 5
Total GHG emissions 1,039 996 977 916 899 821 781 692
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Development of emissions in the Energy Transformation Scenario (ETS), 2000-2030, selected years
2000 2005 2008 2009 2015 2020 2025 2030
mmt CO2 equivalents
Energy sector 361 376 368 344 307 231 196 136
Industry 119 113 119 103 112 107 103 98
Services 55 48 49 45 43 36 28 20
Households 119 112 108 103 92 75 55 36
Transport 182 161 154 153 145 130 117 103
Total energy related emissions 835 811 797 748 698 578 498 393
Fugitive emissions from energy sectors 22 16 13 12 10 8 7 6
Industrial processes 77 81 82 73 63 61 56 43
Product use 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Agriculture 74 70 70 69 68 68 68 68
Waste 27 18 13 12 9 7 6 5
Total GHG emissions 1,039 996 977 916 850 724 636 516
Source: Adapted from UBA (2013).
 
Primary energy consumption decreases less in the BAU scenario (CPS) than in the Energy 
Concept based scenario from Volume I (see Table 3.16). However, the low carbon emissions 
case reaches a similar level as that in the Energy Concept. The overall impact on investment is 
also similar in both cases. It can therefore be concluded that the scenario settings in Volume I 
correspond to the most recent projections for Germany. 
Table 3.16: Germany. Comparison of primary energy consumption estimates in Volume I 
scenarios based on the Energy Concept and the Policy Scenarios VI (Matthes et al., 2013) 
2008=100 percent
2008 2030 BAU 2030 Low Carbon
Total energy consumption  100 72 65
2008 2030 BAU (APS) 2030 BAU (EWS)
Total energy consumption (PSz VI, Matthes et 
al., 2013) 100 81 68
Sources: Author’s calculations based on Matthes et al. (2013) and Volume I, p. 192.
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Assessment of cost and employment estimates for clean energy investments
In Volume I annual clean energy investments equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP in Germany is 
assumed and it is estimated that annual investments of $150 million are necessary up to 2030. 
This figure is a bit lower than the $163 million estimated in Lehr, Lutz and Ulrich (2014b), the 
most recent national study,but reaches a similar order.
Concerning employment eﬀects induced by these investments, it is estimated in Volume I that 
the annual employment generated from energy eﬃciency and renewable energy investments 
up to 2030 could amount to between 299,900 and 404,500 jobs within Germany. This figure 
compares well with the most recent estimates of 363,000 jobs by Lehr, Lutz and Ulrich (2014b). 
None of these studies consider alternative investments in fossil fuels, and hence no comparison 
can be made with the 261,000 jobs generated through similar investments in fossil fuels. This 
figure appears high given the fact that fossil power plants are set up and operated with less 
staﬀ than renewable energy and energy eﬃciency options.
3.6 Conclusion
Conclusions on employment impacts  
Over the past 20 years, Germany has introduced important policies in the field of clean energy 
technologies, which are briefly summarized here:
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????
?? ?????????? ??????? ?????? ??? ?????????? ????????????? ??? ?????? ??????????? ?????
approximately 370,000 jobs. This figure is rapidly growing, but has suﬀered due to 
recent diﬃculties in the German solar industry. Wind energy, on the other hand, has 
contributed over-proportionally to the generation of jobs, especially through exports.
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
are deviations for certain technologies including wind. 
?? ??????? ????????????? ??????????? ????? ???????????????? ????????????????????????????
energy technology, in particular energy eﬃciency and renewable energy, lies in the range 
of 360,000 additional jobs compared to today. This corresponds to roughly 1 percent of 
Germany’s present day workforce and is in line with the estimated employment eﬀects 
generated up to 2030 as estimated in Volume I based on the scenarios from the Energy 
Concept after 2010.
Overall, clean technologies have contributed substantially to the creation of employment 
in Germany and will continue to do so if the policies accompanying the “Energiewende” are 
properly implemented. Specifically, the electricity sector must be restructured to incorporate 
the large amount of variable renewable energy sources. By 2030, a share of renewable energy 
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well in excess of 50 percent should be reached. With the measures introduced till date, 
Germany has had an important headstart into the development of a “green economy”. The 
results achieved thus far demonstrate that it is possible to restructure an economy towards 
more sustainable. 
However, the path to the realization of ambitious climate and energy scenarios is still long. From 
the present perspective, Germany is investing heavily in the energy system’s transformation 
process. With regard to renewable energy, if the forthcoming policy reforms in 2014 maintain 
the promotion system while bringing renewable energy closer to the markets, the momentum 
towards larger amounts of renewable energy will be upheld and the calculated employment 
eﬀects will be realized. For energy eﬃciency, especially in the building sector, present financial 
instruments such as the KfW building rehabilitation programs need to be strengthened by at 
least a factor of 3-4 from the present level of $12.34 billion annually, or complemented with 
other financing instruments such as revenues from the carbon markets (which in that case 
needs to function properly) or from specific renewable energy funds or energy saving obligation 
schemes.
Long-term perspective of the “Energiewende” up to 2050
After 2030 and up to 2050, the current pace should be maintained to reach at least 80 percent 
reduction in GHG emissions as envisaged by the German government, hereby generating further 
employment. Especially, the electricity sector will need to undergo further substantial changes.
The following figures illustrate the long-term perspective of the German “Energiewende”, which 
must be embedded within the European context. This implies:
?? ?? ?????????? ??? ???????? ??????? ???????????? ??? ??? ?????? ??? ???????? ??? ???? ??? ???????
Potentials for both the final and primary energy levels (the latter includes the penetration 
of renewable energy sources) are available, which in principle allow a reduction in 
energy consumption by two-thirds (Figure 3.11).
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Figure 3.11: Long-term potentials for the reduction of primary energy in the EU, 2010-2050
Source: Fraunhofer ISI (2012).
?? ???? ????????? ??? ?? ????? ????? ???????? ?????? ??????? ??????? ??? ????? ??? ????? ?????
renewable energy sources shares at EU level of up to 95 percent. The system includes 
over 50 percent wind power and more than 10 percent PVs; hence more than 60 
percent fluctuating sources. How can such a system be stable and reliable? It requires 
the development of “enablers” that will generate more employment in Germany. 
Significant enablers include the construction of electricity interconnectors between 
countries which are subject to publica approval. Other enablers are energy storage, 
flexible load management, intelligent bi-directional electricity networks, etc. (Figure 
3.12).
Pr
im
ar
y e
ne
rg
y d
em
an
d 
(M
to
e)
■ Conversion savings
    household and tertiary 14 %
■ Conversion savings – industry 10 %
■ Conversion savings – transport 1 %
 
Household, Tertiary
■ Building envelope 11 %
■ Heating and cooling 4 %
■ Lighting 1 %
■ Green information and 
    communication technologies 1 %
■ Household appliances 0 %
 
Industry
■ Paper industry  1 %
■ Steam and hot water 6 %
■ Electric drivers 0 %
■ System optimization 3 %
 
Transport
■ Technical improvements 5 %
■ Behavioral changes 3 %
■ Estimated wedges 7 %
■ Remaining demand – household 
■ Remaining demand – tertiary
■ Remaining demand – industry
■ Remaining demand – transport
Conversion
savings 25%
Final energy related
savings 42%
2,000
1,800
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
93
Figure 3.12: A 2050 electricity supply system for the EU with a renewable energy share of 
95 percent in the power sector
Source: Pfluger et al. (2011).
Only if such changes take place and function properly in practice can further employment eﬀects 
be generated. However, the potential for is large if it were to through the export renewable 
technologies to other countries. These eﬀects have not been considered here, but the example 
of wind energy described earlier demonstrates the job-creation potential of exports.
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CHAPTER 4: INDONESIA
4.1 Introduction
Since Indonesia signed and ratified the UNFCCC in the 1990s, climate change has with its 
significance as a strategic and development challenge becoming evident - gained increasing 
political attention in the country. In 2009, Indonesia voluntarily committed to GHG emission 
reduction targets of 26 percent below the BAU level by 2020, and up to 41 percent with 
international support, while assuming that the country will continue its rapid growth trajectory. 
This is supported by the adoption of a 4-track development strategy based on the pillars “pro-
growth, pro-poor, pro-job and pro-environment” with the objective of promoting sustainable 
and inclusive growth.46 
This study explores Indonesia’s green growth framework against the background of the country’s 
seemingly dilemmatic problems of poverty and environmental degradation. Indonesia is the 
fourth most populous country in the world with approximately 28 million people (11 percent 
of the country’s total population) living below the international poverty line. Climate change 
is a major impediment to poverty eradication in the country as the livelihood of the poorest 
communities, who primarily work in agriculture and fishery, is acutely climate sensitive (UNDP, 
2007). Several studies indicate that Indonesia is one of the most vulnerable countries to 
climate change impact, and since agriculture continues to be a crucial sector in the Indonesian 
economy, this poses a risk to sustaining economic growth. 
At the same time, the pressure of demand by a rapidly growing population, increasing economic 
growth and insuﬃcient environmental management listed Indonesia as the third largest 
GHG emitter in the world in 2007 (Sari et al., 2007). According to the Indonesian Ministry of 
Environment (2010), land use change or deforestation, followed by fossil fuel consumption, are 
the main components of Indonesia’s emissions profile. However, with substantial unexploited 
fossil fuel resources including a thermal coal reserve estimated at 104.76 billion tons, which is 
expected to become a dominant export component in the future, carbon emissions from energy 
consumption are likely to rise considerably. As more people gain access to electricity, demand 
for energy generation will surge.  
As the largest country in Southeast Asia, an eﬀective response to Indonesia’s climate change 
issues will be essential for the entire region. This study presents developments within 
the renewable energy and fossil fuel industries as well as current projections for emission 
reductions. The Indonesian government has recognized that the main challenge is not only to 
tackle emissions from forestry and land use—the largest emitters—but also challenges related 
to energy generation given the expected surge in demand. This study therefore presents the 
policies introduced to promote clean energy investments. 
Indonesia’s development plans include investment measures to create green jobs and to hereby 
alleviate poverty through the advancement of green skill development. 47 The relationship 
46 ‘Comprehensive Development: OBG Talks to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’, www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/comprehensive-devel-
opment-obg-talks-president-susilo-bambang-yudhoyono (Accessed 6 August, 2014).
47 ‘Statement by H.E. Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia, at the 100th International Labour Conference’, www.ilo.
org/ilc/ILCSessions/100thSession/media-centre/speeches/WCMS_157638/lang--en/ (Accessed 5 April, 2014). 
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between clean energy and employment is examined in this study and will be compared to 
estimates in Volume I of the UNIDO/GGGI research project “Global Green Growth: Clean Energy 
Industry Investments for Expanding Job Opportunities”, which conclude that a transition 
towards cleaner energy sources will lead to a net increase in employment in Indonesia. 
The analysis is carried out against a number of obstacles Indonesia faces. First, the Indonesian 
government does not have a clear policy on how to reduce unemployment, and does not 
align with current labour supply conditions. 48 Furthermore, the domestic energy market is 
characterized by a high subsidy burden on electricity and fossil fuels, which distorts the energy 
pricing mechanism and is problematic, as Indonesia has become a net-importer of energy. This 
may impede the promotion of green investment and clean energy access in Indonesia. Such 
considerations will be included when discussing the feasibility of a successful transition of the 
country to a low carbon growth path. 
Section 4.2 outlines Indonesia’s emissions and energy mix profiles and their recent 
developments. Section 4.3 explores Indonesia’s commitments to climate change as well 
as the country’s current policy framework for energy and climate change. To evaluate the 
expected eﬀectiveness of the implemented policies, Section 4.4 compares BAU projections for 
emissions levels up to 2025 with established targets. Section 4.5 examines the relationship 
between climate change and poverty, and looks at the policy incentives in place to promote 
green job creation. The impact of clean investments on green job creation and, hence, poverty 
is subsequently assessed in Section 4.6. This includes a comparison with the results in Volume 
I. Finally, Section 4.7 discusses a number of challenges that are likely to influence the feasibility 
of Indonesia attaining a low-carbon growth path. Section 4.8 concludes. 
4.2 Historical Performance of GHG Emissions and  
Energy Industries
 
This section explores Indonesia’s historical emission performance and its energy industry 
as a framework to understand the country’s critical problem of addressing climate change 
mitigation when elaborating its development agenda. 
Emission profile
With the fourth biggest population in the world and a rapidly growing economy, Indonesia 
has become one of the largest GHG emitters in the world. According to data from the World 
Resources Institute (2014), Indonesia ranked five in 2011, with total emissions of 2,053 
million tons of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) and is superseded only by China, the U.S., India and 
the Russian Federation. Land use change and deforestation are the principal drivers of this 
development. In 2011, the land use change and forestry (LUCF) industry accounted for almost 
60 percent (or rank 1,1218) of total emissions. Due to its vast peat land forests, Indonesia 
emits more forest carbon than any other country (Thorburn, 2011). Approximately 2 million 
hectares of forest were cleared to allow for economic activity in 2012. The forest destruction 
48 ‘Cracking the Conundrum of Indonesian unemployment’, www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/02/23/cracking-conundrum-indonesian-unem-
ployment.html (Accessed 5 April, 2014).
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rate has been increasing since 2003 from around 1 million hectares of forest, totaling 15.8 
million hectares over the period.49 Between 1990 and 2011, emissions increased by 91 percent 
and by 44 percent between 2000 and 2011. Indonesia’s rate of deforestation and its weak 
policy response pose a major challenge to the country’s prospects of low-carbon growth as well 
as pressing development issues (see Section 4.7 for a more detailed discussion). However, 
even when excluding the LUCF industry from the inventories, Indonesia is still the 8th highest 
polluter in the world, and the periods studied indicate almost the same growth rates.  
Figure 4.1 shows the GHG emissions development between 2000 and 2011 (including and 
excluding the LUCF industry), and depicts the sectoral distributions. During this period, the 
LUCF and energy industries, which dominated the inventory in 2011 with shares of 59 percent 
and 25 percent, respectively, grew by 50 percent and 45 percent. This was followed by the 
agricultural sector (12 percent) which employs the majority of the population and whose share 
in the carbon mix has remained more or less unchanged since 2000. The industrial sector and 
the waste industry comprised the remaining 1 percent and 3 percent, respectively. Although 
emissions of the industrial sector dropped in the period, they actually increase by 74 percent 
compared to the 1990 level, making the sector the third largest emitter following the LUCF 
and energy industries. In Section 4.5, we examine whether this development can be explained 
by energy eﬃciency advancements in the industrial sector. According to the Indonesian 
government, the hikes in 2002 and 2006 were attributable to El Nino in those years (Ministry 
of Environment, 2010).       
Figure 4.1: Indonesia. GHG emissions by industry, 2000-2011 
Source: Author’s presentation based on World Resources Institute (2014). 
 
49 ‘Two Million Hectares of Indonesian Forest Destroyed Each Year’, http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2014/05/14/206577738/Two-Million-Hectares-
of-Indonesian-Forest-Destroyed-Each-Year (Accessed August 8, 2014).
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CO2 is the main contributor to Indonesia’s inventories (more than 80 percent) with deforestation 
and land conversion comprising approximately 75 percent. The remaining CO2 emissions are 
associated with forest-related energy consumption and forest-related industrial processes (Sari 
et al., 2007). Not accounting for the LUCF industry, Figure 4.2 illustrates how the majority of CO2 
emissions in 2011 were made up of electricity and heat generation (37 percent), manufacturing 
and construction, and transportation (both 26 percent). 
Figure 4.2 shows the country’s sectoral CO2 emissions profile in 2000 and 2011. Emissions from 
the electricity and heat industries not only dominated in both years but expanded significantly 
due to a rapid increase in demand, sparking an average annual growth of 4.9 percent. The 
manufacturing and construction industries as well as the transportation industry increased 
their share over the period (with an average annual growth of 3.5 percent and 6 percent, 
respectively). On the other hand, other fuel combustion emissions dropped by 2.3 percent, 
while fugitive emissions increased by 2 percent. 
Figure 4.2: Indonesia. Share of CO2 emissions by energy sub-industry, 2000 and 2011 
Source: Author’s presentation based on World Resources Institute (2014). 
Compared globally, Indonesia’s per capita emission level remains very low. While the global 
average in 2011 was 6.3 tCO₂e per capita, Indonesia’s average was only 3.4 tCO₂e per capita. This 
comparison does not, however, include the LUCF industry. When included in the calculation, 
the picture looks very diﬀerent: the global average is not much higher at 6.6 tCO₂e per capita, 
but the Indonesian figure is more than two times higher at 8.4 tCO₂e per capita. Since 2000, the 
per capita value in Indonesia has increased with approximately 24 percent. 
■  Electricity and heat  35%
■  Manufacturing and construction 25%
■  Transportation  23%
■  Other fuel combustion  14%
■  Fugitive emissions  3%
■  Electricity and heat  38%
■  Manufacturing and construction 27%
■  Transportation  26%
■  Other fuel combustion  7%
■  Fugitive emissions  2%
2000: 281.6 MtCO2e 2011: 435.4 MtCO2e
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Energy mix profile
Rapid economic expansion in Indonesia has meant a dramatic increase in the demand for 
energy. Not even the global economic downturn in 2009 aﬀected the country’s surge for 
energy. Despite abundant primary energy resources, Indonesia is struggling to keep up with 
its development. In 2004, Indonesia became a net importer of oil since it failed to attract the 
required investments due to inadequate infrastructure and a complicated regulatory system 
(EIA, 2014a). 50 Between 2000 and 2011, total primary energy consumption grew at 64.7 percent 
from 3.9 quadrillion British Thermal Units (BTU) to 6.4 quadrillion BTU (EIA, 2014a). 
In 2011, petroleum, albeit declining, along with coal, remained the key resources in the energy 
mix with shares of 25 percent (down from 37 percent in 1995) and 18.6 percent (down from 
11.3 percent in 1995), respectively. The share of gas remained more or less the same; 34.7 
percent in 1995 against 34.5 percent in 2011. In 2005, the Ministry of Environment (2010) 
estimated Indonesia to have 58 billion tonnes of proven coal reserves (19.3 billion tonnes in-
situ), 86.9 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (9.1 billion barrel in-situ) and 2.9 tonnes of 
standard cubic feet in gas reserves (185 tonnes of standard cubic feet in-situ). Biomass energy 
is also an important component of the energy mix. The demand is driven by the residential 
sector, particularly by the population living in remote areas that cannot connect to the energy 
transmission networks. Over 2 quadrillion BTU were consumed in 2012 (EIA, 2014b).
As the conventional reserves are expected to be exhausted within the next 20-plus years, 
political eﬀorts have been undertaken to increase the share of renewables in the energy mix 
(see Section 4.3). The shares of crude oil and natural gas in the energy mix have decreased from 
23 percent to 17 percent and from 35 percent to 24 percent, respectively. Coal consumption, 
on the other hand, has increased from 3 percent to 17 percent. The demand for coal has been 
driven by an emergence of independent electricity power plants for industrial manufacturing 
as a response to the frequent blackouts of the Java-Bali electricity system. The majority of all 
coal production (75 percent) is exported, making Indonesia the largest exporter of coal in the 
world (EIA, 2014a). 
A depletion of total fossil fuel consumption and a focus on renewable energy led to an 
expansion in the share of renewables between 2000 and 2010 from 0.56 percent to 4.2 percent. 
In addition to biomass (which rose from 16.2 percent to 18.6 percent) and hydropower (which 
increased from 1.5 percent to 2.1 percent), both biofuels (from 0 to 3.1 percent) and geothermal 
energy (from 19.4 percent to 18.6 percent) gained increasing shares. Figure 4.3 illustrates the 
changes in Indonesia’s energy mix: 
50 The extent of Indonesia’s oil production decline and the failure to attract foreign investors to increase capacity led to Indonesia’s exit from the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 2009. 
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Figure 4.3: Composition of fossil fuels and renewables in Indonesia’s total energy mix,  
2000-2011
Source: Author’s presentation based on the Handbook of Energy & Economic Statistics (2000-2011) by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources.  
Although geothermal energy constitutes a relatively small share of the energy mix, it increased 
significantly since 2000 from 9,179 mtoe to 16.494 mtoe, corresponding to 80 percent. 
Indonesia, nevertheless, has tremendous potential in the world. The country sits on nearly 40 
percent of the world’s geothermal resources, estimated at 28,000 megawatts.51 Geothermal 
energy plays an important role in the domestic power industry, and added 130 megawatts 
of installed capacity to the country’s total 44 gigawatts of total energy capacity in 2012 (EIA, 
2014b).  
Figure 4.4 depicts the development in the electricity industry in terms of installed power plant 
capacity. It shows that coal-driven steam power plants (88 percent) are the key generators of 
electricity in Indonesia.52 This explains the previously reported increase in coal consumption 
and emissions in the country. Combined cycle and diesel power plants are also large generators. 
2011 was an interesting year in terms of Indonesia’s energy portfolio diversity, with a number 
of renewable energy sources being brought into commercial use for the first time. Power plants 
were installed for mini and micro hydro energy, as well as for solar power. 
51 ‘Indonesia’s Hot Terrain Set to Power Its Future’, www.theage.com.au/environment/indonesias-hot-terrain-set-to-power-its-future-20100430-tzd2.
html (Accessed 8 August 2014).
52 The majority of Indonesia’s manufacturing sector uses coal-driven steam power to generate electricity independently. Electricity through the grid 
system, supplied by PT PLN, is unable to supply the sector suﬃciently and is subject to frequent blackouts.
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Figure 4.4: Power plant capacity instalment in the Indonesian electricity  
industry, 2005 and 2011 
Source: Author’s presentation based CDIEMR (2013).  
Source: Author’s presentation based on CDIEMR (2013).  
Indonesia’s rising demand for energy has gone hand-in-hand with increasing emissions. 
According to the EIA (2014b), Indonesia’s energy intensity (measured in 2005 dollars) 
improved from 17,112 BTU per dollar in 2000 to 15,951 BTU per dollar in 2011, corresponding 
to 6.8 percent. This is attributable to the economy’s huge expansion in the period. Carbon 
intensity (measured in 2005 dollars) has only improved slightly - from 1.2 metric tonnes of 
CO2 per thousand dollars in 2000 to 1.1 metric tonnes of CO2 per thousand dollars in 2011. 
The challenges and opportunities of improving Indonesia’s energy industry are discussed in 
Section 4.7.  
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4.3 Policy Framework for Energy and Climate Change
The impact of climate change is becoming increasingly visible in Indonesia. According to a 
World Wide Fund for Nature study (Case, Ardiansyah and Spector, 2007), mean annual 
temperature has increased by approximately 0.1 degrees per decade, and the seasonality and 
patterns of precipitation have not only changed but have actually decreased by 2-3 percent. 
The potential consequences of such changes on the natural environment are extensive and 
aﬀect the real economy as well as the health and well-being of the population (see Section 
4.7). At the same time, climate change represents an opportunity for Indonesia to embark on a 
green growth path. This section presents the policy framework that is in place to facilitate such 
developments.
Commitment to climate change mitigation and adaptation
The presence of immediate and long-term risks associated with climate change has prompted 
reactions by the Indonesian government. Since 1992, the Indonesian government has been 
committed to participate in the battle against climate change and for sustainable development 
by signing the UNFCCC and has thus far submitted two communications on its GHG inventory 
and other climate change activities. At the national level, Indonesia has introduced a number 
of major frameworks, most significantly:
?? ? ????????????? ??? ???? ???????? ????? ??? ???? ????? ???? ??????? ??? ??????????? ?????
mandatory national GHG emissions reduction targets through the National Action 
Plan on Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Presidential Regulation No. 61/2011). 
By 2020, Indonesia aims to reduce its emissions by 26 percent below the estimated 
BAU levels and by 41 percent with international assistance (due to inadequate domestic 
technology). This accounts for a targeted economic growth rate of 7 percent over the 
specified period. The Action Plan comprises 50 categories of policies and actions in 
five key industries. However, the targets are mainly based upon a strategy that reduces 
emissions from the LUCF industry and fossil fuel-driven energy consumption while 
promoting sustainable economic development and energy security. 
?? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
No. 32/2009) under which all government levels, including provinces and cities, are 
obligated to develop GHG inventories. 
?? ????????? ??? ???? ????????? ???????? ??? ???????? ??????? ??????? ????????? ??????????
Iklim) in 2008 (Law No. 46/2008), which was given authority to advise and oversee 
the implementation and monitoring of both climate change adaptation and mitigation 
strategies and policies.
The Indonesian policy framework has increasingly integrated the issues related to climate 
change into the development agenda. Since 2004, President Susilo Yudhoyono has made “pro-
growth, pro-job, pro-poor, and pro-environment” the pillars on which national development 
policy should be built. Their significance was highlighted again in 2011 as being essential to 
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overcoming the eﬀects of the global recession and high unemployment rates.53 
Commitment to these pillars was clearly demonstrated in the National Mid-term Development 
Plan 2010-2014, stage two of Indonesia’s long-term development strategy, which “recognizes 
that given the growing challenges of climate change, it is necessary that Indonesia’s economic 
development mainstreams environmental problems in its strategy through adaptation and 
mitigation policies.” It “calls for the rehabilitation of forests and lands through government 
policies, including better management of watershed, controlling of emissions and a reduction 
in the degradation of the environment. It also says that eﬀorts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions should be focused on forests, peat lands, waste and energy sectors.”54 
In the Second National Communication in 2010, the Indonesian government developed 
a number of innovative schemes to link the global climate change agenda with national 
development priorities. One outcome is the establishment of the Indonesian Climate Change 
Trust Fund (ICCTF), which aims to showcase alternative financing for climate change mitigation 
and adaptation programmes. It comprises five objectives (Republic of Indonesia, 2010):
1. Facilitation and acceleration of investments in renewable energy and energy eﬃciency 
while simultaneously reducing GHG emissions in the energy industry;
2. Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and stabilizing carbon 
stock through sustainable forest and peat land management;
3. Reducing vulnerability in coastal zones, agriculture and water industries;
4. Bridging the financial gaps necessary to address climate change mitigation and adaptation;
5. Increasing the eﬀectiveness and impact of external finance for climate change.
Table 4.1 connects these objectives with the defined GHG emissions targets and other regulations 
both in terms of action as well as financial support. The regulations are designed to comply with 
international regulations. For all industries except for waste, a policy strategy as well as a financial 
policy option has been developed. The table clearly shows that the LUCF and peat land industries 
are priority industries, as this is where the bulk of the emissions reduction eﬀorts will be taking 
place. Moreover, rubber and palm oil are prominent commodities in the agricultural sector. 
Policies to promote a low-carbon economic transition
To complement the national climate change framework, the government has developed and begun 
to implement various policies and incentives to support the Indonesian economy’s transition to a 
low-carbon growth path. For example, from 2006, new policies were developed to allocate large 
areas of land and facilitate fossil fuel substitution, such as Law No. 01/2006 on the provision 
and utilization of bioenergy, particularly palm oil, as an alternative source of energy. This policy 
boosted the allocation of planting new crops of palm oil as bioenergy and drove the price hike to 
53 ‘Indonesian President Calls for Global Coalition for Youth Employment’, http://ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/100thSession/media-centre/press-releas-
es/WCMS_157666/lang--en/index.htm (Accessed August 10, 2014). 
54 ‘National Medium-Term Development Plan 2010-2014’, http://theredddesk.org/countries/plans/national-medium-term-development-plan-2010% 
E2%80%902014 (Accessed August 10, 2014).
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an 88 percent increase from $570 to $1,440 per megatonne in early March 2008 (McCarthy and 
Zen, 2010). Although this policy has positive socio-economic eﬀects by contributing to poverty 
alleviation through job creation in rural livelihoods (Obidzinski et al., 2013), the production 
expansion may cause biofuel carbon debt by releasing 17 to 420 times more CO2 than the annual 
GHG that biofuels would by displacing fossil fuels (Fargione et al., 2008). 
Table 4.1: The Indonesian GHG emission reduction action plan 
Industry
Emission  
reduction
Oﬃcial targets* Total Action plan
Regulations basis 
on GHG emission 
reduction
Imple-
menting 
institu-
tions
Regulation 
basis on 
financial 
instrument26% 15%
LUCF 0.672% 0.367% 1.039%
Controlling forest and 
peat fires, water net-
work management, 
forest and land rehabil-
itation, people forest, 
industrial forest, eradi-
cation of illegal logging, 
evading deforestation, 
society engagement
Law No. 32/2009 
PI No. 13/2011
GR No. 10/2010 
MOF, 
MOE 
MGW, 
MOA
MFR No. 
36/2009
Waste 0.048% 0.03% 0.078% Integrated waste man-agement in urban areas Law No. 32/2009
MGW, 
MOE
Agricul-
ture 0.008% 0.003 0.011%
Lower emission of 
paddy variety, irrigation 
eﬃciency, utilization of 
organic fertilizer
Law No. 32/2009
Law No. 07/2004
PI No. 13/2011
MOE
MOA
Industry 0.001% 0.004% 0.005%
Energy eﬃciency and 
renewable energy us-
age policy regulations 
Law No. 30/2007
Law No. 30/2009
PR No. 05/2006
PR No. 04/2010
MOM Law No. 30/2007
Energy 
and 
Transpor-
tation
0.038% 0.018% 0.056%
Biofuels, machine with 
high eﬃciency fuels, 
improving pedestrian, 
energy eﬃciency, re-
newable energy devel-
opment
Law No. 10/1997
Law No. 27/2003
Law No. 07/2004
Law No. 30/2007
Law No. 30/2009
PR No. 04/2010
MOT, 
MEMR
Law No. 
30/2007
MEMR No. 
02/2011 
Total 0.767 0.422 1.189
Sources: Author’s compilation based on legal documents and government proceedings from: Law No.10/1997 concerning Nuclear Power; Law No. 
27/2003 concerning Geothermal; Law No. 07/2004 concerning Hydro; Law No. 30/2007 concerning Energy; Law No. 30/2009 concerning Electricity; 
GR No. 68/2007 concerning Fiscal Incentive for Geothermal Development; GR No. 10/2010 concerning Procedure of Forest Zone Changes; PR No. 
05/2006 concerning National Energy Plan; PR No. 04/2010 assignment to PLN to accelerate Power Plant Development using Renewable Energy, Coal 
and Gas; PI No. 13/2011 concerning Energy and Water Saving; MEMR No. 02/2011 concerning geothermal price structure; MFR No. 36/2009 concerning 
Procedure of Business Rights on Carbon Credit.
Notes: *Oﬃcial GHG emission reduction targets below the BAU case by 2020 - 26 percent with national eﬀorts only and additional 15 percent with in-
ternational support. GR = Governmental Regulation; PR = Presidential Regulation; PI = Presidential Instruction; MEMR = Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resource; MFR = Ministry Forestry Regulation, MOT = Ministry of Transportation, MOM = Ministry of Manufacturing, MOE = Ministry of Environment, MOA 
= Ministry of Agriculture, MGW = Ministry of General Works, MOF = Ministry of Forestry.
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The government introduced the National Energy Policy (Presidential Regulation No. 05/2006) 
in 2005, which defines targets, policies and actions to achieve energy security through what is 
considered to be the optimal energy mix in 2025: shifting the share of oil from 54.8 percent in 
2005 to less than 20 percent in 2025, the share of coal from 16.8 percent in 2005 to more than 
33 percent in 2025, the share of gas from 20.6 percent in 2005 to more than 30 percent in 2025, 
as well as increasing renewables from 6 percent in 2005 to 17 percent in 2025. These targets 
assume that the amount of energy consumption will rise threefold by 2025 (Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Resources, 2006).
 Climate finance framework
Indonesia has promoted climate change as an investment opportunity since 2011 under 
its Public Climate Finance framework to attract both domestic and international funding 
(Indonesian Ministry of Finance and Climate Policy Initiative, 2014). In 2011, approximately 
$951 million of climate finance was allocated from public sectors (66 percent from national 
sources, 34 percent from international sources) to address emission reduction targets as 
stated in Law No. 61/2011. The Indonesian government was responsible for 77 percent of all 
implemented climate projects, while international development partners, NGOs and others, 
implemented only 2-3 percent. Approximately 60 percent of all climate finance went to indirect 
or ‘enabling’ activities to support future climate action; the majority hereof was associated 
with policy development. The industries to which most finance is channelled are the energy 
and LUCF industries, which underlines their role in controlling climate change in the country. 
Figure 4.5 captures the life cycle of public climate finance flows in 2011. 
Figure 4.5: Landscape of Public Climate Finance in Indonesia, 2011
Source: Indonesian Ministry of Finance and Climate Policy Initiative (2014). 
Notes: Figures are expressed in Indonesian Rupiah and are indicative of annual capital investment flows in 2011 for low carbon and climate resilient 
activities, plus activities that indirectly support mitigation or adaption.  
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According to the Indonesian Ministry of Finance and the Climate Policy Initiative (2014), 
“domestic and international public finance resources appeared to be well aligned with 
Indonesia’s future policy needs and priority sectors”, p. ii. Even though public climate finance 
expenditures in 2011 fell short of the level of annual finance estimated by the government 
required to meet the defined emission reduction targets by 2020, the foreseen growth in 
domestic and international public finance resources is expected to compensate for such 
shortcomings. Although there are some barriers to implementing the policies in certain cases, 
particularly the uncertainty regarding adaptation and development finance, clearance of the 
policy and disseminating the regulation to the public as advocated by Resosudarmo et al. 
(2014) and Luttrell et al. (2014) will improve the policy’s eﬀectiveness. 
Policies to promote renewable energy
The government’s commitment to transforming the energy mix is highlighted in national 
regulations such as the National Energy Policy (Presidential Regulation No. 05/2006) and the 
GHG Emission Reduction Action Plan (Presidential Regulation No. 61/2011) (see Table 4.1). 
Through the former, the government aims to triple the share of renewable energy to 15 percent 
by 2025, and shall comprise biomass, geothermal and other renewables to at least 5 percent 
each. Based on current expectations to economic growth, a renewable energy capacity of 6.7 
GW must be added to realize this goal (International Trade Administration, 2010).  
Broader policies include Law No. 30/2007, which provides for government financial support 
to new projects on provisional and utilization of renewable energy until they reach a further 
economic development stage (Senoaji, 2011). Another example is Law No. 31/2009, which 
obligates the state-owned electricity company (which has a monopoly on electricity distribution 
in Indonesia) to purchase electricity up to 10MW from small and medium sized renewable energy 
power plants developed by cooperatives, community or business entities (Senoaji, 2011).   
The government has rolled out several industrial programmes to encourage the development of 
renewable energy. A large number of programmes target rural electrification and interconnected 
power plants (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2009). Biofuels incentives have been 
particularly instrumental. Since 2007, Indonesia has had numerical targets for biofuel use as a 
mandatory blend of 1-5 percent of bioethanol in gasoline production, and since 2009, a diesel 
commodities mandatory blend of 0.25-1 percent biodiesel. 
Geothermal energy has been extensively promoted through tariﬀ measures which have been 
continuously updated (such as Law No. 32/2009). In August 2014, the Geothermal Law was 
passed (replacing Law No. 27/2003), eliminating the legal barriers for the development of 
the country’s massive geothermal resources. Previously, applications for development of 
geothermal fields located in forest conservation areas were treated as a mining activity under 
the Forestry Law and were, if not rejected, subject to significant delays. In eﬀect, only 9 out of 
the 58 geothermal working (concession) areas oﬀered for development by the government are 
currently in production. Complementing the law is an update in the regulations on the ceiling 
for new geothermal projects.55  
55 ‘Legal Barrier to Geothermal Development Removed’, www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/08/27/legal-barrier-geothermal-development-re-
moved.html (Accessed 30 August 2014).
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Unfortunately, the share of renewable energy is slowing down due to vague guidance in the 
technical implementation on the ground, overlapping policies across industries and, most 
importantly, the phasing out of oil subsidies. 56 Decentralization, which was initiated in 2001, 
allowed local governments to issue concessions and land acquisition permits. However, due 
to insuﬃcient capacity building, the consequences of this policy were not fully understood 
and policymakers are still debating how to apply the renewable energy policy and actions in 
practice. 57 Section 4.7 discusses the current challenges that may decrease the chances for 
Indonesia to realize its renewable energy potential, meet its defined targets for 2025 and, 
ultimately, transition to a green development growth path.   
4.4 Evaluating the Green Growth Potential
The Indonesian Ministry of Environment (2010) has made BAU projections on the development 
of GHG emissions and emissions removal rates in 2020 and 2025 (Figure 4.6). The largest 
increase in emissions is expected to occur in the LUCF and peat industries and the energy 
industry. It is noteworthy that emissions from the industrial sector are projected to largely 
remain unchanged, primarily due to a lack of energy eﬃciency improvements. By 2020, total 
GHG emissions will reach 2.6 Gigatonnes CO2e (GTCO2e) in 2020 and 3.1 GTCO2e in 2025, while 
the GHG emissions removal rate will reach approximately 0.8 GTCO2e in both 2020 and 2025. 
By 2020 and 2025, net emissions are projected to be 1.9 GTCO2e and 2.3 GTCO2e, respectively. 
Figure 4.6 also shows sectoral removal projections. Together, the figures illustrate a projected 
net decrease in emissions by 2025. Emissions might continue to decrease towards the upper 
target of 41 percent, if the Indonesian government accepts international assistance.
Figure 4.6: GHG emissions and removal projections in Indonesia, 2000-2025
Historical and Future Emission BAU Projection
Source: Dewi (2011) based on Ministry of Environment (2010).
56 ‘Renewable Energy’s Slow Road in Indonesia’, www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/renewable-energys-slow-road-in-indonesia/ (Accessed 6 August 
2014). 
57 ‘Indonesia’s Energy Transit: Struggle to Realize Renewable Potential’, www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/09/indonesias-en-
ergy-transit (Accessed 6 August 2014).
■ Waste
■ Agriculture
■ Energy
■ LUCF and peat
■ Industry
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
20
19
20
20
Ra
te
 o
f e
m
is
si
on
 (G
t C
O2
e)
Energy sector
CHAPTER 4 :  INDONESIA
GLOBAL GREEN GROWTH EXPERIENCES
108
Removal Projection 
Source: Dewi (2011) based on Ministry of Environment (2010).
The question is whether these projections are realistic. Warr and Yusuf (2011) have analysed the 
eﬀectiveness of reducing GHG emissions by 26 percent relative to the BAU scenario (President 
Regulation No. 61/2001). Assuming that (1) a prohibition on the conversion of protected native 
forest to other uses is enforced, (2) a subsidy transfer takes place to control commercial forest 
lands rather than convert them for agricultural practices, and (3) a REDD scheme varying from 
$5 to $10 per metric CO2, Indonesia could meet the target through an annual subsidy equivalent 
to $408 million or $1.08 per tonne of abated CO2 emissions to the Indonesian taxpayer. 
According to the Indonesian National Council on Climate Change (Dewan Nasional Perubahan 
Iklim, 2010, p. 12), “Indonesia could potentially provide up to 2.3 GtCO2e of greenhouse gas 
abatement by 2030 (that is, 7 percent of required global emission reductions) through imple-
menting over 90 abatement opportunities across eight major sectors.” Figure 4.7 shows that 
total reduction potential would largely take place in the forestry industry with about 1,204 Mt-
CO2e/year and with an average reduction cost of $11 per MtCO2e. The corresponding figure for 
the peat industry is approximately 566 MtCO2e/year with an average of $1 reduction cost per 
MtCO2e; about 225 MtCO2e /year at an average of $23 reduction cost per MtCO2e for the power 
industry and about 106 MtCO2e /year with an average reduction cost of $5 for the agricultural 
sector. This is followed by the transport industry, which is expected to decline with approximate-
ly 87 MtCO2e, with a negative average reduction cost of minus $126 per year. The petroleum gas 
industry is assumed to decline with about 87 MtCO2e at an average reduction cost of $0, the con-
struction industry with about 43 MtCO2e at an average reduction cost of $60 per year, and the 
cement industry about 13 MtCO2e per year with an average reduction cost of about $14 per year.
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Figure 4.7: Marginal abatement costs of Indonesia’s GHG emission reduction potential 
Source: Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim (2010). 
To assess the likelihood of Indonesia meeting its 2020 GHG emission targets, this study 
evaluates the blueprint energy policy (President Regulation No. 05/2006) as well as its ability 
to reduce the country’s GHG emissions. Table 4.2 compares GDP growth and energy elasticities 
between 2005 and 2020 under the government’s National Energy Plan (Energy Planning 
Scenario) and under the BAU assumptions (BAU scenario).
Table 4.2: Actual and projected GDP and energy elasticities in Indonesia, 2005-2020
Year
GDP growth (percent) Energy elasticity GDP growth (percent) Energy elasticity 
Energy Planning Scenario BAU Scenario
2005 4.92 1.48 5.18 0.8
2010 5.13 1.48 4.76 0.7
2015 5.13 1.48 6.09 1.06
2020 6.51 1.48 7.66 1.1
Source: Data in columns 1 and 2 are from President Regulation No. 05/2006 available at WEBSITE; data in columns 3 and 4 are the author’s calculations. 
Note: Calculations are based on Vector Auto Regression analysis. Energy elasticities have been calculated without energy conservation. 
In our model, BAU assumptions were applied to the Indonesian economy’s development, 
meaning that no significant changes were introduced in economic policy after 2012. The model 
takes GDP and population growth as well as final energy consumption into account. From these 
estimates, it is apparent that the assumptions under the Energy Planning scenario lower the 
performance of Indonesia’s economy: energy elasticity under the BAU scenario was less than 
1 in 2005 at 0.8, followed by 0.7 in 2010, increasing to 1.06 in 2015 and 1.1 by 2020. Under the 
Energy Planning Scenario, the elasticity is expected to be 1.48, meaning that more energy than 
previously is necessary to secure the economy’s expected high growth rate. To this day, no 
real policy action has been taken to increase the economy’s industrial energy eﬃciency, which 
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means that the targets defined by President Regulation No. 05/2006 are bound to be missed. 
If such investments were to take place, the BAU estimates would decline significantly.
Estimates also show that CO2 emissions will considerably increase by 2025 under the Energy 
Planning scenario compared to the BAU scenario. This will primarily be attributable to the 
land use and energy industries, the latter being dominated by the oil, natural gas and coal 
industries, which, according to energy consumption trends, will rise in the near future. Table 
4.3 shows that energy consumption in all energy industries was substantially smaller between 
2005 and 2010 than expected based on the expected energy mix targets in the National Energy 
Plan and upon which the 2020 GHG emissions targets are defined. The gap in the estimated 
consumption levels between the Energy Planning and BAU scenarios increases exponentially 
between 2015 and 2025.  
Table 4.3: Indonesia. Projected energy consumption levels under the Energy Planning and 
BAU scenarios
Energy Planning Scenario (million tonne oil equivalent)
Industries 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Oil 514.8 764.1 1144.9 1901.5 3469.7
Natural gas 275.7 336.6 363.9 520.4 577.2
Coal 152.6 258.6 472.4 733.1 969.1
Electricity 35.3 51.2 52.6 66.4 86.8
 Total 978.4 1410.5 2033.8 3221.4 5102.8
Source: Author’s estimates based on the President of the Republic of Indonesia (2006). 
Actual energy consumption levels and BAU scenario (million tonne oil equivalent)
Industries 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Oil 338.4 363.1 310.0 597.1 672.3
Natural gas 86.6 115.4 119.3 185.4 320.9
Coal 65.7 136.8 255.3 558.8 1421.8
Electricity 65.6 90.7 135.5 218.8 383.8
Total 556.3 706 820.1 1560.1 2798.8
Source: Consumption levels for 2005-2010 are from the Handbook of Energy Statistics (2005-2010) by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources; 
forecasts for 2015-2025 are the author’s calculations.
 
The actual energy consumption levels in 2005 and 2010 suggest that the government was 
too optimistic in its GHG target setting, and the question is whether Indonesia will be able to 
curb its energy consumption to meet the 2020 targets. However, one concern related to our 
energy consumption estimates are the possible limitations in the applied forecasting model 
in terms of technology changes and detailed decomposition, which may have produced too 
conservative estimates. Nevertheless, the sizeable diﬀerence between the BAU forecasts and 
the policy targets suggests that the latter have been too high and loosely defined, and not 
complemented with appropriate technical implementation measures. 
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Energy eﬃciency potential 
One leading question is which energy industries are more likely to be subject to eﬃciency 
improvements through the adoption of relevant technologies and thereby reduce their 
environmental footprint. In what follows, we will evaluate the energy eﬃciency performance 
across Indonesia’s manufacturing industries. This will provide policymakers with guidance on 
which industries policy incentives should be designed for. Appendices 4.A1-4.A3 show average 
energy eﬃciency recordings in manufacturing industries between 2009 and 2011. Energy 
eﬃciency is typically larger for electricity across industries compared to diesel fuel, kerosene, 
liquid petroleum gas, coal and polyethylene gas. The two latter forms of energy are the least 
eﬃcient. In 2011, the top five most energy eﬃcient manufacturing industries were 1) motor 
vehicle trailers and semi-trailers, 2) printing and reproduction or recorded media, 3) textiles, 4) 
pharmaceuticals, and 5) rubber and plastic materials. The appendices show a decline in energy 
eﬃciency in most industries in the relevant period, which is attributable to major technological 
advancements. Fuel and coal stand out by demonstrating the biggest decline and increase, 
respectively, between 2009 and 2011. Table 4.4 summarizes the average energy eﬃciency in 
Indonesia’s manufacturing sector in the period 2009-2011 and depicts the percentage change 
over the three years.
Table 4.4: Average energy eﬃciency in Indonesia’s manufacturing sector, 2009-2011
Percent 
Industries 2009 2010 2011 Change2009-2011
Electricity 0.55 0.563 0.544 -1.1%
Gasoline 0.443 0.453 0.414 -6.5%
Fuel 0.471 0.461 0.422 -10.4%
Kerosene 0.282 0.275 0.259 -8.2%
Coal 0.191 0.186 0.213 11.5%
Polyethylene gas 0.223 0.185 0.208 -6.7%
Liquid petroleum gas 0.286 0.292 0.284 -0.7%
Source: Author’s own calculations based on 5-digit data of Large and Medium Scale Manufacturing Statistics of BPS (2011).  See Appendix.
Indonesia faces a number of informational, technical, financial and institutional barriers to 
energy eﬃciency improvements typical to developing countries (Brown, 2008; Sarkar and 
Singh, 2010; UNIDO, 2011) This includes energy subsidies and lack of information, consensus 
on best practices to promote energy eﬃciency, ambitious and concrete engagement at all 
levels of government, eﬃcient energy eﬃciency governance and institutional capacities. 
Although energy eﬃciency records tell us how manufacturing industries are performing relative 
to each other and how well eﬃcient energy forms are utilized, they do not say anything about 
the eﬀectiveness of energy eﬃciency investments. By conducting a rebound eﬀect analysis for 
the manufacturing sector based on the same methodology used by Saunders (2013), we are 
able to estimate how energy eﬃciency investments aﬀect energy consumption and emission 
levels (through changes in consumer behaviour). The rebound eﬀect can be explained as 
“the extent of the energy saving produced by an eﬃciency investment that is taken back by 
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consumers in the form of higher consumption, either in the form of more hours of use or a 
higher quality of energy service.” 58 Table 4.5 summarizes these findings.  
Table 4.5: Rebound eﬀect in Indonesian manufacturing industries, 2009-2011
Percent 
Industries 2009 2010 2011 Change2009-2011
Food products 25.32 12.97 8.46 -67%
Beverages . 9.62 5.01 -
Tobacco products 29.84 19.08 23.76 -20%
Textiles 10.77 5.34 2.46 -77%
Wearing apparel 27.31 7.45 7.02 -74%
Leather and related products 50.95 7.80 3.03 -94%
Wood and products of wood without furniture 12.61 8.08 27.86 121%
Paper and paper products 10.19 5.75 3.68 -64%
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 13.50 8.66 5.11 -62%
Coke and refined petroleum products 14.07 6.72 2.26 -84%
Chemical and chemical products 21.28 11.91 11.46 -46%
Pharmaceutical medicinal chemical and botanical products 11.70 12.46 9.28 -21%
Rubber and plastic products 5.18 10.03 6.72 30%
Other non-metallic mineral products 13.11 3.06 4.43 -66%
Basic metals 17.41 9.11 17.52 1%
Fabricated metal products except machinery 12.80 7.11 2.48 -81%
Computer electronics and optical products . 26.06 5.12 -
Electrical equipment 21.64 14.94 3.84 -82%
Machinery and equipment n.e.c 10.16 6.92 8.33 -18%
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 14.64 10.22 21.03 44%
Other transport equipment 10.94 21.65 5.26 -52%
Furniture 9.97 10.31 4.43 -56%
Other manufacturing 23.46 12.60 5.72 -76%
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 12.22 1.92 3.72 -70%
Total 17.63 10.46 8.02 -55%
Notes: Missing values are due to changes in definition of sector classifications.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from BPS (2011).
 
In 2011, the industries with the largest rebound eﬀect are, in descending order, wood and 
products of wood without furniture, tobacco products, motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers, basic metals and pharmaceuticals. Considerable improvements were observed in 
58 ‘Rebound Eﬀect”, www.eoearth.org/view/article/155666/ (Accessed 29 August 2014).
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all industries except four, two of which are among the previously listed top five. On average, 
however, the rebound eﬀect for the total manufacturing sector declined by 55 percent between 
2009 and 2011, indicating that investments in industrial energy eﬃciency measures more so 
than previously led to reductions in energy consumption and emissions.
Renewable energy potential  
Indonesia’s renewable energy potential is expanding, especially in geothermal energy, hydro-
power as well as solar, ocean and tidal energy. 
Table 4.6: Renewable energy potential and targets in Indonesia by 2025
Industry Potential Target
Hydro 75,600 MW 20 GW (by 2021)
Solar 4,8 KW/m2/day 180-240 MW/year 2-5 MW/location
Biomass 49,800 MW 10% biofuel added to diesel
Geothermal 29,000 MW
Wind 9,000 MW 711 MW (by 2021)
Ocean 43,000 MW 334 MW (by 2021)
Source: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (2013).
Geothermal energy could ensure Indonesia’s energy security. Grid independence and 
availability are the main reasons why the focus in Indonesia is on geothermal energy for energy 
security. Acquisition conflict has hampered investments in this proven resource in Java.59 
In 2013, Indonesia used only 1.226 (MW) or 5 percent of its total geothermal reserves. Out 
of 20 geothermal projects, 11 are still in the exploration stage. Furthermore, acceptance by 
local communities and a lack of coordination between stakeholders are the main challenges 
investors in geothermal energy face in Indonesia.
Hydropower in Indonesia comprises large-scale hydropower and micro as well as mini 
hydropower. The total potential of hydropower in Indonesia is estimated at about 75,000 MW, 
ranking fourth in terms of hydropower potential after China and the Russian Federation. A total 
of 45.3 percent or 34,000 MW is exploitable. About 41,000 MW is still embedded in natural 
resources and has not yet been extracted due to the high costs of capital investment and 
geographical constraints. Natural resource extraction projects usually face social as well as 
environmental hurdles such as land acquisition conflicts with indigenous people. The energy 
potential of micro hydro is estimated at about 459.91 MW, and about 20.85 MW or 4.5 percent 
mini hydro potential has been developed by the National Electricity Company (PT PLN) for 
power generation in rural areas. There are 6,000 mini hydropower plants with a range of 300-
500 MW across the islands supplying the local economy with 7,500 MW of electricity. These 
forms of energy are a plausible solution for eradicating energy poverty in the rural economy and 
to secure energy for households. 
59 ‘RI’s Geothermal Dream May Never be a Reality’, www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/07/01/ri-s-geothermal-dream-may-never-be-a-reality.html 
(Accessed 6 August 2014). 
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In terms of biomass energy potential, Indonesia has 146.7 million tons per year, equivalent to 
470 GJ/y, which is concentrated mostly in rural areas and small industries and includes energy 
for cooking, heat and electricity. Table 4.7 shows the potential of diﬀerent biomass sources, 
notably rice residues and rubber wood. At present, commercially developed biomass energy 
resources only contribute 445 MW to the energy mix (Mujiyanto and Tiess, 2013).
Table 4.7: Biomass energy potential in Indonesia
Biomass Production (million/year) Technical energy potential (GJ/year)
Rubber wood 41.0 (replanting) 120
Logging residues 4.5 19
Sawn timber residues 1.3 13
Plywood and veneer production residues 1.5 16
Sugar residues 23.6 78
Rice residues 65.0 150
Coconut residues 65.0 7
Palm oil residues 8.2 67
Source: Adapted from Hasan, Mahlia and Nur (2012).
As a tropical country, Indonesia has potential energy sources in solar energy. PV energy is used 
in rural areas with a low installment capacity (12.1 MW). People who live in rural areas use PV 
energy for local electricity and solar thermal technology for solar stoves, water pumping and 
for drying equipment for fish dryers in coastal zones. Installing this technology is relatively 
expensive compared to the installation of other energy sources. Rural area residents do not 
have suﬃcient skills to carry out maintenance and to replace and purchase spare parts in 
case troubleshooting is required. Although some local companies, such as PT LEN (National 
Electronic Institute, which is funded by the government), provide solar modules for PV 
technology, demand for this product continues to be low. 60 
With 60 percent of its territory surrounded by water, Indonesia could potentially develop ocean 
and wind energy to boost its renewable energy portfolio. Currently, the Agency for Assessment 
and Application of Technologies (BPPT) is developing tidal wave energy and ocean thermal 
conversion amounting to 6 GW. The technologies are implemented in remote areas such as 
small islands and supply rural populations with electricity, water pumping and battery charging 
(Mujiyanto and Tiess, 2013). The projects were set up in 10 straits in the territorial waters of 
West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara. The projects established 100 wind turbine farms, 
which generate a total of 3 MW.61 
Indonesia is widely recognized as a country with a huge potential to trade biofuel commodities. 
It has been the biggest producer of palm oil in the world since 2005. The total production 
of palm oil in 2007 was 17 million tons of crude palm oil and 1.9 million tons of crude palm 
kernel oil. More than 70 percent of crude palm oil was exported. Consequently, the Indonesian 
government introduced Presidential Instruction No. 01/2006 on palm oil production for biofuel 
60 ‘Production Facility – Solar Module’, www.len.co.id/len_web/fasilitas/?lg%3D%3D (Accessed 6 August 2014).
61 ‘Indonesian Territorial Water Save Electricity Energy Potential from the Ocean Current’, www.esdm.go.id/news-archives/electricity/46-electrici-
ty/4446-indonesian-territorial-waters-save-electricity-energy-potential-from-the-ocean-current.html?tmpl=component&print=1&page= (Accessed 6 
August 2014). 
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as an alternative fuel (biofuel). At least 15 companies have established new larger biodiesel 
refineries to produce 82.5 million tons. Today, 24 biodiesel producers and 14 bioethanol 
producers are licensed to produce biodiesel and bioethanol. The installed capacity of biodiesel 
is 4,659,938 KL/year and 463,980 KL/year for bioethanol. 
Palm oil production on Sumatera Island is projected to increase from 18,956 hectares in 1990 
to 2,431,722 hectares in 2030, and in Kalimantan from 15,982 hectares in 2000 to 1,237,534 
hectares in 2030 (author’s calculation based on Miettinen et al. (2012) and MoEM (2013)). 
According to the government, biodiesel energy based on palm oil supplied 0.4 million kilo 
liters to the energy mix in 2010, and is expected to rise to 2.7 million kilo liters by 2015, 5.8 
million kilo liters by 2020 and 13.5 million kilo liters in 2030. In line with Presidential Instruction 
No. 01/2006, Indonesia plans to reach 26.1 million hectares by 2020 through a number of 
plantation programs. 
Finally, more than any other nation, Indonesia has the potential to gain the most in financial 
terms if REDD and/or REDD+ (an extension of REDD by low-carbon but high biodiversity lands) 
were to become practiced on a nationwide basis. As the first country, Indonesia enacted 
national REDD regulations in 2009 and has since been targeted by and implemented various 
REDD schemes across the country and in cooperation with other countries. According to a 2013 
Human Rights Watch Report, “illegal logging and forest-sector mismanagement resulted in 
losses to the Indonesian government of more than US$7 billion between 2007 and 2011”.62 
In fact, national sources project that annual revenue generation up to $765 million per five 
percent reduction in deforestation emissions is possible, and up to $4.5 billion in the event of a 
30 percent cut (Thorburn, 2011). However, a number of risks with regard to the implementation 
of REDD/REDD+ have been identified. One key argument is that “by monetizing forest carbon, 
REDD would substantially increase the market value of forests, including those previously 
considered marginal, prompting central governments to increase control”.63 This poses a 
particular challenge to Indonesia’s indigenous peoples as they seek to have their customary 
forest rights recognized within the emerging legal frameworks of REDD/REDD+. To date, only 
two REDD projects have been implemented through the Ministry of Forestry, both of which have 
been financed by international institutions. Local governments are participating to ensure that 
those projects are implemented eﬃciently.   
Such vast resources oﬀer a great potential for Indonesia to increase the share of renewable 
energy in the energy mix substantially and create a long line of create jobs. The next section will 
dwell on the policies in place to realize this potential. 
4.5 Policies for Green Job Creation
Although Indonesia continues to make major macroeconomic improvements, the reduction 
of poverty remains one of the country’s main policy objectives, as half of all households are 
clustered around the national poverty line. The root causes of poverty are under-employment 
and a low absorption rate in the formal labour market. In 2010, about 60 percent of the labour 
force was employed in low-wage jobs in the informal sector, working less than normal working 
62 ‘Indonesia: Forestry Failures Jeopardize ‘Green Growth’, www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/16/indonesia-forestry-failures-jeopardize-green-growth 
(Accessed 10 August 2014). 
63 ‘Rush for REDD Could Undermine Local Forest Rights’, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/04/16/us-carbon-forest-communities-idUK-
TRE63F0SC20100416 (Accessed 10 August, 2014).
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hours and resulting in low labour productivity (Statistics Indonesia, 2011). A link between 
poverty eradication and climate change in Indonesia could be established by intertwining these 
policies to target green job creation. Green jobs oﬀer an immediate response for Indonesia to 
improve poverty alleviation through a sustainable low carbon development path.
According to Gunawan and Fraser (2014), any policies linked directly to green job creation have 
yet to be developed in Indonesia. This ‘non-focus’ on green jobs is explained by the continued 
priority given to improving economic activities and aversion towards the possible high costs of 
green investments. Nevertheless, the increasing eﬀorts to steer government regulation both 
within and across ministries towards environmental management in a number of industries have 
implicitly promoted the generation of green jobs. Gunawan and Frasier (2014) find that such 
indirect eﬀects take place in four industries, specifically the agricultural, energy, industrial and 
tourism industries. We will explore the eﬀorts in the two former industries in more detail below.
Policies with green jobs implications
The agricultural sector: Law No. 41/2009 on Sustainable Agriculture Land Protection includes 
environmentally benign farming, participatory processes and the promotion of local knowledge. 
Several policies related to this matter have been introduced, such as the Ministry of Agriculture 
Decision No. 456/2006, the Ministry of Agriculture Regulation No. 07/2007 and the Ministry of 
Agriculture Regulation No. 28/2009. None of these regulations, however, explicitly target green 
job creation. According to Ariesusanty (2011), Indonesia has developed organic farmland of 
about 50,000 hectares corresponding to 0.2 percent of total farmland. For a case study in Java 
and North Sumatera, Jahroh (2010) reported that about 149 farmers involved in organic farming 
on 51 hectares which creates at least 3 jobs for each ha. Together, these studies suggest that 
about 150,000 jobs had been created in organic farming by 2011. Organic farming is still limited 
in Indonesia and conventional farmers must be educated in such methods in order for them to 
change their practices away from monoculture (Jahroh, 2010).  
The energy industry: under Law No. 17/2007 on the National Long Term Development Plan 
2005-2025, the government suggested developing renewables such as micro/mini hydro or 
solar energy to improve energy independence and energy security for oﬀ-grid and remote 
areas. Some case studies (ILO, 2013) show that a government micro and mini hydro programme 
(18,800 watt/18,8 kW) (President Regulation No. 05/2006) has generated approximately 4-5 
jobs for each project. We will use this number as a basis for a simple calculation of potential 
job creation in future micro and mini hydro projects. The government has stated that micro and 
mini hydro projects will add 1,260 MW in 2015, 2,348.1 MW in 2020, and 330 MW in 2025 to 
installed capacity. Hence, using our simple assumption, such projects will generate 335,106 
jobs in 2015, 624,495 jobs in 2020 and 87,766 in 2025, adding up to 1,047,367 jobs in the 
period 2015-2025. Until 2012, the implementation of micro and mini-hydro projects added 
installed capacity of 1.8 MW, which should have created 479 jobs (ILO, 2013). 
Challenges to green job creation
Although Indonesia has had policy tools to promote green investment as well as green 
industries (see Section 4.2), and though it would appear straightforward to shift those policies 
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to generate green jobs, good governance issues have been identified as a stumbling block 
to turn such policies into concrete actions. Uncertainty and continued changes in elites has 
aﬀected the political system at both the ministerial and technical level. Lack of commitment to 
organizing and coordinating the policies adds insecurity to the implementation.
Zaituni et al. (2010) also note that access to relevant skills poses yet another challenge for 
the creation of green jobs in Indonesia. This is a major bottleneck and may determine whether 
people will enter into informal or formal sectors in green industries. The adoption and 
dissemination of clean technologies both for manufacturing sectors as well as for workers are 
crucial factors for adapting the changes of environmental policies. This process is challenged 
by four limitations to skill development (Gunawan and Fraser, 2014):
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
causes information lags of green knowledge transfer; 
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
does not encompass knowledge of green technologies. It is therefore diﬃcult to improve 
the technical skills of students through formal education;
?? ?????????????? ???? ???????? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ????????? ????????? ???? ????????? ???
Manpower and Transmigration is impeded in the promotion of green skills development 
and the green industry;
?? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
knowledge to support green economies, including job access to formal and informal 
sectors. 
Creating a new green industry to incorporate the promotion of entrepreneurship and estab-
lishing green jobs in the formal sector may be less beneficial than in informal sectors, whereas 
the majority of labour supply in Indonesia has poor skills in green job industries, and creating 
green jobs will therefore require additional costs to improve their skills and adopt the technol-
ogy as well.
Green jobs demand
To determine the demand for labour on output we estimate the elasticity of substitution of labour 
supply. This estimate calculates the percentage of change of output eﬀect on the percentage 
of change of labour. To obtain this parameter, we reconcile data on output and labour. Labour 
data was obtained from the 5-digit Indonesian Labor Survey in 2007-2009 and was then sorted 
according to I-O data classification. I-O tables are generated by the Indonesia Statistics Agency 
every five years with the most recent being from 2008. To estimate the I-O table with an annual 
trajectory, we followed the methodology of Wood (2011). Finally, we estimated labour supply 
elasticities by applying the OLS regression technique. 
Appendix 4.A4 reports labour supply elasticities across 62 industries for the period 2007-2010. 
As shown in Table 4.8, labour demand elasticity for green job industries is dominated by the 
biofuels industry, including the palm oil industry. Even if we compare it with other elasticities 
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of labour demand in this industry and non-green industries, the biofuels industry is still the 
industry that can generate higher labour demand than other industries. This is followed by 
bioenergy, environmental protection, forestry services and other industries. 
Table 4.8: Indonesia. Labour demand elasticity for potential green job industries, 2007-2010
Industries with green job potential Labour demand elasticity
Bioenergy 24.5%
Biofuels 26.67%
Environmental protection 4.2%
Forestry services 1.4%
Geothermal 0.0%
Photovoltaic 1.0%
Waste recycling 0.3%
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Indonesian Labor Force Survey (2007-2011) by Statistics Indonesia. 
Notes: Labour data sample sizes were 729,146 in 2007, 176,104 in 2008 and 176,026 in 2009.
 
The results in Table 4.8 suggest that the bioenergy and biofuels industries may generate more 
jobs than other clean energy industries. Following the methodology of Borghans and Groot 
(1999), we use a segregation index to establish whether green jobs are more likely to occur 
in the formal or informal sector, or put diﬀerently, whether the jobs created in clean energy 
industries are more likely to be formal or informal. We follow the definition of formal/informal 
sectors used by the Indonesian Ministry of Labor: the formal sector includes companies with 
formal payroll systems, whereas the informal sector has none. An index value close to zero 
indicates that there is no segregation between the formal and informal sector. On the other 
hand, the higher the index value, the closer the industry comes to complete segregation, 
meaning that an industry only employs informal labour. Table 4.9 presents the segregation 
index for Indonesia’s clean energy industries.   
Table 4.9: Indonesia. Segregation index of formal and informal labour in clean energy 
industries (baseline), 2007-2010 
Industry 2007 2008 2009 2010
 Bioenergy 0.000 0.024 0.020 0.045
 Biofuels 0.003 0.538 0.290 0.469
 Environmental protection 0.077 7.255 3.520 5.654
 Forestry 0.008 88.204 32.803 52.376
 Forestry services 0.796 49.873 171.125 81.226
 Geothermal 95.750 2,435.104 1,508.838 1,638.375
 Photovoltaic 0.147 8.221 10.926 6.908
 Waste recycling 0.571 29.971 29.304 28.278
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Indonesian Labor Force Survey (2007-2011) by Statistics Indonesia.
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Table 4.9 reveals that the biggest index values in 2010 were reported for the geothermal 
industry followed by forestry services, the forestry and waste recycling industries. The fact that 
most sectoral index values are high suggests that the majority of jobs created in the clean 
energy industries are informal. Moderate segregation is present in the waste recycling and PV 
industries and only limited in the environmental protection, bioenergy and biofuels industries. 
One important issue to be taken into account is the impact of wage rigidity on labour 
segregation between the formal and informal sector. We apply a panel probit model to evaluate 
the probability of segregation from increasing wages and find that a wage hike may increase 
the probability of formal labour creation by up to 10.4 percent (keeping other parameters 
fixed). Applying this result to our framework, we see a strong eﬀect on the baseline segregation 
index values, as shown in Table 4.10. The eﬀect on the index values implies that an increasing 
minimum wage level may decrease segregation and hereby stimulate the movement of people 
into formal jobs in the clean energy industries. 
Table 4.10: Indonesia. Eﬀect on segregation index estimates of formal and informal labour in 
clean energy industries (accounting for wage rigidity), 2007-2010
Industries 2007 2008 2009 2010
 Bioenergy -0.004 0.006 0.005 0.015
 Biofuels -0.129 0.155 0.090 0.218
 Environmental protection -0.354 0.699 0.888 0.075
 Forestry -2.891 36.332 6.920 54.644
 Forestry services -2.931 7.887 9.972 36.076
 Geothermal -1596.618 9.745 11.453 91.611
 Photovoltaic -0.310 0.614 0.239 0.054
 Waste recycling -1.370 0.357 0.222 0.324
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Indonesian Labor Force Survey (2007-2011) by Statistics Indonesia. 
Note: A simple panel probit model has been applied, formal = f(education, wage). 
 
This section has demonstrated that green job creation will have clear implications for poverty 
alleviation. The creation of green jobs may cause a shift in the profiles of jobs and skills in 
Indonesia’s key sectors such as agriculture and others. The objective is thus to increase job 
opportunities as well as generate incomes and activities, especially in rural areas which heavily 
rely on environmental services for their livelihood. Hence, improving environmental services 
through green jobs could improve poverty alleviation and preserve natural resources in the 
future. 
Adopting a green economy as well as green jobs will improve the Indonesian economy’s 
capacity to promote low carbon green growth and simultaneously tackle both environmental 
concerns and poverty reduction. This potential has been recognized by the Indonesian 
government, which has formulated the Indonesian Climate Change Sectoral Roadmap (ICSSR) 
as a foundation to adapt and mitigate climate change and to attract investment not only 
domestically, but internationally as well. Green jobs in Indonesia should be created along 
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with other imperative agendas such as poverty-related issues in order to be appealing. These 
policies must be realizable and implementable to be attractive. 
4.6 Impact of Clean Energy Investments on Job Creation and Poverty
Despite the lack of dedicated industrial policies, green job creation is likely to have taken place 
through the promotion of clean energy industry growth in Indonesia. This section assesses the 
impact of clean investments on job creation and poverty alleviation.
Green job creation to date
We can calculate the number of jobs created in clean energy sectors between 2008 and 
2010 by analysing micro data from the Indonesian Labor Survey database. For this analysis, 
the definition of ‘green job’ follows the classification of Yi (2013), namely a) any economic 
activity that generates electricity using renewable energy or nuclear fuels; b) agricultural jobs 
that generate corn or soy used for transport fuel; c) manufacturing jobs producing goods 
used for renewable power generation; d) equipment dealers and wholesale specializing in 
renewable energy or energy eﬃciency products; e) construction and installation of energy and 
pollution management systems; f) government administration of environmental programmes; 
and g) supporting jobs in engineering, legal, research and consulting fields. Based on this 
classification, eight sectors with potential for green job creation are defined: biofuels, 
bioenergy, forestry, forestry services, environmental protection, geothermal energy, waste 
recycling and PV. Table 4.11 summarizes the results:  
Table 4.11: Indonesia. Job creation in clean energy industries, 2008-2010
Clean energy industries 2008 2009 2010
Bioenergy  9,875  9,323  17,658 
Biofuels  2,213  2,403  4,974 
Environmental protection  101  293  436 
Forestry  50  91  248 
Forestry services  27  13  30 
Geothermal energy  1  1  4 
Photovoltaic  330  125  488 
Waste recycling  51  60  96 
Green jobs  12,648  12,309  23,934 
Brown jobs  163,456  163,717  319,162 
Total  176,104  176,026  343,096 
Source: Author’s estimates based on data from the Indonesian Labor Survey (2008-2010) by Statistics Indonesia.  
Notes: The total number of observations was 1,424,371. Based on five-digit Indonesian Standard Industrial Classification codes.
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Between 2009 and 2010, the number of green jobs created in the clean energy industries 
doubled from 12,309 to 23,934. The share of green jobs as a share of total job creation in 
the clean energy industries has remained unchanged at approximately 7 percent between 
2009 and 2010 as overall employment in the clean energy industries also doubled in the 
same period. The distribution of green job increases has not, however, been symmetric. The 
bulk of the increase is attributable to the bioenergy industry, which comprises activities in 
the agricultural sector, including the production of feedstock for bioenergy derivation such as 
corn, soybean, sugarcane and coconut. These activities typically take place in rural areas. The 
second largest contributor to the increase in green jobs is the biofuels industry, which includes 
the palm oil industry, followed by activities associated with environmental protection, forestry 
and renewable energy activities. 
Poverty, education and green jobs
Labour market analyses play a crucial role in Indonesia to understand the relationship between 
poverty and the labour market and to answer why large parts of the Indonesian population 
still live below the poverty line. According to Teal (2011), one key issue in this regard is the 
price of labour and the demand for labour. Figure 4.8 illustrates the link between wages and 
employment across industries with potential for green job creation in Indonesia.
Figure 4.8: Indonesia. Average employment and wages in industries with green job creation, 
2008-2010
Source: Author’s estimates based on data from the Indonesian Labor Survey (2008-2010) by Statistics Indonesia.
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Figure 4.8 indicates that demand for labour in biofuels, bioenergy, forestry and environmental 
protection has reached nearly perfect market conditions. For each figure, the fitted values 
demonstrate that employment grows with practically perfect elasticity along the labour supply 
curve. This reflects Indonesia’s abundance of labour supply and low labour costs, emphasizing 
the mismatch of labour supply and labour demand in Indonesia’s labour market. 
The eﬀect the average level of education had on labour demand in the period 2008-2010 in 
green job industries (Figure 4.9) is noteworthy. According to estimations based on a simple 
econometric model, the price of labour is not significantly aﬀected by level of education as 
indicated by the flatter curve for wages in the biofuels, bioenergy and forestry industries. This 
implies that the wages do not necessarily correspond to the increasing level of education. These 
industries typically require unskillled labour. The biofuels industry is more labour intensive 
than capital intensive, and the expansion of biofuel production could further increase demand 
for unskilled labour.  
Figure 4.9: Indonesia. Education and wages in industries with green job creation, 2008-2010 
Source: Author’s estimates based on data from the Indonesian Labor Survey (2008-2010) by Statistics Indonesia.
The biofuel industry includes employees with various levels of education, but in terms of 
price of labour, only few changes are observable. Hence, it can be argued that an increase in 
green investments will result in the growth of the biofuels, bioenergy and forestry industries, 
which would be a quick solution for the Indonesian government to resolve the problems of 
energy security and poverty alleviation. This phenomenon is typical for developing countries 
where agriculture represents the main sector and absorbs more labour than the manufacturing 
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sector. When green investments increase the demand for labour, especially in the biofuels 
and bioenergy industry, unskilled and informal labour may enter the labour market, whereas 
demand for labour in the forestry industry may shift to the tourism industry. If Indonesia is to 
glean benefits from the forestry industry, it must preserve the country’s forest ecosystem to 
attract forest tourism. 
To assess the impact of an increase in clean energy investments on labour demand, and 
hence the green jobs potential, we estimated the impact of the endowment factor as an 
input to production on poverty alleviation. We looked at how the probability of labour supply 
entering the green jobs market changes with an increase in green investments. By taking an 
econometric approach, namely bivariate probit analyses, we can measure the probability of 
labour in informal industries as well as the entry of unemployed labour into the existing labour 
market. 64 Such an analysis shows the probability of higher labour demand if green investments 
are increased, as well as the current entry of unskilled and informal labour into the green jobs 
labour market.
Table 4.12 presents the probability of new entrants into the green jobs market. The highest 
probability of entrance is in the forestry industry at 32.1 percent followed by environmental 
protection at 32 percent, the biofuels industry at 29.9 percent, the bioenergy industry at 28 
percent and the forestry services industry at 26.2 percent. Based on this, it is possible to 
estimate in which clean energy industries labour demand is created and which ones absorb 
labour supply. 
Table 4.12: Probability of entry into clean energy industries in Indonesia
Percent
Green jobs industry Probability of entrance into green jobs market 
Probability of poverty reduction in 
green jobs industries
Bioenergy 28.0 35.3
Biofuels 29.9 30.4
Environmental protection 32.0 20.7
Forestry 32.1 25.0
Forestry services 26.2 15.4
Geothermal 24.6 16.0
Photovoltaic 22.4 15.7
Waste recycle 18.9 23.7
Total 26.4
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Indonesian Labour Survey (2008-2010) by Statistics Indonesia.
 
Another important consideration is the match between labour demand and supply for each 
industry. This is achieved by combining the data in the Indonesian Labor Survey with that of 
the Indonesian National Survey, a method inspired by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997). 
64 This method is inspired by Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2006) and Heckman and Willis (2014). 
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The results show that the bioenergy industry contributes to the reduction of the probability of 
poverty. That is, bioenergy contributes more labour than other sectors (see also Table 4.12), 
which implies that an increase in bioenergy could increase the probability of labour in informal 
industries and the entrance of unemployed into green jobs. This in turn alleviates poverty. The 
same applies to the biofuels and forestry industries as well as others. 
These results suggest that clean energy investments may generate green jobs and opportunities 
in green industries and may reduce poverty in Indonesia. Green jobs alone could contribute to 
poverty alleviation and increase the probability of people entering the green jobs market. 
Clean energy investments and job creation
Now that a positive link has been established between green job creation and poverty 
alleviation, this section will estimate the impact of clean energy investments on green jobs in 
the Indonesian economy. To date, there have been limited eﬀorts to capture such correlations 
in Indonesia and only few studies have applied deeper econometric analysis. The I-O method 
used in this study and the associated findings will be compared with those of two notable 
studies in Volume I and the ILO (2013). 
To create a robust forecast with a time horizon of 2020 using I-O tables, this study follows the 
methodology of Wood (2011). The employed I-O tables cover 66 industries at a five-year interval 
over the period 1971-2008. 65 To extend the I-O tables to 2020, an interpolation procedure 
was applied according to registered growth movements over five consecutive years between 
1971-2008.66 The I-O tables were projected based on the price index projection, which was 
associated with output by moving the average estimation towards 2020. We employed RAS 
methods for intermediate sectors to create projected I-O tables for each consecutive year 
as well as the trajectory periods 2010 and 2020. Besides the I-O tables, carbon emissions 
were projected using a Vector Autoregression model based on Zhang and Cheng (2009), and 
categorized according to I-O tables as in Butnar and Llop (2012). Finally, employment data for 
2001-2012 was used from the Indonesian Labor Survey, sorted according to I-O classifications 
and estimated towards 2020 by moving the average interpolation. 
We consider two scenarios for our projections, a baseline or BAU scenario and one that assumes 
GHG emission reductions by 45 percent as targeted by President Regulation No. 61/2001. 
The latter scenario assumes that the drop in GHG emissions is 45 percent in all industries 
taken together and that on average, at least 15 percent of all investments in the 66 industries 
targeted energy eﬃciency improvements, while 85 percent or less targeted renewable energy. 
Our findings are presented in Table 4.13. 
The net eﬀect of the scenario analysis reflects the estimated employment creation of clean 
energy investments of 3,954,005 in 2008, followed by 5,335,968 in 2010, and by 8,338,188 
in 2020. From these results it can be argued that if Indonesia were to follow the scenario 
65 Between 1971 and 1985, the published data contained total transactions and hence did not distinguish between imports and domestic production. 
In this analysis, it is assumed that both activities represent the total economy and contribute to GHG emissions in Indonesia.
66 The estimation methodology applied is based on Temurshoev, Webb and Yamano (2011), Lahr and de Mesnard (2004), Jackson and Murray (2004), 
Toh (1998). The I-O tables were estimated based on price index projection, which is associated with output by moving the average estimation towards 
2020; a RAS method (an iterative method of biproportionally adjusting rows and columns) was applied to intermediate sectors to create I-O tables for 
each consecutive year between 1971 and 2008 as well as the trajectory period between 2010 and 2020.
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according to the GHG emission reduction blueprint presented in President Regulation No. 
61/2001, Indonesia could achieve emission reductions and increase green job opportunities 
in the economy.
Table 4.13: Indonesia. Scenario analysis of GHG emissions reduction and improving clean energy 
investments
2008 2010 2020
Baseline Scenario
Jobs created 39,540,053 53,359,681 83,381,873
CO2 emissions 212,799 297,978 457,025
45-percent scenario
Jobs created 43,494,058 58,695,649 91,720,061
CO2 emissions 105,336 147,499 226,227
Net eﬀect
Jobs created 3,954,005 5,335,968 8,338,188
CO2 emissions -107,463 -150,479 -230,797
Source: Author’s calculations. Data from 2008 and 2010 are based on the Indonesian Labor Force Survey (2010) by Statistics Indonesia. Figures for 
2020 are estimates. 
 
By comparison, the results in Volume I are relatively small. They find that that the annual 
employment generated from energy eﬃciency and renewable energy investments up to 2030 
could amount to between 1.6 million and 2.1 million jobs within Indonesia. If we compare 
these figures with total employment in Indonesia (about 100 million people), green jobs will be 
available for less than 1 percent of the total labor force. 
The method applied in this study diﬀers to some degree from that used in Volume I. While the 
estimates in Volume I are merely based on a single I-O table for 2008, our projection relies on 
a time series. This makes the results in Volume I less robust. Moreover, adding employment 
data and carbon emissions data further strengthens our calculations. Finally, the fact that we 
take Indonesian GHG reduction strategies into account (President Regulation No. 06/2001) by 
reconciling marginal abatement curves conducted by Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim (2010) 
adds considerable robustness. 
A study by the ILO (2013) projects that as many as 4 million people are currently involved in 
economic activities in Indonesia that can be defined as ‘green jobs’. The estimate, which is 
similar to ours, entails green job creation in the entire economy. Most of the green jobs are 
apparently found in the agricultural sector at 61.1 percent (2,434,637 jobs), the transportation 
industry at 15.1 percent (603,593 jobs), followed by the manufacturing sector at 8.3 percent 
(331,538 jobs), the fisheries industry at 6.1 percent (241,739 jobs), construction industry at 
4.7 percent (187,752 jobs), forestry industry at 2.5 percent (97,630 jobs), the waste industry 
at 1.8 percent (73,462 jobs), the tourism industry at 0.3 percent (10,665 jobs) and the mining 
and energy industry at 0.1 percent (4,820 jobs). Moreover, the study finds that there are 
approximately 8.8 million environment-related jobs. The ILO study is a baseline survey only 
and hence does not oﬀer an analysis of the green job potential for Indonesia’s economy. 
CHAPTER 4 :  INDONESIA
GLOBAL GREEN GROWTH EXPERIENCES
126
4.7 Challenges for Green Growth in Indonesia 
Indonesia’s renewable energy potential has not been realized due to a number of challenges, 
which we will address below: 
Energy security: A number of issues related to pressure on the energy industry have emerged, 
including rising costs, bottlenecks in energy distribution and surging supply uncertainties – all 
of which have added to the threat to energy security. One of the key concerns is that the majority of 
Indonesia’s energy reserves are owned by multinational companies under long-term contracts. 
This means that the utilization of the country’s resources may not be benefiting the economy.67 
For example, the multinational companies currently dominating the primary energy supply are 
Caltex, CNOOC, Total, Exspan, Conoco Philips and BP. Together, these companies account for 
90 percent of total energy production, whereas national oil companies like Pertamina produce 
merely 5 percent (Hasan, Mahlia and Nur, 2012). Therefore, while the energy supply owned by 
foreign oil supply companies relies on imports, energy security is becoming a crucial issue since 
key energy resources have become scarce due to shortages in domestic production. Pertamina, 
Indonesia’s national oil company, is seeking to correct this shortcoming by improving oil 
production, rewarding oil exploitation contracts to national companies and expanding existing 
refineries. 68
Fossil fuels have tremendous potential in Indonesia (see Table 4.14), especially coal, 69 and the 
government continues to support their development to ensure energy security. For example, 
the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources has supported a fast track program for coal 
resources since 2004 to establish a 10,000 MW coal fired power plant as well as the use of 
brown coal and coal liquefaction technology. In addition, a ban was issued on coal exports to 
secure domestic energy security and to improve the added value of coal.
Table 4.14: Fossil fuel resources and reserves in Indonesia, 2011
Types of energy Resources Proven reserves Production
R/P ratio
(year)
Oil (million barrels)
Gas (trillion cubic feet)
Coal (million tonnes)
Coalbed methane (trillion cubic feet)
56.6
334.5
104.9
453
4.2
108.4
5529
366,056
7.9
275.2
11.8
37.4
18
Source: Mujiyanto and Tiess (2013).
 
Subsidies: It is relatively unattractive for investors to invest in the renewable energy sector 
because the price of renewables competes with fossil fuel subsidies. The Indonesian 
government’s eﬀorts to keep the price of oil below the market price have hampered the 
development of the renewable energy sector. In 2005, the Ministry of Finance provided $9.7 
billion equal to 3.4 percent of GDP to subsidize the oil price which was budgeted at about 
$2 billion, the subsidy increased fivefold due to the unexpected world oil price hike. The oil 
67 ‘Exxon’s LNG Output from Indonesia’s Arun May Drop on Depleting Reserves’ ,www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-07/exxon-mobil-lng-output-
from-arun-may-drop-in-2011-oﬃcial-says.html (Accessed 12 September 2014).
68 ‘Komite Percepatan dan Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia’, http://kp3ei.go.id/in/main_ind/home (Accessed 6 August 2014).
69 ‘Swallowed by Coal: UK Profits from Indonesia’s Destructive Mining Industry’. www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/oct/30/coal-min-
ing-uk-profits-indonesia (Accessed 6 August 2014).
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price subsidy directly aﬀected eﬃciency costs which potentially distorted consumption and 
investment decisions (Mourougane, 2010). Even though a feed-in tariﬀ has been eﬀective in 
the electricity industry since 2002, the price is still unable to compete with fossil fuel-based 
power plants, which are heavily subsidized. 
The first impact on the economy is over-consumption of subsidized energy, and in the case of 
Indonesia, the country does not have suﬃcient oil to meet domestic demand and must rely on 
imports to fill the gap. In the macro context, occasional imports to meet the demand for oil may 
hamper the balance of payment in Indonesia, raising government expenditure in the energy 
industry while reducing subsidies in other industries, which may be more important, such as 
education and health. This approach is supported by the Ministry of Finance with a high oil 
price subsidy, strict fiscal balances and a reduction in fiscal space to improve renewable energy 
incentives as well as a reduction in the allocation for infrastructure, health, food security, 
poverty and education (van Tho, 2013). Vagliasindi (2012) also confirms that kerosene, in 
particular, is predominantly consumed by the bottom quintile group, whereas gasoline is 
mostly consumed by the top quintile group in Ghana, India, Pakistan, Egypt and Indonesia. 
Low-income groups in Indonesia do not benefit from energy subsidies, rather middle and high-
income groups are beneficiaries. 
Education and awareness: this issue is related to the subsidy challenge. Indonesian households 
do not fully understand and accept the implications of energy resource scarcity and the 
importance of renewable energy. They are not educated to change their consumption behavior 
from subsidized energy goods to non-subsidized ones. This consumption behavior was 
indoctrinated between 1965-1998, when the country’s leaders controlled Indonesia’s natural 
resources and increased their allocation among the population. While the political leadership 
increased resource extraction, it also increased the misallocation of natural resources, albeit 
ensuring social stability (Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2006). Subsidizing household oil 
consumption was a concrete action by the government to persuade households to support 
its re-election. Oil and electricity subsidies were invested as political preponderance but were 
economically unproductive projects (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). With this policy, households 
became trapped in the vicious circle of oil subsidies. 
Moreover, potential investors in clean energy projects face regulatory obstacles, for example, 
with regard to coordination between the central and local government as well as coordination in 
terms of spatial planning and land acquisition, which delays investment projects and increases 
risks because land prices continue to increase. Limitation of investments, lack of infrastructure 
and geographical constraints (i.e. some areas are very diﬃcult to reach) are to some extent 
the root causes that disrupt Indonesia’s energy industry. These factors lead investors to cover 
their high risks and costs of exploration of energy resources (i.e. oil, coal and geothermal) with 
longer contract agreements. 
Despite these circumstances, Indonesia has nevertheless realized and is pursuing green 
growth as a new way to achieve economic growth and development to evade environmental 
degradation, loss of biodiversity and unsustainable use of natural resources (OECD, 2011).
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4.8 Conclusion
The Indonesian government has promulgated green investments although in practice, its 
policies are still unclear and require coordination among stakeholders. Biofuels and bioenergy 
industries seem to be growing to replace fossil fuels although in reality, implementation is 
still staggering due to the reluctance to phase out oil subsidies. Indonesia has the potential to 
create green jobs and thereby reduce poverty and GHG emissions. In this study, we show that 
green jobs might be able to create opportunities for people to participate in the green jobs 
market. According to our analysis, between 3.6-4 million green jobs have already been created 
in Indonesia and up to 17 million jobs could be created by 2020. 
To realize these opportunities, some hurdles must be resolved, especially the barriers to 
investment as well as a restructuring of the domestic price mechanism for oil and electricity. 
The lack of technological improvements in the private sector is a crucial issue, as neither 
the industry nor the Indonesian population seem to currently be displaying any significant 
adaptation behavior because they have not yet recognized the potential benefits of green 
investments. 
The current policy framework is insuﬃcient to reinforce the green investment agenda and to 
promote the green industrial growth agenda. Indonesian policymakers must demonstrate 
strong commitment. They specifically will need to consider the dependencies between food 
security, energy security and environmental preservation when formulating a sustainable 
development agenda for Indonesia. Financial assistance will be a crucial success factor in 
supporting Indonesia’s green industrial transition. To promote well-implemented renewable 
energy policies in Indonesia, Havrland and Satyakti (2011) propose four areas the government 
should focus on:
1. Changing society’s behavior towards using renewables and preserve the limited fossil 
energy. This policy could be implemented if the government removes the fossil fuel 
subsidy to promote renewables. Public education to create awareness of the benefits of 
renewable energy compared to fossil fuels will be crucial;
2. Renewable energy should be adaptable, applicable and locally implementable to 
ensure that its technology has longer utilization. Use of the technology should be 
straightforward for people living in both rural and urban areas; 
3. The government should intervene with specific assistance such as feed-in tariﬀs, 
renewable upstream subsidies or renewable energy micro financing;
4. Increasing access for renewables to promote poverty alleviation and energy 
independency by promoting micro and mini hydropower in the electricity grid in remote 
areas and generating energy productivity in the economy. Improving cooperation to 
attract international assistance through REDD+ and the Clean Development Mechanism. 
There are good prospects and opportunities for Indonesia to implement enabling clean energy 
investment policies to realize the country’s strategic long-term development plans towards 
2025. At this stage, in order to get on track with the defined emission reduction targets, 
129
Indonesia must rely on international assistance to reduce the carbon footprint of the LUCF 
industry through well-designed carbon financing mechanisms such as a REDD mechanism and 
the Clean Development Mechanism. On the other hand, uncertainty of the post-Kyoto Protocol 
agreements as well as an economic slowdown in developed countries might complicate the 
realization of a clean energy investment framework in Indonesia. The removal of domestic 
fossil fuel subsidies will be crucial to the process as will a persistent focus on implementing 
and substantially expanding public education along with societal awareness about energy 
independence. The drivers behind the green transformation of the Indonesian economy will be 
the promotion of clean energy to create green jobs and alleviate poverty. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
5.1 Introduction
The Republic of Korea (referred to as ‘the ROK’ from this point forward) announced “Low 
Carbon, Green Growth” as a national agenda in 2008 emphasizing the positive interactions 
between pro-growth and pro-green policies. Green growth policies are necessary to promote 
simultaneous economic growth and protection of the environment. This study provides an 
overview of the ROK’s green growth eﬀorts and policies for clean energy investments, and 
examines the relationship between green energy and employment. 
So far, the ROK’s government’s Green Growth Five-Year Plan has reaped outstanding results. For 
instance, the government established the Presidential Committee on Green Growth, enacted 
the Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth, and set the goal to reduce GHG emissions to 30 
percent below BAU levels by 2020. For the past five years, total GHG emissions have increased 
by 3.3 percent annually on average, primarily due to continued economic growth (Statistics 
Korea – KOSTAT, 2013). Between 2009 and 2013, the government has allocated 2 percent of 
GDP for the implementation of green growth policies. Moreover, with the establishment of the 
GGGI, which has become a renowned international organization, the ROK serves as a bridge 
between advanced and developing countries.
In order to promote investment in the clean energy industry, the ROK has introduced and 
implemented various policies such as feed-in tariﬀs and renewable portfolio standards. 
These policies are still at an initial stage, but have contributed to considerable progress in the 
development of the country’s clean energy industry. The share of new and renewable energy in 
total energy, as well as the levels of private investment and exports in the new and renewable 
energy industry, have been steadily increasing.
The analysis of this study suggests a mutually beneficial relationship between green energy 
and employment in the ROK. When examining the eﬀects of government spending in the new 
and renewable energy industry on employment generation in the ROK, it is found that the 
direct eﬀect of such spending increases employment in the industry, and the indirect spill-over 
eﬀects increase the level of employment in other industries. 
These findings are held up against estimates on green employment in Volume I of the UNIDO/
GGGI research project “Global Green Growth: Clean Energy Industrial Investments and 
Expanding Job Opportunities”, in which it is concluded that a shift from a fossil-fuel energy 
framework to cleaner energy sources will bring about a net increase in employment in the ROK 
of between 235,400 and 315,700 jobs per year over the next 20 years. With the aim to provide 
deeper insight about the prospects of the ROK’s transition to a clean energy economy, the 
methodology in Volume I is compared with other green employment studies, in particular with 
estimates by Kang (2011) in Economic Spillover Eﬀects of Green Industry, Hypothetical Approach 
to Green Growth Policy’s Spillover Eﬀects. This comparison helps draw policy implications from 
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the conclusions presented in Volume I. Based on the comparison and the discussion of the 
ROK’s clean energy framework, the feasibility of the country’s 2020 target for GHG reduction 
as well as the prospect of reducing its per capita CO2 emissions by half over the next 20 years 
is examined.
5.2 Overview of Green Growth Agenda 
Background
After years of tremendous economic growth, the ROK now faces the gravity of imminent fossil-
fuel depletion and climate change. As of 2010, it had become the world’s fifth largest net 
importer of crude oil with 119 million metric tons (mmt) (IEA, 2012). As of 2011, it was ranked 
seventh in the world in terms of (total) CO2 emissions (OECD, 2013) and sixth among OECD 
countries in per capita terms (IEA, 2013). The country's GHG emissions continue to rise. 
 
Table 5.1: Timeline for the Republic of Korea’s Green Growth Framework, 2008-2012
Date Progress
Aug. 2008 Former President Lee Myung-bak announces “Low Carbon, Green Growth” as national agenda.
Nov. 2008 Preparatory task force for Presidential Committee on Green Growth is assembled.
Jan. 2009 Presidential Decree on Establishment and Operation of the  Presidential Committee on Green Growth is proclaimed.
Feb. 2009 1st Meeting of the Presidential Committee on Green Growth.
Jul. 2009 4th PCCG Meeting finalizes Five-Year National Plan for Green Growth.
Nov. 2009
National GHG reduction target: -30 percent from BAU until 2020.
Green budget: 2 percent of GDP on Green Growth Policies is allocated between 2009 and 2013.
Green technology development: 27 core green technologies are defined.
Jan. 2010 Legislation of the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth.
Jun. 2010 The GGGI is established as an international role model.
Mar. 2012 Green Technology Center Korea is founded.
Oct. 2012 Songdo becomes host for the Green Climate Fund (GCF).
Source: Author’s compilation.
Against this backdrop, former President Lee Myung-bak proposed “Low Carbon, Green Growth” 
as a national agenda in his speech of August 2008, delivered on the 60th anniversary of the 
founding of the ROK. And hence began the discussion on green growth at the national level. 
In his speech, Lee referred to green growth as “a new national development paradigm through 
which [the ROK can promote] sustainable growth to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
environmental pollution and to create new growth engines and job opportunities by using 
green technologies and clean energy” (Lee, 2008).70
70 The Lee Myung-bak Administration’s national vision aimed to achieve sustainable development (a society in which people can lead a happy and 
decent life) through green growth and the ‘human new deal.’ While green growth focuses on a balance between economic growth and environmental 
protection, the human new deal emphasizes social and economic development. Based on this practical and balanced approach, the government and 
market assume separate roles. At the same time, there has been a shift from government-led strategies to market-oriented plans.
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Green growth was declared a national vision at a time when the ROK had to seek ways to overcome 
the energy crisis and achieve another economic miracle. The vision outlines directions for a new 
set of economic development policies, signaling the need to shift from the previous energy 
intensive economic growth paradigm to a new paradigm, which pursues eco-friendly and energy 
eﬃcient growth. While manufacturers powered by fossil fuels led growth in the past, high value-
added industries are now to become the growth engine of the future (Kang, 2012a). 
The Five-Year National Plan for Green Growth
Over the past five years, the ROK’s government has set up various institutions and implemented 
diverse policies to promote green growth on a national level. Table 5.1 provides a timeline 
for such eﬀorts. The draft of the Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth was finalized in 
February 2009. During the fourth meeting of the Presidential Committee on Green Growth in 
July that year, the “Five-year National Plan for Green Growth” was unveiled. The Five-year Plan 
consists of three strategies and ten policy directions, which are described in Table 5.2 below. 
 
Table 5.2: Strategies and policy directions of the Republic of Korea’s Five-year National Plan 
for Green Growth
Strategies Policy directions
1. Measures for climate change and 
securing energy independence
1. Reduce carbon emissions.
2.  Decrease energy dependence on oil and enhance energy suﬃciency.
3. Support adaptation to climate change impacts.
2. Creation of new growth engine
4. Develop green technologies as future growth engines.
5. Greening of industry.
6. Develop cutting-edge industries.
7. Set up policy infrastructure for green growth.
3. Improvement of quality of life 
and contribution to international 
community
8. Green city and green transport.
9. Green revolution in lifestyle.
10. Enhance national status as a global leader in green growth.
Source: PCGG (2014).
The Five-year Plan provides details on green growth policies. As Table 5.2 shows, the policies 
include the creation of new growth engines and improvement of quality of life in addition to 
measures for climate change and energy independence. Thus, the Five-year Plan has a much 
wider scope than the environmental policies usually adopted in developed countries, which 
only focus on energy and climate change. In November 2009, the sixth Presidential Committee 
on Green Growth proposed to reduce GHG emissions to 30 percent below the BAU level by 
2020. This was a very ambitious goal since developing nations pledged to reduce their GHG 
emissions to 15-30 percent below their BAU levels in the same period (Kang, 2012b). The 
decision was considered particular significant because the target was voluntarily set by the 
government (Kang, 2012b).
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Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth
In January 2010, the government enacted the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth to 
build a legal foundation for green growth. In April of that same year, the Enforcement Decree 
for the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth was promulgated (Prime Minister’s Oﬃce, 
2013). According to its Article 1, the purpose of the Act is to strike a balance between economic 
development and environmental protection by a) laying the foundation for low carbon, green 
growth; b) promoting economic growth by making use of green technologies and industries as 
new engines of growth; c) contributing to the improvement of quality of life; and d) enabling the 
ROK to become a mature and responsible country in the international community by realizing 
a low carbon society.
In June 2010, GGGI was established and became an international organization in October 2012. 
The ROK took the lead in creating the GGGI whose function is to assist developing nations in 
establishing green growth policies by sharing the ROK’s development experience, providing 
high-quality research outcomes for policymakers and building a green growth network. As of 
2012, the donor countries include Australia, Denmark, Germany, Japan, United Arab Emirates, 
the United Kingdom as well as international organizations and companies (Kang, 2012a).
In March 2012, the ROK established Green Technology Center-Korea, 71 which aims to develop 
advanced green technologies and to create a global network for green technology cooperation. 
Nine research institutes, 72 including the Korea Institute of Science and Technology, play a 
crucial role in cooperative networks.
In October 2012, the ROK was chosen to host the Green Climate Fund Secretariat. The Fund 
serves as a financial mechanism to transfer funds from the developed to the developing world 
hereby assisting developing countries in adapting and mitigating practices to counter climate 
change. Advanced nations are donors to the Fund, and the World Bank was chosen as the 
interim trustee until 2015. In the short term, developed countries pledged to raise $30 billion 
by 2012 and then $100 billion per year by 2020 (Jung, Park and Lim, 2011). Together with the 
GGGI (strategy) and Green Technology Center-Korea (technology), the Green Climate Fund 
(fund) constitutes the “Green Triangle” and is a driving force behind green growth in the ROK.
Based on its national vision and legal foundation for green growth, the ROK has taken measures 
to enhance its potentials for new and renewable energy development. The recent improvement 
of and projections for the new and renewable energy industry reflect the green growth eﬀorts of 
the government. Table 5.3 presents statistics for the industry from 2008 to 2011. The increase in 
the number of businesses, number of employees, sales, exports and investments in the industry 
reflects the government’s initial eﬀorts to promote new and renewable energy development. 
Also, from 2008 to 2011, the exports of businesses in the industry increased by 2.6 times, 
and private investments in the industry increased by 2.4 times (Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Energy – MOTIE, 2014). In the BAU scenario, MOTIE (2014) reports that the joint share of new 
71 At the Global Green Growth Summit held in June 2011, former President Lee Myung-bak announced the establishment of the Green Technology 
Center-Korea, whose key role is to enhance global green technology networking and cooperation. For more information on the GTCK, refer to the GTCK 
webpage (http://www.gtck.re.kr/eng/information/history.php).
72 The research institutes involved are KIST (Korea Institute of Science and Technology), KISTEP (Korea Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning), STEPI 
(Science and Technology Policy Institute), KEITI (Korea Environmental Industry & Technology Institute), Korea Institute of Energy Technology Evaluation 
and Planning), KISTI (Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information), KIER (Korea Institute of Energy Research), KAERI (Korea Atomic Energy 
Research Institute), and KAIST (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology).
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and renewable energy and miscellaneous energy in total energy consumption in the ROK was 
2.4 percent in 2011, and is expected to increase to 5 percent by 203573. Furthermore, the ROK 
aims to raise the share of new and renewable energy supply in total primary energy from 3.2 
percent in 2012 to 5.2 percent by 2020, and to 11 percent by 2035 (MOTIE, 2014). 
Table 5.3: The new and renewable energy industry in the Republic of Korea, 2008-2011
Category 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average annual increase (percent)
Number of businesses 136 193 212 224 18.1
Number of employees 6,700 10,395 13,651 14,563 29.5
Sales (million dollars) 3,058 3,719 6,988 8,891 45.7
Exports (million dollars) 1,957 2,424 4,536 5,105 37.7
Exports/sales (percent) 62.0 54.5 59.9 55.3 -
Investment (million dollars) 1,773 2,343 3,069 4,217 33.0
Source: MOTIE (2014).
Note: The original data on sale and investment was in billion Korean Won and has been converted to dollars, using the annual average exchange rates 
based on monthly averages in each year (World Bank, 2014).
A comparison with leading nations in new and renewable energy development indicates that 
the ROK’s potentials herein are in line with those of Japan and the U.S. As of 2011, 5 percent 
of the U.S.’ total primary energy was derived from new and renewable energy, and the share is 
projected to increase to 13 percent by 2035. For Japan, the corresponding shares are 3 percent 
and 13 percent. As a group, the OECD countries in Europe supplied 9 percent of their total 
primary energy from new and renewable energy, which is planned to increase to 21 percent by 
2035. And finally, looking to another emerging nation, the corresponding shares in China are 
9 percent and 10 percent.
In the BAU scenario, MOTIE (2014) projects that total energy consumption will increase by 
approximately 0.9 percent annually from an average of 205.9 million tons of oil equivalent 
(mmtoe) in 2011 to 254.1 mmtoe by 2035. Table 5.4 presents energy consumption in the ROK in 
2011 and projections for 2025, 2030 and 2035. The projected energy consumption by industries, 
transportation, households, businesses and public/miscellaneous industries is increasing. 
Energy consumption by businesses and public/miscellaneous industries, in particular, is 
projected to increase relatively faster than in other industries. Industries represented the major 
share of total energy consumption with 61.6 percent in 2011; the share is projected to decrease 
to 58.4 percent by 2035 in the BAU scenario (MOTIE, 2014).
73 MOTIE (2014) defines new and renewable energy to include solar, PV, wind, hydro, bio, ocean, geothermal, and hydrogen fuel cell energy. In 
particular, the hydrogen fuel cell energy industry includes activities such as manufacturing, storage, distribution and supply technology and safety 
establishment for hydrogen.
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Table 5.4: Projection for energy consumption in the Republic of Korea, 2011-2035
Million metric tonnes of oil equivalent
Sectors 2011 2025 2030 2035 Average annual increase (percent)
Industries 126.9(61.6)
151.6
(60.9)
152.3
(59.9)
148.4
(58.4) 0.66
Transportation 36.9(17.9)
44.0
(17.7)
45.5
(17.9)
46.5
(18.3) 0.97
Households 21.6(10.5)
24.2
(9.7)
24.6
(9.7)
24.9
(9.8) 0.59
Businesses 15.9(7.7)
23.6
(9.5)
26.0
(10.2)
28.1
(11.0) 2.39
Public/miscellaneous 4.6(2.2)
5.4
(2.2)
5.8
(2.3)
6.2
(2.5) 1.31
Total 205.9(100)
248.7
(100)
254.3
(100)
254.1
(100) 0.88
Note: The number in parentheses refers to the share of energy consumption by each sector in total energy consumption in percentage. Industries refer 
to firms that manufacture or produce goods or services. Businesses refer to enterprises that trade goods or services to consumers.
Source: MOTIE (2014).
To conclude, the ROK’s green growth policy has resulted in a number of achievements since its 
implementation. The government has created a comprehensive framework for such policies and 
have specified clear targets for the future. It has also designated 27 core green technologies 
based on their potentials to create new growth engines. The diﬀerent technologies target short-
term, mid-term and long-term intensive investments as well as long-term gradual investments 
(UNEP, 2010). In particular, investment in the technologies for high eﬃciency and primary 
energy led to 1,410 and 469 patent applications, respectively (Korea Institute of Science and 
Technology Evaluation and Planning, 2011). The initial green growth eﬀorts of the government 
have enhanced the country’s potential for new and renewable energy development, and 
the improvement in the projections for new and renewable energy development and energy 
consumption reflects the government’s commitment to green growth.
5.3 Policies for Clean Energy Investment
The international community has been attempting to shift away from a fossil fuel global 
economy and transition into an economy based on clean energy. The rising significance of 
clean energy reflects the global commitment to GHG emissions reduction and sustainable 
development. Accordingly, developed economies have been continuously and increasingly 
investing in the development and supply of new and renewable energy. The global supply 
of solar and wind energy increases on average by 20-30 percent annually (MOTIE, 2013). 
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Overview of policies in the Republic of Korea
The ROK understands the crucial significance of clean energy in the context of the country’s 
ambition to transition towards a low carbon, green growth pathway. Consequently, the ROK 
has implemented various energy policies to promote clean energy investment. Table 5.5 
shows the progress of new and renewable energy policies from 1987 to 2011. For instance, in 
December 1987, the government enacted and promulgated the Alternative Energy Development 
Promotion Act, which defined new and renewable energy and established a legal foundation for 
government support for investments herein. Government support as well as the participation 
of the private sector initiated such investments. In December 1997, the Act was revised to 
design the structure for recommendations to use alternative energy, pilot projects and loans 
and tax benefits for alternative energy usage. The revision of the Act in 2002 included the 
mandatory purchase of new and renewable energy by public institutions, certifications for new 
and renewable energy equipment and feed-in tariﬀs (MOTIE, 2013).
Table 5.5: Timeline for new and renewable energy policies in the Republic of Korea, 1987-2011
Year Laws and plans Contents
1987 Enactment and Promulgation of Alternative Energy Development Promotion Act
Legal foundation for alternative energy R&D and 
support
1997 Alternative Energy Development, Use, and Distribution Act (1st revision) Support for alternative energy supply
2002
2003
Alternative Energy Development, Use, and 
Distribution Act (2nd and 3rd revisions)
Mandatory use of new and renewable energy in 
public buildings
Certifications for equipment
Feed-in tariﬀs
2003
The 2nd Basic Plan for New and Renewable 
Energy Technology Development and 
Distribution
Supply target of 5 percent by 2011
Strategy and implementation
Technological roadmap
2004 New and Renewable Energy Development, Use, and Distribution Promotion Act (4th revision)
Standardization of technological products
Administrative support
2008
The 3rd Basic Plan for New and Renewable 
Energy Technology Development and 
Distribution
2011 supply target adjusted
2020 and 2030 supply targets established
Promotion of industrialization
2009
2010
New and Renewable Energy Development, Use, 
and Distribution Promotion Act (5th revision)
Renewable portfolio standards introduced  
(2 percent by 2012, 10 percent by 2022)
Mandatory use of new and renewable energy in 
public buildings
2011
The 4th Basic Plan for New and Renewable 
Energy Technology Development and 
Distribution
The 2nd National Energy Basic Plan
Expansion of new and renewable energy supply-
export industrialization
Source: MOTIE (2013).
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In 2004, the Act was revised again into the New and Renewable Energy Development Promotion 
Act and redefined the definition and scope of new and renewable energy. The redefined scope 
included geothermal energy, and the revised Act introduced measures to promote the supply 
of new and renewable energy such as the international standardization of new and renewable 
energy technology, the specialized enterprise system and specialized statistical agency for 
new and renewable energy, and the support for commercialization of the new and renewable 
energy technology. In order to adapt to the energy induced changes such as volatile oil prices 
and the Climate Change Convention and increase the supply of new and renewable energy, 
the subsequent revision of the Act in 2010 established the minimum ratio of such energy in 
total energy consumption in public buildings. The revised Act also required power generators 
to supply a certain amount of electricity from these energy sources (MOTIE, 2013). The initial 
enactment of the Act in 1997 and its subsequent revisions reflect the ROK’s commitment to 
clean energy investment in accordance with global eﬀorts to address climate change and 
promote sustainable development.
In addition to establishing a legal foundation to promote investment in and development 
of new and renewable energy, the ROK devised the First Basic Plan for Alternative Energy 
Technology Development and Distribution in February 2001 for the systematic implementation 
of its policies in the field. The Plan targeted in particular the solar, wind and fuel cell industries 
for concentrated investments. In December 2002, the Second Basic Plan for New and 
Renewable Energy Technology Development, Usage, and Distribution (2003-2012) introduced 
incentive programmes such as tax reductions and the renewable portfolio standards to 
promote investment. Moreover, the second Basic Plan extended the loan periods for facilities 
that use or generate new and renewable energy. The Third Basic Plan for New and Renewable 
Energy Technology Development, Usage, and Distribution (2009-2030) sought to promote the 
industry as a new growth engine and provided a long-term vision for renewable development. 
Specifically, the Plan established targets to increase the supply of new and renewable energy 
to 4.3 percent by 2015, 6.1 percent by 2020 and 11 percent by 2030 (MOTIE, 2013).
Based on the legal foundation and basic plans for the clean energy framework, the government 
has implemented a number of policies to increase the supply of and promote investment in new 
and renewable energy generation equipment installation with the general and regional supply 
support programmes. It aims to create the initial markets and promote the commercialization of 
new and renewable energy technology. In particular, the government supports up to 60 percent 
of the installation costs for new and renewable energy generation equipment for automobiles. 
For solar, geothermal and bio energy generation equipment, the government supports up to 50 
percent of the installation costs (Ministry of Environment – MOE, 2009).
The Million Green Home plan subsidizes the installation of new and renewable energy 
generation equipment in homes. By 2020, the plan intends to help one million households 
install PV, solar, geothermal, wind and/or fuel cell energy equipment. As of 2012, the plan 
had subsidized the installation of PV energy equipment in 141,468 households and the 
installation of solar energy equipment in 18,387 households (KEMC, 2014). In addition, the 
government promoted investment by providing loan support to businesses and households for 
the purchase, installation, reparation and production of new and renewable energy and related 
equipment. In 2013, the government’s loan support amounted to $72.3 million (Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy – MKE and KEMCCNRE, 2013). 
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Furthermore, the government implemented the feed-in tariﬀs policy in 2002 in order for the 
Korea Electric Power Corporation to compensate the diﬀerence between the cost of electricity 
produced by generators with new and renewable energy and the market price of electricity. 
As of 2009, the company had provided a total of $344.7 million to 1,308 generators for the 
accumulated capacity of 835 MW (MOTIE, 2013).
In 2012, the government shifted from the feed-in tariﬀs policy to the renewable portfolio 
standards to increase the supply of new and renewable energy and ease the fiscal burden. 
The standards require generators to supply a fixed percentage of the total amount of energy 
provided by using new and renewable energy. Hence, generators must install new and 
renewable energy facilities, purchase electricity from new and renewable energy generators or 
purchase new and renewable energy credits from the financial market. The renewable portfolio 
standards aims to increase the share of electricity generated from new and renewable energy 
in the total electricity generated from 2 percent in 2012 to 10 percent in 2022 (MOTIE, 2013).
Progress and evaluation
Between 1988 and 2011 - since the enactment of the Alternative Energy Development Promotion 
Act in 1987 - the ROK’s government has allotted a total of $4.8 billion to the new and renewable 
energy industry. Out of $225 million spent on investment in technology development, the 
government contributed about $1.4 billion, while the private sector provided approximately 
$0.8 billion. Government policies to promote investment in the industry ranged from funding to 
administrative support. Consequently, the share of new and renewable energy in total energy 
increased from 0.4 percent in 1990 to 2.6 percent in 2010 (MOTIE, 2013). 
Moreover, MKE (2012) reports that the government’s eﬀorts to promote such investment 
resulted in a substantial increase in the level of private investment and exports in the industry. 
Private investment increased from $653 million in 2007 to $2,792 million in 2009 and reached 
$4,343 million in 2011. Furthermore, the export of new and renewable energy increased from 
$663 million in 2007 to, $886 million in 2009, and to $6,463 million in 2011. In particular, PV 
energy accounted for 87 percent of exports and wind energy was 13 percent (MKE, 2012).
The increase in the number of employees in the new and renewable energy industry reflects 
the ROK’s commitment to new and renewable energy development and the eﬀectiveness of 
its policies to promote investment in the industry. As indicated in Table 5.3, the number of 
employees in the industry increased from 6,700 in 2008 to 14,563 in 2011, corresponding 
to an average annual increase of 29.5 percent (MOTIE, 2014). According to MKE (2011), the 
government’s expenditure for the industry created a total of 30,065 jobs between 2008 and 
2010. Therefore, the policies to promote new and renewable energy investment have not only 
increased the level of private investment and exports in the industry, but they have also had a 
positive impact on employment generation.
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Obstacles for clean energy investment
The transition of the ROK towards a low carbon, green growth pathway has already begun, and 
its emphasis on clean energy has been growing. Despite the achievements of the current clean 
energy investment policies, there are substantial obstacles that need to be dealt with. One of 
the most evident problems is that investment in clean energy still lags far behind that of other 
developed countries. Lee and Teske (2013) note that the ROK’s investment in the new and 
renewable energy technology industry was less than 10 percent of that of China or the U.S. in 
2011. In that year, China invested $55 billion, while the U.S. invested $51 billion in renewable 
energy. By contrast, the ROK invested $235 million. Compared to China, which has established 
its leadership in the global market for wind and PV energy, the ROK has to invest more in order 
to join the frontrunners in the clean energy market (Lee and Teske, 2013).
In addition to the need to increase the level of clean energy investment, the ROK must establish 
stronger incentives for private investment in the clean energy industry. MOTIE (2014) reports 
that the domestic development of core technologies in the industry is still at its initial stage. 
Despite investment in the 27 core green technologies, the development of core new and 
renewable energy technologies is still under progress. In 2011, the average import rate of the 
major components, materials and tools for PV energy was 79 percent, 85 percent for wind 
energy and 91 percent for fuel cell energy. Along with the lack of programmes to commercialize 
the technologies, the slow pace of technological development could potentially limit medium- 
and long-term clean energy investment in the ROK. Moreover, the subsidized (low) cost of 
electricity continues to increase the consumption of fossil fuels and could restrict the supply of 
clean energy (MOTIE, 2014).
5.4 Evaluation of Green Growth in the Republic of Korea
Green growth indicators
Given the long-term nature of its green growth plans, many of the ROK’s strategies for 
successful implementation of the plans are still on-going. Yet, it is crucial to assess its present 
achievements in and the obstacles to green growth implementation to better understand its 
trajectory towards a green growth economy. One way to evaluate the current progress of its 
green growth is to examine its green growth indicators. To support the National Strategy for 
Green Growth and provide statistics for green growth policies, KOSTAT developed green growth 
statistics and built the framework for green growth indicators (Choi, 2010). These indicators 
aim to “monitor the level of progress toward green growth, make policies to foster green growth 
activities, and evaluate the performance of green growth policies in Korea” (Choi, 2010, p. 4). 
Building on policy relevance, analytical soundness and data availability, KOSTAT developed 
the indicators with three themes and ten sub-themes to reflect the three objectives and ten 
policy directions of the Five-year Green Growth Plan (Choi, 2010).
This section addresses current problems and the policy implications of the implementation 
of green growth based on KOSTAT’s 2013 green growth indicators. Table 5.6 depicts the recent 
trends of the indicators.
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Table 5.6: Recent trends of green growth indicators in the Republic of Korea, 2007-2012
3 themes 10 sub-themes Green growth indicators Trend Unit
Th
em
e 
1.
 M
ea
su
re
s 
fo
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lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 
an
d 
se
cu
rin
g 
en
er
gy
 in
de
pe
nd
en
ce Reduce carbon 
emissions
GHG emissions per GDP → kg CO2/1,000 won
Total GHG emissions ↗ million t CO2
GHG absorption by forests ↗ million t CO2
Decrease ener-
gy dependence 
on oil and en-
hance energy 
self-suﬃciency
Energy consumption per unit of GDP ↗ toe/ million won
Share of self-development of oil and gas ↗ percent
Share of new and renewable energy ↗ percent
Support ad-
aptation to 
climate change 
impacts
Self-suﬃciency rate of food ↘ percent
Accuracy of rainfall forecast ↗ percent
Government budget dedicated to disaster  
prevention ↗ percent
Th
em
e 
 2
. C
re
at
io
n 
of
 n
ew
 g
ro
w
th
 e
ng
in
es
Develop green 
technologies as 
future growth 
engines
Share of green R&D in total government  
R&D expenditures ↗ percent
Share of GDP dedicated to total R&D expenditures ↗ percent
Number of international patent applications  
per thousand people ↗ per 1,000 people
Greening of 
industry
Domestic material consumption per unit of GDP ↘ kg/1,000 won
Share of environmental industry sales ↗ percent
new and renewable energy industry sales ↗ 1 billion won
Develop cut-
ting-edge in-
dustries
Share of value added from service sector in total 
value added ↘ percent
Share of value added from knowledge intensive 
industries in total value added from services ↗ percent
Share of value added from information and com-
munication industries in total value added ↗ percent
Set up policy 
infrastructure 
for green 
growth
Number of ISO14001-certified businesses per 
thousand people ↗ per 1,000 people
Share of environmental taxes in GDP → percent
Th
em
e 
 3
. I
m
pr
ov
em
en
t o
f q
ua
lit
y 
of
 li
fe
  
an
d 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
om
m
un
ity
Green city and 
green transport
Urban green space per capita ↗ m2/person
Share of public passenger transportation in total 
passenger transportation ↗ percent
Share of environment protection expenditures 
in GDP → percent
Green revolu-
tion in lifestyle
Household energy consumption per capita → toe/person
Municipal water use per capita ↘ l/person/day
Municipal waste generation per capita ↘ kg/person/day
Enhance na-
tional status as 
a global leader 
in green growth
Share of oﬃcial development assistance in gross 
national income ↗ percent
Share of green growth oﬃcial development assis-
tance in total oﬃcial development assistance → percent
Source: KOSTAT (2013).
Note: The arrows in the Trend section indicate the trends of green growth indicators over the past five years (2007-2012).
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Theme 1 of the KOSTAT indicators represents the measures for climate change and securing 
energy independence. It consists of 3 sub-themes: reduce carbon emissions, decrease energy 
dependence on oil and enhance energy self-suﬃciency, and support adaptation to climate 
change impacts. With respect to Theme 1, five out of nine indicators have shown improvement, 
while three indicators have deteriorated for 2008-2012 (one indicator remained constant). In 
the sub-theme carbon emissions reduction, GHG absorption by forests increased by 4.1 percent 
annually on average due to forest accumulation.
In the sub-theme decreasing energy dependence on oil and enhancing energy self-suﬃciency, 
the share of self-development of oil and gas is an indicator that represents energy independence. 
It increased steadily to 13 percent in 2011 and 2012. The share of new and renewable energy was 
3.2 percent of total energy supply in 2012 and increased by 0.8 percentage points compared 
to the 2007 level. In particular, new and renewable energy consisted of waste materials (67.8 
percent), bio energy (15.1 percent) and hydroelectric energy (9.2 percent).
Among the three indicators that deteriorated, the total GHG emissions were an indicator for the 
sub-theme carbon emissions reduction. For the past five years, it has increased by 3.3 percent 
annually on average, primarily due to continued economic growth. Specifically, the increase 
in steel production and climate anomalies such as the heat wave and cold wave raised GHG 
emissions by 60 mmt to 670 mmt of CO2. For the sub-theme decreasing energy dependence 
on oil and enhancing energy self-suﬃciency, the energy consumption per unit of GDP reflects 
energy consumption eﬃciency. It increased over the last five years, reaching 0.274 tonnes of oil 
equivalent (toe) per thousand dollars. In the sub-theme strengthening the capacity to adaption 
to climate change, the self-suﬃciency rate of food recently decreased to less than 50 percent. 
Compared to the 2009 and 2010 levels, the self-suﬃciency decreased by 10 percentage points 
to 45.3 percent in 2012.
Theme 2 of the KOSTAT indicators reflects the creation of new growth engines. It consists of 
4-sub-themes: develop green technologies as future growth engines, greening of industry, 
develop cutting-edge industries, and set up policy infrastructure for green growth. With 
respect to Theme 2, nine out of eleven indicators have shown improvement, while one 
indicator deteriorated over the past five years (one indicator remained constant). In the sub-
theme development of green technology, the share of green R&D in total government R&D 
expenditures represents the indicator enhancement of environmental technology. It decreased 
by 0.6 percentage points to 16 percent from 2011 to 2012, yet the current level is higher than 
the 2007 and 2008 levels. Also, the share of GDP allocated to total R&D expenditures reflects 
the ROK’s technological capability, which has increased by 0.2 percentage points annually on 
average over the past five years. In particular, the 2012 level of 4.4 percent was higher than the 
2011 level by 0.4 percentage points. Moreover, the number of international patent applications 
per thousand people increased by 10.3 percent annually on average for the last five years. In 
2012, the number was 0.2 and thus higher than the 2007 level by 0.1.
In the sub-theme greening of industry, domestic material consumption per unit of GDP has 
decreased by 1.9 percent annually on average for the past five years. Compared to the 2007 
level, the 2011 level of 0.692 kg per $1 was lower by 0.033 kg per $1. Meanwhile, the share 
of environmental industry sales exceeded the 1 percent mark in 2010 after a steady increase. 
Furthermore, new and renewable energy industry sales increased by 68.5 percent annually on 
average for the last five years.
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In the sub-theme developing cutting-edge industries, the share of value added from knowledge 
intensive industries in total value added from the service sector increased by 0.2 percentage 
points annually on average for the past five years. In 2012, the share reached 48.3 percent, 
increasing by 0.9 percentage points compared to the 2007 level. For the sub-theme setting 
up policy infrastructure for green growth, the number of ISO14001-certified businesses per 
thousand people reflects the recognition and implementation of green growth by industries. 
The number was 7,293 in 2012 and increased by 5.1 percent relative to the previous year. The 
only sub-theme indicator that deteriorated was the share of value added from the service 
sector in total value added. This indicator represents the structural change in industries. Since 
the financial crisis, it decreased below 60 percent and remained constant from 2010 to 2012.
Theme 3 of the KOSTAT indicators reflects the improvement of quality of life and the contribution 
to the international community. It consists of 3 sub-themes: green city and green transport, 
green revolution in lifestyle and enhancing the national status as a global leader in green 
growth. With respect to Theme 3, five out of eight indicators have shown improvement, while 
the other three remained generally unchanged. In the sub-theme green city and green transport, 
urban green space per capita has been increasing steadily. Between 2007 and 2011, the figure 
increased by 13.6 percent to 7.95 m2. Moreover, the share of public passenger transport in total 
passenger transport increased by 1.5 percentage points to 25.9 percent between 2007 and 
2011. For the sub-theme green revolution in lifestyle, municipal water use per capita decreased 
substantially until 2009 and slightly increased subsequently. In 2007, the figure was 340 litres 
and decreased by 5 litres between 2007 and 2011. Also, municipal waste generation per capita 
has been decreasing since 2009. The 2011 level was 0.95 kg and lower than the 2010 level 
by 1 percent. In the sub-theme enhancing national status as a global leader in green growth, 
the share of oﬃcial development assistance in gross national income has been increasing 
steadily. In 2012, total oﬃcial development assistance increased by 17.1 percent to $1.55 billion 
compared to the 2011 level. The share of oﬃcial development assistance in gross national 
income increased to approximately 0.1 percent between 2011 and 2012. 
While the green growth indicators provide a meaningful insight about the ROK’s green growth 
eﬀorts, it is important to check the quality of the indicators before drawing policy implications 
from them. The KOSTAT and other statistical agencies produce economic and social statistics 
that are used for the development of the green growth indicators. In general, these statistics 
are of high quality. However, Choi (2010) warns of the potential quality problems inherent 
in non-oﬃcial statistics used for some of the green growth indicators such as the share of 
green R&D in the total R&D budget and the government fund for the green industry. Most of 
the non-oﬃcial statistics were obtained from administrative data, and their definitions and 
classification lack consistency. Also, the environmental statistics must be viewed with caution 
due to methodological issues. In particular, the number of monitoring sites and their location 
influence the quality of the environmental statistics (Choi, 2010). 
The green growth experience
The KOSTAT green growth indicators provide an insight into the current progress of the ROK’s 
green growth as well as its future direction. The country has made notable improvements 
with respect to a number of aspects covered in the green growth indicators. In particular, the 
share of green R&D in total government R&D expenditure increased between 2007 and 2012. 
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Moreover, new and renewable energy industry sales increased steadily as well. However, the 
indicators also highlight the areas the ROK needs to work on. For instance, GHG emissions were 
increasing in the five-year period. This calls for the government to take measures to reduce GHG 
emissions, especially in order to meet its 2020 GHG emissions target.
5.5 Employment Generation and New and Renewable Energy
Background
Traditionally, employment generation and sustainable development were viewed as two 
separate objectives. In a macroeconomic perspective, employment generation represented 
a major factor in growth strategies for both developing and developed economies. Also, the 
employment rate served as an important measure of economic growth. On the other hand, 
the global discussion and awareness of climate risks underlined the inevitable need for 
sustainability and corresponding economic adjustments. An increasing number of economies 
have realized the grave consequences of the traditional fossil fuel economy. In order to present 
an alternative for the existing fossil fuel energy resources, governments’ energy plans have 
begun to incorporate R&D of clean, and new and renewable energy.  
The ROK had an understanding with a number of other countries regarding the need for new and 
renewable energy as well as employment generation. Until recently, the relationship between 
the two reflected a certain level of dichotomy, if not an outright trade-oﬀ. For many economies, 
the necessary economic adjustments for sustainability often meant a compromise on economic 
growth. Hence, in the traditional approach to sustainable development, this compromise 
posed a potential obstacle, particularly for developing economies without advanced new and 
renewable energy technology. After a prolonged period of economic growth in the presence 
of the dichotomy between new and renewable energy and employment generation, the ROK’s 
“Low Carbon, Green Growth” agenda presented an alternative approach to achieve both. 
This section examines the relationship between employment generation and new and 
renewable energy in the ROK. To fully grasp the relationship, it is crucial to understand the 
context in which it takes place based on the employment status and environmental statistics in 
the ROK. Along with many other advanced economies, the ROK is still feeling the impact of the 
recent international financial crisis and the worldwide recession. Table 5.7 shows the change 
in employment rate in the ROK from 2008 to 2012 (Ministry of Strategy and Finance – MOSF, 
2013). According to MOSF (2013), the ROK recorded an annual average real economic growth 
rate of only 3 percent between 2008 and 2012. Also, the employment rate has not returned 
to its pre-crisis level but only recovered modestly since 2010. Moreover, the employment rate 
among young adults has not increased since its drastic decline during the financial crisis. 
Under such circumstances, now is the right time for the ROK to implement specific measures 
to meet the government’s targets for both the potential growth rate and the employment rate.
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Table 5.7: Employment rates in the Republic of Korea, 2008-2012
Percent
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average annual increase 
Employment rate 59.5 58.6 58.7 59.1 59.4 -0.004
Employment rate among 
young adults 41.6 40.5 40.3 40.5 40.4 -0.007
Source: MOSF (2013).
Note: ‘Young adults’ refers to population of age 15-29.
On the other hand, climate change and the consequent need for new and renewable energy 
pose new challenges for the ROK. In the BAU scenario, Westphal, Hughes and Brömmelhörster 
(2013) project that the economic loss would amount to 3 percent of GDP by 2100. In particular, 
climate change would induce volatility in the prices of primary resources and aﬀect the market 
environment. Furthermore, climate anomalies and climate disasters could potentially cause 
severe economic loss and employment displacement on a national level. In addition, climate 
change poses both a direct and indirect threat to diverse industries. According to the National 
Emergency Management Agency (2013), climate disaster resulted in property damage of $1.02 
billion and 43 deaths annually on average between 2003 and 2012. Given the gravity of its 
impact on both society and the economy, climate change presents a severe risk to individuals 
as well as governments around the world. Climate risk implies the need to acknowledge the 
limitations of the traditional economic development paradigm under which the reliance on 
climate change-inducing fossil fuels has been excessive (Kang, 2012c). On this background, it 
has become essential for the ROK to reinforce its new and renewable energy industry and, in 
turn, transition towards a low carbon green growth economy.
The recent green growth eﬀorts of the ROK’s government have resulted in the expansion of 
new and renewable energy supply, which in turn has led to an increase in employment in the 
new and renewable energy industry. Since the implementation of the green growth strategy, 
the industry has expanded substantially. From 2007 to 2010, the number of manufacturers in 
the industry increased by 2.2 times from 100 to 215. Over the same time period, the number of 
manufacturers in the PV energy industry increased by 3.2 times and by 39 percent in the wind 
energy industry (MKE, 2011, cited in Lee et al., 2011). Between 2008 and 2012, the share of PV 
energy in total primary energy increased by 41 percent annually on average and that of wind 
energy increased by 20 percent annually on average (MOTIE, 2014).
Between 2007 and 2010, the employment in the industry increased by 3.6 times from 3,691 to 
13,380. In particular, employment in the PV energy industry increased by 7.4 times from 1,156 
in 2007 to 8,579 in 2010 (MKE, 2011, cited in Lee et al., 2011). In the BAU scenario, Teske, 
Zervos and Lee (2012) project that employment in the electricity industry will grow from 59,000 
jobs in 2010 to 94,000 jobs by 2020 and decrease to 67,000 jobs by 2030. The nuclear, PV 
and wind generation industries will primarily drive this increase in employment. In particular, 
employment in the PV generation industry will increase to 29,000 jobs by 2020 and fall back 
to 11,000 jobs by 2030.
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MOTIE (2014) defines new and renewable energy to include solar, PV, wind, hydro, bio, ocean, 
geothermal, and hydrogen fuel cell energy. In particular, the hydrogen fuel cell energy industry 
includes activities such as manufacturing, storage, distribution and supply technology and 
safety establishment for hydrogen. The PV energy industry promotes technological development 
of the PV generation system to create jobs through domestic energy supply, climate change 
responses and export industrialization. The bio energy industry promotes development of bio 
fuel transportation technology.
The employment inducing eﬀect of new and renewable energy
To fully grasp the relationship between employment and government expenditure on new and 
renewable energy, it is essential to examine the direct and indirect employment and worker 
inducing eﬀects of government expenditure on new and renewable energy. The direct eﬀect 
refers to the result of multiplying government expenditure ($865,000) for each industry 
by the employment-inducing coeﬃcient (i.e. the number of employees divided by the total 
government expenditure), excluding the spill-over eﬀects on other industries. On the other 
hand, the indirect eﬀect refers to the result of subtracting the direct eﬀect from the total eﬀect. 
When an industry receives government funds, its production will increase. Consequently, the 
production of another industry increases due to the rise in production of the initial industry. The 
indirect eﬀect captures the consequent increase in employment of the latter industry (Ministry 
of Employment and Labor – MOEL, 2010). The demand-side model used by MOEL (2010) also 
analyses the backward eﬀect of the government new and renewable energy expenditure on 
employment in other industries that provide intermediate goods for new and renewable energy 
industries. Table 5.8 shows the direct and indirect employment and worker inducing eﬀects of 
government expenditure. 
Table 5.8: The Republic of Korea. Direct and indirect employment and worker inducing eﬀects 
of government expenditure on new and renewable energy, 2008-2010
Number of employees per $1 million
Government expenditures Feed-in tariﬀs
Employment inducing 
eﬀect
Total 12.7 3.5
Direct 9.2 1.2
Indirect 3.5 2.3
Worker inducing eﬀect
Total 19.7 3.5
Direct 13.9 1.2
Indirect 5.8 2.3
Source: MOEL (2010).
Note: a) Worker includes self-employed, unpaid family members and paid workers. b) The worker inducing eﬀect refers to the eﬀect on the number 
of workers. c) The employment inducing eﬀect refers to the eﬀect on the number of paid workers. d) The table is based on the data of government 
expenditure for the new and renewable energy industry between 2008 and 2010. e) The conversion from Korean Won to dollars is based on the 2010 
exchange rate from http://data.worldbank.org. f) The demand-side model analyses the backward eﬀect of the government new and renewable energy 
expenditure on employment in other industries that provide intermediate goods for new and renewable energy industries. g) The total government 
expenditures on the new and renewable energy industry was $461.8 million in 2008, $380.6 million in 2009, $399.4 million in 2010.
151
According to MOEL (2010), the employment inducing eﬀect on account of government 
investments between 2008 and 2010 was 12.7 employees per $1 million, while the eﬀect on 
account of the feed-in tariﬀs was 3.5 employees per $1 million. Thus, the result implies that 
government investments induce employment more eﬀectively than feed-in tariﬀs. Moreover, 
the worker inducing eﬀect indicates that government investments are more eﬀective in terms 
of worker inducement than feed-in tariﬀs (19.7 employees per $1 million against 3.5 employees 
per $1 million).
Furthermore, the demand-side model provides meaningful insights on the relationship 
between employment and government expenditure on new and renewable energy in the ROK. 
MOEL (2010) reports that the total employment inducing eﬀect of government expenditure on 
new and renewable energy was 21,633 employees between 2008 and 2010 (see Table 5.9). The 
impact on the new and renewable energy industry was 16,046 employees. The impact on the 
service sector was 3,441 employees and on the manufacturing sector was 1,638 employees.
Table 5.9: The Republic of Korea. Total employment inducing eﬀect of total government 
expenditure on new and renewable energy, 2008-2010
Number of employees per $1 million 
2008 2009 2010 Total
Agriculture, fishery and forestry 32 31 29 92
Manufacturing 572 547 519 1,638
Service 1,202 1,148 1,091 3,441
Electricity, gas and water 18 17 16 62
Construction 22 20 20 61
Research Institutions 106 102 96 304
New and renewable energy 5,606 5,353 5,087 16,046
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0
Total 7,558 7,217 6,858 21,633
Source: MOEL (2010).
Note: Total government expenditure on new and renewable energy is the sum of government expenditure on supply and technology development of 
new and renewable energy and loan support and infrastructure for new and renewable energy. The conversions from Korean Won to dollars are based 
on the 2008, 2009 and 2010 exchange rates, respectively, from http://data.worldbank.org.
The employment inducing eﬀect of government expenditure on the supply of new and renewable 
energy was 9,203 employees between 2008 and 2010 (see Table 5.10). The impact on the 
new and renewable energy industry was 6,824 employees, the largest among all industries. 
The impact on the service sector was 1,462 employees and on the manufacturing sector 
was 696 employees. Moreover, the employment inducing eﬀect of government expenditure 
on technology development for new and renewable energy was a total of 12,170 employees 
between 2008 and 2010 (see Table 5.11). The impact on the new and renewable energy industry 
was 9,025 employees. The impact on the service sector was 1,936 employees and the impact 
on the manufacturing sector was 922 employees.
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Table 5.10: The Republic of Korea. Total employment inducing eﬀect of government 
expenditure on the supply of new and renewable energy, 2008-2010
Number of employees per $1 million 
2008 2009 2010 Total
Agriculture, fishery and forestry 17 13 10 40
Manufacturing 300 218 178 696
Service 631 458 373 1,462
Electricity, gas and water 10 6 6 22
Construction 11 9 7 27
Research Institutions 56 41 34 131
New and renewable energy 2,942 2,140 1,742 6,824
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0
Total 3,967 2,886 2,350 9,203
Source: MOEL (2010).
Note: Total government expenditure on new and renewable energy is the sum of government expenditure on supply and technology development of 
new and renewable energy and loan support and infrastructure for new and renewable energy. The conversions from Korean Won to dollars are based 
on the 2008, 2009 and 2010 exchange rates, respectively, from http://data.worldbank.org.
MOEL (2010) also examines the worker inducing eﬀects of government expenditures on 
new and renewable energy (see Table 5.12). Between 2008 and 2010, the eﬀect was 32,871 
employees. The impact on the new and renewable energy industry was 25,415 employees, 
reflecting the fact that government expenditure was primarily concentrated on this industry. 
The impact on the service sector was 4,445 employees, and that on the manufacturing sector 
was 1,823 employees.
The worker inducing eﬀect of government expenditure on the supply of new and renewable 
energy was 13,983 employees between 2008 and 2010 (see Table 5.13). The eﬀect was the 
largest for the new and renewable energy industry, providing jobs for 10,812 new employees. 
The impact on the service sector was 1,891 employees and on the manufacturing sector was 
775 employees.
Moreover, the worker inducing eﬀect of government expenditure on technology development for 
new and renewable energy was 18,520 employees between 2008 and 2010 (see Table 5.14). The 
impact on the new and renewable energy industry was 14,293 employees. While the impact on the 
service sector was 2,499 employees, the impact on the manufacturing sector was 1,026 employees. 
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Table 5.11: The Republic of Korea. Total employment inducing eﬀect of government expenditure 
on technology development of new and renewable energy, 2008-2010
Number of employees per $1 million 
2008 2009 2010 Total
Agriculture, fishery and forestry 15 18 18 51
Manufacturing 268 323 331 922
Service 562 678 696 1,936
Electricity, gas and water 9 10 10 29
Construction 10 13 13 36
Research Institutions 50 60 61 171
New and renewable energy 2,620 3,160 3,245 9,025
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0
Total 3,533 4,262 4,375 12,170
Source: MOEL (2010).
Note: Total government expenditure on new and renewable energy is the sum of government expenditure on supply and technology development of 
new and renewable energy and loan support and infrastructure for new and renewable energy. The conversions from Korean Won to dollars are based 
on the 2008, 2009 and 2010 exchange rates, respectively, from http://data.worldbank.org. The worker inducing eﬀect of new and renewable energy.
 
Table 5.12: The Republic of Korea. Total worker inducing eﬀect of total government 
expenditure on new and renewable energy, 2008-2010
Number of employees per $1 million 
2008 2009 2010 Total
Agriculture, fishery and forestry 269 257 244 770
Manufacturing 637 608 578 1,823
Service 1,553 1,483 1,409 4,445
Electricity, gas and water 18 17 16 51
Construction 23 22 21 66
Research institutions 106 102 96 304
New and renewable energy 8,879 8,479 8,057 25,415
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0
Total 11,484 10,966 10,421 32,871
Source: MOEL (2010).
Note: Total government expenditure on new and renewable energy is the sum of government expenditure on supply and technology development of 
new and renewable energy and loan support and infrastructure for new and renewable energy. The conversions from Korean Won to dollars are based 
on the 2008, 2009 and 2010 exchange rates, respectively, from http://data.worldbank.org.
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Table 5.13: The Republic of Korea. Total worker inducing eﬀect of government expenditure on 
the supply of new and renewable energy, 2008-2010
Number of employees per $1 million 
2008 2009 2010 Total
Agriculture, fishery and forestry 141 102 83 326
Manufacturing 334 243 198 775
Service 816 592 483 1,891
Electricity, gas and water 10 6 6 22
Construction 12 9 7 28
Research institutions 56 41 34 131
New and renewable energy 4,662 3,389 2,761 10,812
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0
Total 6,030 4,382 3,571 13,983
Source: MOEL (2010).
Note: Total government expenditure on new and renewable energy is the sum of government expenditure on supply and technology development of 
new and renewable energy and loan support and infrastructure for new and renewable energy. The conversions from Korean Won to dollars are based 
on the 2008, 2009 and 2010 exchange rates, respectively, from http://data.worldbank.org.
Table 5.14: The Republic of Korea. Total worker inducing eﬀect of government expenditure on 
technology development of new and renewable energy, 2008-2010
Number of employees per $1 million 
2008 2009 2010 Total
Agriculture, fishery and forestry 126 151 190 467
Manufacturing 298 359 369 1,026
Service 725 875 899 2,499
Electricity, gas and water 9 10 10 29
Construction 11 13 13 37
Research institutions 50 60 61 171
New and renewable energy 4,149 5,004 5,140 14,293
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0
Total 5,367 6,471 6,682 18,520
Source: MOEL (2010).
Note: Total government expenditure on new and renewable energy is the sum of government expenditure on supply and technology development of 
new and renewable energy and loan support and infrastructure for new and renewable energy. The conversions from Korean Won to dollars are based 
on the 2008, 2009 and 2010 exchange rates, respectively, from http://data.worldbank.org. Forward linkage eﬀect of feed-in tariﬀ on employment.
In the previous sections, the demand-side model analysed the backward eﬀect of the 
government new and renewable energy expenditure on employment in other industries that 
provide intermediate goods for new and renewable energy sectors. On the other hand, the 
supply-side model provides an alternative perspective on the relationship between employment 
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and government expenditure on new and renewable energy. MOEL (2010) uses the 2008 I-O 
table to examine the forward linkage eﬀect of the feed-in tariﬀs policy. Table 5.15 shows the 
nominal and real values of feed-in tariﬀs in new and renewable energy by year. The introduction 
of feed-in tariﬀs increases an industry’s production. Since another industry uses the product of 
the initial industry as a factor of production, the forward linkage eﬀect captures the increase in 
the latter industry’s employment due to the rise in its production. Between 2008 and 2010, the 
forward linkage eﬀect of feed-in tariﬀs on employment was 2,444 employees (see Table 5.16). 
Table 5.15: The Republic of Korea. Value of feed-in tariﬀs in new and renewable energy,  
2008-2010
Thousand dollars
2008 2009 2010 Total
Nominal value 108,217 216,569 235,333 560,119
Real value 108,217 210,617 222,360 541,194
Source: MOEL (2010).
Note: The conversions from Korean Won to dollars are based on the 2008, 2009 and 2010 exchange rates, respectively, from http://data.worldbank.org.
Table 5.16: The Republic of Korea. Forward linkage eﬀect of feed-in tariﬀs in new and 
renewable energy on employment, 2008-2010
Number of employees per $1 million 
2008 2009 2010 Total
Agriculture, fishery and forestry 3 8 7 18
Manufacturing 104 271 235 610
Service 69 183 157 409
Electricity, gas and water 204 534 462 1,200
Construction 6 14 12 32
Research institutions 2 5 5 12
New and renewable energy 24 63 53 140
Miscellaneous 4 10 9 23
Total 417 1,087 940 2,444
Source: MOEL (2010).
Note: The conversions from Korean Won to dollars are based on the 2008, 2009 and 2010 exchange rates, respectively, from http://data.worldbank.org.
Concluding remarks
The existing literature suggests the existence of a mutually beneficial relationship between 
employment and government expenditure on new and renewable energy. While climate change 
has caused the need for new and renewable energy, investments in the new and renewable 
energy industry do not necessarily imply a decline in employment. In fact, the greater emphasis 
on new and renewable energy implies employment generation in the new and renewable energy 
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industry as well as direct and indirect employment generation for other industries. It is evident 
that a shift from a fossil fuel based economy to one based on new and renewable energy would 
incur worker displacement throughout the ROK’s economy. Nevertheless, it would be essential 
to compare this worker displacement eﬀect with new employment generation on account of 
new and renewable energy investments. Incorporating this comparison into their analysis, 
policymakers will then be able to determine the net change in employment on account of the 
ROK’s transition towards a low carbon pathway.
5.6 Methodology for Estimating Employment Eﬀects of  
Green Investments
 
As mentioned in previous sections, the ROK’s green growth policies have achieved tangible 
results in diverse aspects within a short period of time. Among others, analyses on the impact 
of the ROK’s green growth policies on the macro-economy including job creation are crucial 
to verify the significance of such policies. Indeed, a quantitative analysis before and after the 
implementation of the policies is essential to help policymakers revise the future direction of 
the ROK’s green growth pathway. This section reviews the two most important studies on the 
subject, Volume I and Kang (2011), and looks at the diﬀerences in research methodologies 
applied in these studies. A framework comparable to the ROK’s green growth is adopted in 
Volume I in which the eﬀects of clean energy investments on emissions is analyzed and it 
is found that the ROK can realistically reduce its absolute per capita CO2 emissions by half 
compared to its 2010 emissions over the next 20 years. The study projects that between 235,400 
and 315,700 direct and indirect jobs per year in the 20-year clean energy investment scenario 
will be created. Similarly, Kang analyses the impact of green investment macro-economy using 
an I-O analysis and concludes that national green growth policies have contributed positively 
to economy and job creation. 
Methodology in Volume I
The methodology in Volume I builds on the two assumptions of Miller and Blair (2009). The 
study analyses the impact of green investment on job creation based on an I-O analysis using 
the 2008 I-O table published by the Bank of Korea. The research findings are examined based 
on gender, type of employment (wage vs. self-employment), enterprise type (micro versus non-
micro enterprise) and educational level. Each subcategory above is represented by a share 
(percentage) of the total population. Based on estimates of each subcategory, each industry’s 
share with respect to total employment is used to disaggregate the estimate for employment 
on the I-O table into relevant labour markets.
As for the eﬀect of job creation, weighted estimates are used in Volume I to conduct a 
comparative study of diﬀerent countries. The estimate for job creation is adjusted to reflect the 
level of the ROK ‘s average wage in comparison to that of the U.S., going beyond analysing how 
much employment occurred for every $1 million invested. The U.S. index is 1, and an index that 
reflects the ROK ‘s average wage is used in the analysis.
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Kang (2011)’s findings and methodology
Kang (2011) analyses the worker inducing eﬀect and employment inducing eﬀect of investment 
in green industry under scenarios 1 (broad) and 2 (narrow) since the Five-Year Action Plan 
for Green Growth was implemented in 2008. From 2009 to 2013, the worker inducing eﬀect 
amounted to 720,879 workers and 522,456 workers under scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. 
Meanwhile, the employment inducing eﬀect recorded 541,747 people and 425,521 people 
under scenarios 1 and 2, respectively (Table 5.17).
The analysis above is calculated by first determining both the worker and employment inducing 
coeﬃcients based on the 2008 I-O table under the exogenous specification of the model, which 
is then multiplied by the amount of investment in green industry as outlined in the Five-Year 
Action Plan (see Kang, 2011 for further details).
Table 5.17: The Republic of Korea. Estimated budget of investment in green industry,  
2009-2013
Number of workers or employees
Year   2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Scenario 1
Workers 117,578 158,704 165,573 137,085 141,938 720,879
Employees 88,361 119,268 124,430 103,021 106,668 541,747
Scenario 2
Workers 85,215 115,021 119,999 99,352 102,869 522,456
Employees 69,404 93,680 97,735 80,919 83,783 425,521
Source: Kang (2011).
Similarly to Volume I, Kang analyses the impact of green investment on the macro-economy, 
including job creation, using an I-O analysis. Kang put together the green industries defined 
by the Science and Technology Policy Institute’s IPC-KSIC (International Patent Classification-
Korean Standard International Classification) table and green industry classifications, which 
incorporated the qualitative opinions of experts at the Korea Employment Information Service 
and the Korea Environmental Industry & Technology Institute. The IPC-KSIC table classified 153 
non-overlapping industries as having green patents cited over 250 times.
In addition to these analytical methods, Japan’s I-O table is used to analyze green growth 
investments’ economic spill-over eﬀects, including job creation. This is to address the criticism 
that many research institutions omit the industrial structure outlook and new economic growth 
rate when examining the impact of a green growth policy. In light of this, this paper is analyzed 
under the restrictive assumption that the ROK ‘s industrial structure would resemble that of 
Japan when the ROK’s per capita income reaches that of Japan.
Diﬀerences in the methodologies of Kang (2011) and Volume I 
There are several major diﬀerences in the research methodology applied in Volume I and Kang. 
First, there is a diﬀerence in the way the ROK’s green growth eﬀorts are analyzed. In Volume 
I, more emphasis is placed on environmental factors focusing on new and renewable energy 
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industries such as biomass, solar, wind, building weatherization and smart grid. On the other 
hand, Kang defines green industry based on environmental and economic classifications and 
uses the definition to analyze green growth eﬀorts.
Second, there is a diﬀerence in the scope of categorization used in the I-O analysis. The 
I-O table published by the Bank of Korea consists of the integrated large-sized category (29 
industries), medium-sized category (78 industries), small-sized category (168 industries), and 
smallest-sized category (403 industries). As for Volume I, a medium-sized category of the 2008 
I-O table is used. However, Kang uses the I-O table’s most detailed classification composed 
of 403 industries to measure the green industry’s economic spill-over eﬀect. This was done to 
prevent an overestimation of the spill-over eﬀect that could occur in the integrated categories. 
However, in the case of the worker and employment inducing coeﬃcients, the Bank of Korea, 
as already mentioned earlier, only formally provides the integrated small-sized category. 
Accordingly, in Kang the worker and employment inducing coeﬃcients of 403 industries (the 
smallest-sized) was estimated with a limited assumption. Kang assumed that the worker and 
employment inducing eﬀect of the 403 industries included in the same industry under the 168 
industries is the same. 
Third, the variables and terminology used to measure the job creation eﬀect diﬀer. In Volume I, 
after dividing it into two cases, one that excludes self-employment and the other that includes 
the self-employed only, the two cases were combined and referred to as total employment. 
Kang (2011) uses variables like the worker inducing coeﬃcient and employment- inducing 
coeﬃcient. It is more common in the ROK’s I-O analysis to use the worker inducing eﬀect, 
which includes, paid workers, the self-employed and unpaid family members, or to use the 
employment inducing eﬀect that includes paid workers only, than to use the eﬀect of self-
employment on its own. In general, the worker inducing coeﬃcient and employment inducing 
coeﬃcient are used to estimate the eﬀects of job creation. The worker inducing coeﬃcient is 
more comprehensive and has a larger value than the employment inducing coeﬃcient. 
Fourth, the methods utilized to project the impact of green investment on job creation diﬀer. 
Volume I uses the I-O analysis methodology utilized by Miller and Blair (2009) and forecast 
future job creation under an assumption that the technical coeﬃcient and input proportions 
are fixed variables. However, Kang re-examines the green growth classification and analysis 
under two basic scenarios using the I-O table of Japan whose industrial structure and growth 
pattern are similar to those of the ROK. The re-examination is based on a restrictive assumption 
that the ROK’s industrial structure resembles that of Japan when the ROK’s per capita income 
reaches that of Japan. Such limited assumption finds its root in the fact that Japan’s industrial 
structure is similar to that of the ROK, a manufacturing-centered country.
Fifth, while Volume I carries out an I-O analysis on industries of interest in the 
endogenous sector to examine the eﬀect of green investment on job creation, Kang 
categorizes the relevant industries under the exogenous sector and studies the net impact 
those industries have on others in the endogenous sector.
Volume I and Kang represent two diﬀerent approaches to analyze the ROK’s green growth 
eﬀorts and their impact on employment generation based on diﬀerent sets of assumptions. 
Given the inherent uncertainty in making projections for the future clean energy infrastructure 
and employment outcomes, it is essential to evaluate the current achievements and future 
159
direction of the country’s green growth eﬀorts from multiple perspectives. By analyzing the 
relationship between the new and renewable energy industry and employment generation in 
the ROK, Volume I examines its clean energy outlook based on a set of carefully considered 
assumptions, while Kang delves into the task of defining the green industry based on green 
growth agenda. When policymakers design policy measures to achieve 2020 GHG emissions 
target, they will benefit from taking the methodological diﬀerences of the two studies into 
account and modify the future direction of its transition towards a low carbon pathway 
accordingly.
In Volume I the prospect for the ROK to reduce its per capita CO2 emissions by half is examined 
based on a set of assumptions, and the assessment seems realistic. In particular, the projected 
net positive employment outcome from this transition seems feasible and will help convince the 
public of the viability of the ROK’s clean energy future. In fact, the existing literature supports 
this projection of the impact of new and renewable energy investments on employment 
generation. For instance, MOEL (2010) analyses the impact of new and renewable energy 
technological development, usage and supply policies on the macroeconomic variables in 
the ROK. According to its computable general equilibrium model, the government expenditure 
for the new and renewable energy industry between 2008 and 2010 will result in a long-term 
worker inducing eﬀect of 51,163 employees in 2019.
However, it is important to consider some potential challenges the ROK might face in reducing 
its per capita CO2 emissions by half to fully understand the feasibility of the transition. In order 
for the ROK to achieve this over the next 20 years, it must maintain its clean energy investment 
framework. In fact, one of the main assumptions in Volume I is that the ROK will invest 1.5 
percent of its annual GDP in clean energy every year. They align the country’s 20-year clean 
energy investment framework closely with its green growth strategy. Hence, it is crucial for the 
ROK to continue investing in its clean energy infrastructure and to expand the supply of new 
and renewable energy.
Another potential challenge is the inherent diﬃculty in transitioning from a fossil fuel based 
energy framework to a clean energy one. Policymakers will have to incentivize businesses and 
households to adopt the clean energy framework. The government could also help mitigate 
the shock of the transition by facilitating the transformation of businesses’ energy mix without 
severely sacrificing their international competitiveness. Hence, the government may have to 
play a major role in addressing the diﬃculties in implementing this transition.
5.7 Conclusion
Since the introduction of former President Lee Myungbak’s “Low Carbon, Green Growth” as a 
national agenda, the ROK has undertaken concerted eﬀorts to transition from a fossil fuel based 
economy towards a low carbon, green growth pathway. While the transition is still at an initial 
phase, the ROK has established a legal foundation for the future direction of its green growth 
strategy and introduced various policies to expand the supply of and promote investment in 
new and renewable energy. Despite the traditional dichotomy between economic growth and 
environmental protection, the ROK’s green growth model suggests an alternative approach, 
which pursues both economic growth and sustainable development.
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The ROK’s investment in clean energy has been increasing substantially, and the government has 
made concerted eﬀorts to commercialize and support the development of new and renewable 
energy in the ROK. If the current eﬀorts were to continue and evolve, it seems possible that the 
ROK will achieve its 2020 target to reduce GHG emissions to 30 percent below its BAU level. 
However, a number of potential limitations and challenges will have to be considered before 
the feasibility of the 2020 target can be fully understood.
The change in the political environment could pose a certain degree of uncertainty with respect 
to the future direction of the ROK’s green growth eﬀorts. In order for the ROK’s transition towards 
a low carbon green growth economy to be successful, its green growth plans require consistent 
support in terms of their implementation. The inherent uncertainty of the political environment 
could mean that the implementation of green growth eﬀorts may take a diﬀerent form. The 
2020 target for GHG emissions reduction may not be as feasible if government support for new 
and renewable energy investment were to decrease in the near future.
Furthermore, the ROK’s economy will experience a major transformation as its transition into 
a low carbon economy progresses. Some industries will feel the economy-wide shock more 
severely, and worker displacement could exacerbate the on-going problem of unemployment 
in the ROK. For the transition to occur as smoothly as possible, policymakers will have to 
devise a policy tool to mitigate the shock. Gradual implementation of the green growth plans 
could provide businesses with suﬃcient time to adjust their business models and future plans 
according to the new clean energy infrastructure. In addition, the government will have to 
incentivize businesses as well as households to expedite the process of moving out of the 
existing fossil fuel based energy framework to one of new and renewable energy. It is crucial 
for policymakers to help businesses and households incorporate the clean energy economy as 
the new norm.
The analysis of the feasibility of 2020 target for GHG emissions reduction becomes particularly 
important considering the imminent launch of the emissions trading schemes in 2015. Beginning 
on 1 January 2015, about 490 of largest emitters will participate in the trading schemes either 
voluntarily or mandatorily (Sopher and Mansell, 2013). The emissions trading schemes in 
2015 will play a crucial role in helping the ROK to achieve its 2020 target. Hence, it becomes 
essential to adjust the trading schemes plans based on the analysis of current achievements 
of green growth eﬀorts. Moreover, the evaluation of the impact of the green growth eﬀorts on 
employment generation could help policymakers as well as businesses and households better 
understand the outcomes of the trading schemes in 2015 and the GHG target in 2020.
The initial stage of the ROK’s green growth eﬀorts has resulted in a number of achievements 
and established the country en route to a new clean energy economy. The existing policies 
to promote clean energy investment and pursue green growth will help the ROK adopt and 
expedite the economy-wide transition. With the continued support from the government and 
consistency in the future implementation of its green growth plans, the ROK will be able to join 
the frontrunners in establishing a clean energy economy.
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CHAPTER 6: SOUTH AFRICA
6.1 Introduction 
South Africa contributes 40 percent of Africa’s total CO2 emissions, making the country the 
largest polluter in the region. In comparison, Egypt and Algeria rank second and third, with 
emission values at a distant 17 and 10 percent, respectively, of total regional CO2 emissions 
(Urban Earth, 2012). South Africa’s climate change response strategies are pivotal to Africa’s 
aggregate contribution to global eﬀorts to reduce atmospheric concentrations of GHG.74 South 
Africa and the ROK share similar levels of total carbon emissions and rates of per capita 
pollution.75 The ROK’s gross domestic output (GDP normalized on a purchasing power parity 
basis) is approximately three times that of South Africa (World Bank, 2011). This wide disparity 
between these two countries’ energy eﬃciency, that is, the ratio of energy consumption to 
economic activity, underscores South Africa’s global standing in terms of carbon emissions.
Furthermore, estimates in Volume I of the UNIDO/GGGI research project “Global Green Growth: 
Clean Energy Industrial Investments and Expanding Job Opportunities” place South Africa’s per 
capita carbon dioxide emissions at twice the global average (9.5 vs. 4.6 metric tons).76 Such high 
levels of energy use and emissions per capita reflect the country’s exploitation of its abundant 
coal resources and its comparative advantage in low cost production of electricity. Low-cost 
electricity has spurred growth in a large number of coal-based energy-intensive industries. The 
combustion of fossil fuels has emerged as the biggest source of emission. Accordingly, the 
mining, mineral processing, electricity, liquid fuel supply and minerals beneficiation industries 
are the largest polluters. Electricity and petroleum refining head the list of largest polluters. 
Climate change mitigation in South Africa needs to therefore clearly focus on the energy sector.
However, since “climate change has the potential of setting back the development of many 
countries of the global south. Countries have to fashion ways to address climate change without 
compromising their economic growth and development” (CLACSO, CODESRIA and IDEAS, 2014, 
p. 4). It is therefore important to better understand how southern countries are mainstreaming 
climate change policies into development plans, and their enabling public policies. It is also 
remarkable that the Government of South Africa has so far succeeded in managing the country’s 
competing demands in a manner that has essentially morphed the agenda for a low-carbon 
economy into a positive change agent for economic transformation, despite the legacy of 
apartheid and the resulting welfare burden. Put simply, South Africa has achieved a remarkably 
widespread buy-in to the national green agenda and hence presents a good case study of a 
South-South developing country. By examining traditional sources of energy, this study on 
South Africa presents a non-technical review of the relationship between job creation, climate 
change and investments in energy eﬃciency and clean renewable energy (hereinafter referred 
to as green investments). This relationship is explored in the context of South Africa’s overall 
74 GHG include methane, chlorofluorocarbons and carbon dioxide that are gaseous compounds, which act as a shield trapping heat in the earth’s 
atmosphere. The resulting GHG eﬀect is claimed to exacerbate global warming.
75 Total carbon emissions for the ROK and South Africa are 581 million and 473 million metric tons, respectively, whereas per capita emissions in 
metric tons amount to 11.7 (the ROK) and 9.5 (South Africa) (Volume I, based on EIA, 2013).
76  The estimates in Volume I are based on data from the U.S. Environmental Information Agency, the International Energy Agency’s Statistics database 
and the World Bank Basic Energy Indicators for 2010.
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climate change response strategy, comprising adaptation and mitigation strategies. Mitigation 
here refers to responses aimed at curbing the rate of climate change to its natural rate, usually 
taken to either mean levels that occur naturally (i.e. in a pollution-free atmosphere) or reducing 
atmospheric concentrations of GHG emissions.77 On the other hand, adaptation as used here 
refers to actions taken in response to the adverse consequences of climate change. There is 
a third dimension that relates to the management of any unintended adverse consequences 
of climate change policies on other countries. Sensitivity to the externalities induced by its 
own mitigation and adaptation responses is another distinct aspect of South Africa’s overall 
climate change plan and one that makes the country’s climate change plan eﬀectively strategic. 
Actions taken under this third dimension are referred to as “response measures.” 
This study is organized as follows: Section 6.2 reviews South Africa’s experience with pollution 
reduction, otherwise referred to as the green agenda. Section 6.3 examines the job implications 
of the green agenda. Section 6.4 focuses on industrial policies to promote investments in clean 
energy and implicitly jobs, the implementation experience and an analysis of South Africa’s 
performance record. Section 6.5 concludes. 
6.2 South Africa in the context of global GHGs emissions 
To better understand South Africa’s trajectory to date and the lessons that can be gleaned, 
it seems sensible to recollect the country’s initial conditions in the context of global GHG 
emissions parameters, the country’s eﬀorts to fight climate change, progress achieved to 
date based on available data as well as the implications for employment and job creation. 
The underlying objective of the climate change response strategy (the green agenda) is to 
produce a set of instruments that is consistent with South Africa’s development framework 
and is derived from principles set in the country’s Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the National 
Environmental Management Act, the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and the United 
National Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) (DEA, 2013).78 Bearing in mind 
the inherent interdependencies in climate change response strategies, South Africa uses 
the term “climate change resilient development” to reflect the fact that “an eﬀective South 
African climate change response also requires the management of any response measures 
generated by our action as well as being able to respond to the response measures of other 
countries that have negative consequences for our country” (DEA, 2013, p. 13). For the purpose 
of implementation and performance assessment, the planning horizon is defined to be short 
term (five years from the date of publication of the policy), medium term (20 years ) or long term 
(a planning horizon beyond 2050).
Climate change: What it means for South Africa
South Africa has an abundance of natural resources such as minerals and fossil fuel, but has 
poor water resources. It describes itself as both a “contributor to, and victim of, global climate 
change given that it has an energy-intensive, fossil-fuel powered economy and is also highly 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate variability” (DEA, 2010, p. 7). South Africa’s response 
77 GHG include methane, chlorofluorocarbons and carbon dioxide that are gaseous compounds, which act as a shield trapping heat in the earth’s 
atmosphere. The resulting GHG eﬀect is claimed to exacerbate global warming.
78 Inter-generational commitment of the Environmental Right is enshrined in Section 24 of the Constitution of South Africa; see DEA (2010, p.7).
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builds on the recognition that climate change poses one of the greatest threats to sustainable 
development. If climate change is not mitigated, it carries the potential to undermine many of 
the positive advances made so far in meeting the nation’s development goals and the MDGs. 
Against the backdrop of this reality, the government acknowledges that the stabilization 
of atmospheric concentrations of GHG at a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climatic system requires global cooperation on GHG emission reductions. 
The government is therefore committed to continue meaningful engagement in international 
climate change negotiations, particularly in UNFCCC negotiations, to achieve a multilateral 
agreement that will limit the average global temperature increase to at least below 2˚C above 
the pre-industrial temperature level. In the event multilateral action fails in achieving this 
goal, the “potential impacts on South Africa in the medium- to long-term are significant and 
potentially catastrophic” (DEA, 2010, p. 7). The objectives of South Africa’s engagement in 
climate change can be summarized as follows:
Even under emission scenarios that are more conservative than current international 
emission trends, it has been predicted that by mid-century the South African coast will 
warm by around 1-2˚C. After 2050, warming is projected to reach around 3-4˚C along 
the coast, and 6-7˚C in the interior. With these kinds of temperature increases, life as 
we know it will change completely – parts of the country will be much drier; increases in 
evaporation will ensure an overall decrease in water availability significantly aﬀecting 
human health, agriculture…; the increased occurrence and severity of veld and forest 
fires especially extreme weather events such as floods and droughts …; sea level rise 
will negatively impact the coast and coastal infrastructure; mass extinctions of endemic 
plant and animal species will greatly reduce South Africa’s biodiversity. 
In addition to the increased atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations measured 
at Global Atmosphere Watch station at Cape Point, some climate change impacts are 
already being observed … the sea-level around the South African west coast is already 
rising by 1.87 mm per year, the south coast by 1.47 mm per year, and the east coast 
by 2.74 mm per year. It is also well established that observed surface air temperatures 
over land as well as the number of frost days have changed with statistical significance 
since 1950s across South Africa and that these changes are consistent with, and have 
sometimes exceeded the rate of mean global temperature rise. …
Given the significance of these impacts, it is clear that urgent and decisive international and 
local action is required to achieve real reduction of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
and in so doing limit the impacts of climate change into the future. (DEA, 2010, p. 7)
The publication of the "National Climate Response Green Paper" in 2010 for public comments 
was the first formal manifestation of the government’s vision of an “eﬀective climate change 
response and the long term transition to a climate resilient and low-carbon economy and 
society” (DEA, 2010, p. 7). Subsequently, in August 2013, a "National Climate Change Response 
White Paper" was issued; the policy development timeline is summarized in Table 6.1. The 
white paper outlines South Africa’s vision of transitioning to a climate resilient and low carbon 
economy. The process builds on coordinated management of climate change eﬀects, using 
interventions that develop and sustain social, economic and environmental resilience as well 
as contributing equitably to the global drive to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of GHG 
emissions within acceptable limits. As envisaged in the plan, acceptable limits are atmospheric 
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concentrations of GHG at levels that prevent “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system” (DEA, 2013, p. 5). The plan shall be implemented within a timeframe that does 
not compromise sustainable socioeconomic development. This, in principle, implies that the 
introduction of climate change measures is not an overriding objective in South Africa. 
Table 6.1: The Green Agenda Policy timeline in South Africa
Green Paper on Environmental Policy for South Africa released for public comments October 1996
White Paper on Energy Policy released for public comments December 1998
Energy Eﬃciency Strategy of the Republic of South Africa March 2003
National Climate Change Response Green Paper released by the Department of 
Environmental  Aﬀairs November 2010
South African Renewables Initiative released by the Department for Trade and Industry December 2010
National Climate Response Green Paper released for public comments November 2010
Integrated Energy Plan released for public comments June 2013
National Climate Change Response White Paper released August 2013
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Elements of South Africa’s response strategy 
Two broad policy approaches and actions underpin South Africa’s national response strategy. 
The first is the prioritization of mitigation interventions that hold the potential of positive job 
creation; the integration of climate response into all national, provincial and local planning 
activities; the alignment of private incentives with public objectives in this context through the 
use of fiscal, regulatory and economic instruments to induce positive behavioral changes that 
enhance South Africa’s transition to a low carbon economy.
The second is recognition of inherent interdependencies, namely the acknowledgment 
that South Africa’s high level of energy use and emissions per capita reflect the country’s 
exploitation of its comparative advantage in the low cost production of electricity. The 
structural transformation of economic activities will require addressing the costs of mitigation, 
particularly in the energy, transport and manufacturing industries as well as any resulting 
structural unemployment within those industries, including forward and backward linkages 
(i.e. along the entire value chain). Similarly, the recognition that economic integration within 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region and an increase in intra-regional 
trade implies that South Africa’s climate change response entails major implications for both 
SADC and the rest of Africa. Thus, national responses must be “aligned to support and operate 
as part of a broader regional response” (DEA, 2010, p. 9).79 This seems to indicate that South 
Africa’s policy approach does not consist of a set of rules. The initial (i.e. short to medium term) 
focus will be on (1) adaptation in the areas of water, agriculture and human health; and (2) 
mitigation in the areas of energy, industry and transport.
79 Presumably, the Government of South Africa contends that in order to align its national responses with those of the SADC, it is important to know 
what responses have been defined for SADC. There is no SADC strategy yet. There may be country strategies already in place for some SADC member 
states. Nonetheless, the strategies of the member states do not need to be known now or exist before South Africa can declare its intention to be 
mindful of other countries’ strategies for its overall strategy. As a matter of policy, South Africa will countenance them if and when those other strat-
egies emerge.
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Climate change adaptation
Based on South Africa’s current demographic development, water supply and water usage, the 
government predicts that South Africa will exceed the “limits of its economically usable, land-
based water resources by 2050” (DEA, 2010, p.10). Furthermore, rainfall is low and the rates 
of run-oﬀ are among the lowest in the world. Rising temperatures can increase flooding and 
cause higher rainfall variability as well as higher average temperatures. Higher temperatures 
in turn increase evaporation from dams and rivers and reduce run-oﬀ on the ground, leading 
to less feed into the rivers and dams. As a response, the government plans to strengthen the 
environmental management of the natural resource base, promote optimal recycling of waste 
water and increase (green) investments in wastewater treatment facilities to boost capacity to 
meet future demand in a sustainable manner. 
Agriculture is considered a key sector. Whereas the direct contribution to GDP and employment 
are estimated at less than 5 percent and 13 percent, respectively, agriculture’s aggregate 
contribution, including its multiplier eﬀects, amount to approximately 12 percent and 30 percent 
of national output and employment, respectively. Given that irrigation agriculture requires 
significant amounts of water, accounting for over 50 percent, the risks irrigation agriculture 
faces from increased evapotranspiration and competing demands for other alternative uses 
cannot be overemphasized. “Potential adverse impacts of climate change on food production, 
agricultural and subsistence livelihood, rural nutrition and food security in South Africa are 
significant policy concerns” as are the “shifts in the preferences of consumers, particularly 
in the EU, away from purchasing of carbon intensive products.” 80 One of the key initiatives in 
climate change adaptation is a plan to link investments in education and awareness programs 
in rural areas to agricultural extension activities to enable all producers (subsistence and 
commercial) to adequately respond to the adverse consequences of climate change.
Due to the high level of wealth disparity, a substantial share of South Africans, particularly 
the poor, face formidable health challenges, which are exacerbated by poor living conditions. 
With the highest global prevalence of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Tuberculosis, water 
scarcity and its implications for sanitation is a serious health hazard, especially given that these 
two diseases account for approximately “75 percent of premature deaths in South Africa” (DEA, 
2010, p. 13). Furthermore, 3 million South Africans have no access to water and over 14 million 
people do not have adequate sanitation, i.e. access to solid waste facility and wastewater 
treatment and sewerage. Some of the key response strategies thus include the development 
of quality health infrastructure, improvement of health education and introduction of eﬀective 
nutritional policies. These initiatives are driven by the understanding that good nutritional 
status among the population implies stronger resistance against opportunistic diseases. In 
addition, the government plans to reduce the “incidence of respiratory diseases by improving 
air quality through reducing ambient particulate matter … and sulphur dioxide … concentrations 
by legislative and other measures to ensure full compliance with the National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards by 2020” (DEA, 2010, p. 14).
80 For instance, the term “food mile” is now used in the food value chain to indicate physical distance from the point of production to consumption 
so as to capture and label the carbon emission status of a particular food item. 
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Climate change mitigation
South Africa is a signatory to both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. In December 2009 in 
Copenhagen (the Copenhagen Accord), South Africa committed to reducing its rate of emis-
sions. It has agreed to the decisions of the 16th Conference under the auspices of the UNFCCC 
in Cancun 2010. In its formal submission to UNFCCC in 2010, South Africa pledged to “take 
nationally appropriate mitigation action to enable a 34% deviation below the ‘Business As 
Usual’ emissions growth trajectory by 2020 and a 42% deviation below the ‘Business As Usual’ 
emissions growth trajectory by 2025 on the condition that it receives the necessary finance, 
technology and support from the international community that will allow it to achieve this” 
(DEA, 2010, p. 16). 
The focus of the country’s mitigation strategy lies in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the 
economy which, incidentally, have been undergoing structural change since the 1980s when 
the concentration of economic activities in terms of relative contribution to GDP began shift-
ing from predominantly primary (i.e. mining, quarrying, agriculture, forestry and fishing) and 
secondary (manufacturing and construction) sectors to the tertiary sector (ibidem). The tertiary 
sector encompasses financial services, real estate, business services, wholesale/retail trade, 
catering and accommodation, transport, storage and communication. The ongoing structural 
shift in economic activities is significant because it signals progress towards economic diversi-
fication away from primary commodity dependency. It additionally creates a reasonable expec-
tation of reducing the country’s overall energy intensity. Considering that economic diversifica-
tion usually generates stability and growth, South Africa could benefit from green growth in the 
future (i.e. economic growth coupled with carbon footprint reduction).  
As commercial and manufacturing activities account for over 55 percent of total electricity con-
sumption in South Africa’s economy, it is assumed that heavy intervention in this area may po-
tentially lead to a significant reduction in GHG emissions, even though as noted in the Climate 
Change White Paper, “electricity savings at point of consumption does not necessarily trans-
late into equivalent mitigation at the point of generation” (DEA, 2010, p. 18). This nonlinearity 
raises a pertinent public policy question that has not been addressed in the Climate Change 
White Paper. Given that investments in energy eﬃciency are a nontrivial component of South 
Africa’s energy mitigation strategy (which is discussed in the next subsection), the question 
arises whether to aim for additional investments in energy eﬃciency to reduce electricity by 
a unit demand or additional investments in renewable energy to increase the supply of clean 
electricity to meet a unit demand. 
The conventional recommendation is that additional investments to reduce electricity demand 
should only be aimed at if the net marginal benefit from the investment exceeds the cost of 
supplying clean renewable energy to meet that additional demand. However, it must be not-
ed that, as with any bulk infrastructure, investments in electricity infrastructure can be lumpy 
(non-convexities), with the degree of non-convexities varying in accordance with the condi-
tions of the existing infrastructure and the amount of the additional investment. For instance, 
increasing the generating capacity by a certain scale may trigger a complementary investment 
into further strengthening the grid or into building new distribution infrastructure. 
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In other words, tradeoﬀs between varying levels of investment in renewable energy and energy 
eﬃciency may not be independent of the scale of operations (energy generation and consump-
tion). This means that marginal analyses are of limited applicability when dealing with public 
policy questions related to energy eﬃciency and renewable energy (considering that the rela-
tionship between demand for and supply of electricity is not uniform across all activity levels). 
Hence, the context in which marginal analysis is a suitable tool for decision-making in energy 
eﬃciency and renewable energy-related policy must be substantiated.
Energy eﬃciency initiatives seem to attract as much attention as renewable energy initiatives 
within the framework of South Africa’s green agenda. This seems to have been the case since 
the release of the White Paper on Energy Policy in 1998 (DME, 1998). In the White Paper, the 
Government of South Africa acknowledged that the country’s energy use is generally ineﬃcient 
and that consumption behavior had to be modified through a policy of proactive demand 
management. Such a proactive management policy entails standards setting and appliance 
labeling. The Energy Eﬃciency Strategy of 2005 introduced consumption reduction targets as 
key performance drivers of the country’s energy eﬃciency objectives. The strategy specifically 
provides for the implementation of sectoral programs in three phases: from 2005-2008; 2008-
2011 and 2011-2015, arriving at a final reduction in energy demand of 12 percent. This reduction 
is expressed as a share of the projected national energy usage in 2015, which, in turn, is based 
on an assumed average GDP growth of 2.8 percent and the achievement of planned energy 
savings across the three phases (DME, 2015). Final energy demand in 2015 is estimated to be 
3200 Petajoules while electricity demand is predicted to be around 285,526 GWh in 2015 and 
336,178 GWh in 2020 (DME, 2015 and DoE, 2013a).81  
Electricity demand has remained below expectation since 2010 for a number of reasons, 
including the fact that the average rate of economic growth has been below expectation. Other 
reasons include a repurchase program that has resulted in demand reduction by some industrial 
customers. Reductions of approximately 4 TWh of electricity use are estimated to have been 
achieved through the buyback incentive (DoE, 2013). It is also argued that market incentives have 
played a major role, with increases in the price of electricity since 2008 forcing consumers to cut 
back their electricity usage and energy intensive industries to relocate their smelting operations 
to countries with lower relative electricity prices. This trend in energy demand will presumably 
be reinforced by the planned energy eﬃciency measures such as improved boiler eﬃciency, 
HVAC (heating, ventilation and air conditioning), refrigeration, water heating, and the roll out of 
energy management systems in buildings, including lighting and compressed air management, 
building-shell design, optimizing process controls and the introduction of variable speed motors. 
These measures do not, however, reduce the manufacturing/commercial sector’s vulnerability 
to punitive trade measures taken both internationally and in the future, regionally, to reduce 
GHG emissions. Products likely to be aﬀected include minerals, base and precious metals, pulp 
and paper products, prepared foodstuﬀs, chemicals, cement, iron and steel. These products 
are derived from emission intensive and trade exposed industries such as iron and steel, non-
ferrous metals, chemicals, petrochemicals, mining and quarrying, machinery and manufacturing, 
agriculture, transport, services and tourism. 
81 The electricity demand forecast as opposed to that of total energy demand is derived from two sources, namely the System Operator and the Coun-
cil for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). These sources present three scenarios, low, moderate and high electricity demand. We build on the 
System Operator’s moderate forecast, which is the demand forecast used in the policy-adjusted IRP. The System Operator’s forecast for 2020 ranges 
from 315,930 GWh (low) to 336,178 GWh (high).
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Potential economic risks emerge from, among others, the impacts of climate change 
regulation, the application of trade barriers, a shift in consumer preferences, … 
International climate change measures, such as the EU directive on aviation and 
moves to bring maritime emissions into an international emissions reduction regime, 
could significantly impact on a variety of South Africa’s manufactured exports through 
increasing the costs of air freight and shipping (DEA, 2010, p. 18-19)
With coal as an energy carrier and accounting for over 60 percent of South Africa’s GHG 
emissions, the mining industry is at considerable risk (DEA, 2010). Therefore, part of the 
proposed mitigation strategy is to develop plans to identify and promote other areas of 
potential competitive advantage in the mining industry, which are less emission intensive such 
as opportunities in platinum, uranium and copper resources.
In the transport sector, the legacy of apartheid has left behind both a challenge and an 
opportunity. The existing transport network was designed to serve only a select few. In the post-
apartheid era, the transport network is poorly integrated, with the majority of the population 
not only residing very far from their workplace but also using deficient (unreliable and 
dangerous) as well as expensive transport infrastructure to get to work. However, remedying 
the remnants of apartheid holds opportunity, namely the building of sustainable transport 
systems. Currently, the transport sector is the most rapidly growing source of GHG emissions 
in South Africa and already ranks second to energy as the largest source of emissions. In 2004, 
transport accounted for approximately 25 percent of energy demand, with road transport 
accounting for 84 percent (DEA, 2010). 
Recognizing that transport corridors are engines of growth but mindful of the current conditions 
in the transport sector, the government aims to support investments in schemes that develop 
“green” rapid mass transit systems, resulting in a shift by commuters to low carbon forms of 
transport. Similar support will also be made available for investments that promote the shift of 
freight from the road to “green” rail transport. The government promotes urban development 
within the scope of an integrated development framework as specified in the Strategic 
Infrastructure Plan (SIP): building liveable cities in which the way people live, work, worship 
and play influences their demand for sustainable rapid transit, transportation and logistics.82 
One example is the “integration of land use and transportation planning in cities in a manner 
that encourages public transport, non-motorized transport (walking and cycling) and promotes 
alternative communication methods such as telecommuting…” (DEA, 2010, p. 22). Additionally, 
investments in the development and implementation of green transport technology such as 
electric automobiles and hybrid cars as well as the production and adoption of cleaner fuel 
technology are being encouraged.
Thus far, with the few exceptions noted above such as non-motorized transport, the focus of 
mitigation strategies in South Africa has primarily been on demand-side management to be 
achieved by (1) introducing improvements in energy use, (2) encouraging a reconfiguration of 
the structure of economic activities to emphasize green manufacturing, i.e. technologies that 
use clean energy in industrial production, and (3) boosting the share of the tertiary sector’s 
contribution to GDP. By contrast, the mitigation strategy in the electric power industry focuses 
82 In 2012, Government of South Africa established the Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Commission (PICC) to harmonize infrastructure plan-
ning and implementation across all spheres of government, state agencies and social partners. The components are classified into 18 strategic 
infrastructure projects known as SIPs ICC, 2013.
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on adapting the energy mix to achieve a transition to a low carbon economy whilst minimizing 
disruptions to economic growth, employment and human development. Due to the diﬀerences 
in focus and the energy sector’s huge contribution to South Africa’s GHG emissions, the energy 
sector’s mitigation strategy is discussed separately.
Energy industry – climate change mitigation
The energy industry is the largest contributor to pollution in South Africa. The main energy 
uses are for electricity generation, petroleum refining, solid and liquid fuels manufacturing, 
mining, minerals processing and energy-intensive beneficiation. The principal method of energy 
extraction is by combustion of fossil fuels. The major sources of emissions are Eskom, the main 
electricity producer Sasol, the petrochemical conglomerate. Together, Eskom and Sasol account 
for over 80 percent of GHG emissions in South Africa. The major energy carrier in the country is 
coal, accounting for 92 percent of this energy source and meeting 72 percent of primary energy 
needs. Energy supply in South Africa is clearly carbon-intensive. Hence, any meaningful climate 
change mitigation strategy must target the energy sector.83  
Potential intervention strategies include energy eﬃciency measures such as those discussed 
above and should be considered complementary to investments in clean energy sources. 
Of the clean energy sources under consideration, nuclear energy is expected to be the most 
significant alternative energy source in the shift away from heavy dependence on coal-based 
energy generation. The intervention strategies come with their own set of challenges. The 
costs of implementing clean energy substitutes, lead times (i.e. the length of time required 
to implement a new technology), the impacts of the resulting transitional phase, and how to 
manage these. Moreover, with regard to lead times, decision-makers need to assess the speed 
with which clean energy alternatives can be implemented at a scale that complements the 
country’s base-load requirements. One example of cost concerns, which can be distinguished 
from financing challenges, include the “persistent uncertainty” of nuclear capital costs (DOE, 
2013a). A number of studies estimate a wide range of “generic nuclear capital costs” which, 
together with the relatively high set up costs of a nuclear plant, complicates the energy-mix 
choice. 
These challenges notwithstanding, the enabling measures include renewable energy feed-in 
tariﬀs, the introduction of a levy on the generation of non-renewable electricity, increasing 
awareness of clean alternatives such as wind sources, solar (PV cells), concentrated solar 
power, hydroelectricity and biomass. The possible impact of the transition to a clean energy 
economy on income and employment is of utmost concern. These crucial issues are discussed 
in the next section.  
83 Sectoral mitigation and low carbon development strategies will be formulated under the leadership of the relevant government department, spec-
ifying a “suite of mitigation programmes and measures appropriate to that sector or sub-sector” (DEA, 2013, pp. 25, 28). Furthermore, South Africa’s 
Energy Eﬃciency Strategy sets an interim target of reducing power generation by 15 percent and energy consumption by the industrial and mining 
industries by 15 percent by 2015 (DME, 2005). Demand side management as part of the Energy Eﬃciency Strategy provides for a peak load reduction 
target of 1.37 GW in Eskom’s Integrated Energy by 2015, consisting of 0.81 GW from load shifting and 0.56 GW from energy eﬃciency measures.   
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6.3 Job implications of climate change mitigation
Demand-side management of energy use through the introduction of energy eﬃciency 
technologies is strongly supported by the government and industry against the backdrop of 
the direct and indirect employment implications of such initiatives. A range of labour-intensive 
opportunities may arise from the introduction of appropriate industrial policies, particularly for 
the poor as well as low and low-middle income earners, to participate in the proactive energy 
management measures. These include LED (Light Emitting Diodes) retrofits, compressed air 
management schemes including upgrade of pneumatics (compressed air devices), installation 
of variable speed drives, upgrade of motors, thermal replacements (heat pumps) and other 
steam system upgrades as well as heating, ventilation, and air conditioning DEA, 2010. Solar 
water geysers and “geyser blankets” (the latter referring to proper insulation of water heaters 
to minimize convectional heat loss) are other sources that have become popular. 
Clean energy and technology types
Challenges with regard to investments in energy eﬃciency and the employment nexus lie 
in (1) identification of technologies that are most suitable for widespread roll out, and (2) 
determination of job creating potentials implicit in the implementation of the identified 
technologies.
Although the job potential of diﬀerent energy generation technologies have yet to be fully 
determined, investments in clean renewables are primarily aimed at achieving an optimal 
energy supply mix from diverse sources such as wind, PV, concentrated solar power, land fill 
gas, biomass, biofuels, shale gas and clean coal technologies. Therefore, it is useful to explore 
potential investments in technology types before discussing the employment implications 
of various feasible configurations (if any) of the energy supply mix. According to estimates 
in Modise (2013), South Africa’s energy outlook up to 2030 (taking regional integration into 
consideration) envisages a dominant role for wind, nuclear, coal, concentrated solar power, PV, 
gas, hydro and geothermal. The hydro option is based on the prospects for electricity imports 
from the Inga Dam project in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
The Integrated Resource Plan 2010-30 (IRP) for electricity provides the framework for investment 
in power generation technologies to promote South Africa’s climate change mitigation strategy. 
The IRP currently serves as the policy and technical platform for electricity, at least until the 
energy policy framework is promulgated; the national energy policy is still a work-in-progress 
and is expected to be finalized in 2014. Essentially, the IRP is a 20-year electricity plan to 
improve the reliability of power generation, determine investment needs to achieve the required 
capacity, assess environmental impacts and the eﬀects of renewable energy technologies, as 
well as to provide a framework for ministerial decisions on new energy generation capacity. 
The Energy Act of 2008, the primary legislative instrument governing the development and 
transformation of South Africa’s energy sector, complements the IRP. One of the objectives of 
the Energy Act is to promote the diversification of energy sources and of energy eﬃciency. The 
Act further provides for new energy generation capacity whereby the Minister of Energy may in 
consultation with the Energy Regulator determine how much new energy generation capacity 
is required. The Minister of Energy is also authorized to determine the types of energy sources 
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from which electricity should be generated as well as the share of energy supply from those 
sources (Modise, 2013).
The IRP is intended to be a dynamic instrument that reflects the economic and technological 
changes and adapts to South Africa’s evolving socio-political objectives. In this regard, the 
IRP has undergone iterations that reflect both the country’s commitment to the declared 
transition to a low carbon economy and the decreasing costs of renewable energy. The latter 
(i.e. decreasing costs of renewables) has allowed for a higher share of renewable energy in the 
energy configuration as specified in the latest version of the IRP, yet at the same time, system 
costs (aggregate investment outlay) are higher than previously budgeted in the policy-adjusted 
IRP 2010.84 Table 6.2 presents the total additional capacity that will be required in gigawatts 
up to the year 2030 to achieve a 34 percent reduction in carbon intensity (from 912 grams 
per kilowatt-hour to 600 grams per kilowatt-hour). It also shows the resulting energy supply 
technology mix, which comprises the new energy generation capacity and the share of that new 
energy supply represented by each source (i.e. the distribution of new energy supply). 
Table 6.2: New generation capacity in South Africa to 2030: Electricity supply mix
Energy source Total addition by source (MW) Share of new supply (percent)
Coal 6.3 15
Nuclear 9.6 23
Hydroelectricity 2.6 6
Gas CCGT 2.4 6
Peak OCGT 3.9 9
Renewables of which 17.8 42
Wind 8.4
CSP 1.0
SPV 8.4
Total 42.6 101.0
Source: Data is from Modise (2013).  
Note: Totals do not add up due to decimal-place approximations; Megawatt = MW.
Figure 6.1 illustrates this distribution up to the year 2030, and highlights the dominance of 
renewable energy and nuclear sources in the marginal supply mix. Figure 6.2 compares the 
total energy supply mix (installed capacity) from the baseline (2010-2030) and shows that coal 
continues to be the leading source, although it no longer will play an overwhelming role as is 
currently the case; the weight of coal in the industry will be shared with nuclear energy and 
renewable energy.   
84 First introduced as IRP1 in 2009, a second version of the IRP, the Revised Balanced Scenario IRP 2010 (RBS), was released in October 2010 as a draft 
for comment. Following public comments, the policy-adjusted IRP was promulgated by the Department of Energy in May 2011 with the primary objec-
tive of determining South Africa’s long-term electricity demand and addressing that demand by specifying the costs and configuration of generation 
capacities. The IRP shall be revised by the Department of Energy every two years. According to feedback received so far, accelerated deployment of 
renewable energy (solar PV, CSP, wind) has been adopted because such deployments are expected to catalyse the development of an industry in this 
sector domestically. Further insights have revealed the importance of explicitly considering the alternatives of domestic production or importation 
of hydroelectricity, leading to better cost estimates. For further details, see Modise (2013). The latest IRP is the IRP 2010-2030 Update Report 2013 
released on 21 November 2013 (DOE, 2013a), which was open to public comments until 7 February 2014 and thereafter was submitted to the Cabinet 
for approval (see http://www.energy.gov.za/files/irp_frame.html (accessed March 17, 2014).
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Figure 6.1: New generation capacity in South Africa up to the year 2030 (distribution  
2010 and 2030)
Source: Author’s calculations based on Modise (2013).  
Figure 6.2: Comparative energy generation source distribution in South Africa, 2010  
and 2030
Source: Author’s calculations based on Modise (2013).  
To implement the energy capacity building programme, the Minister of Energy, acting under 
the Electricity Regulation Act of 2006 (as amended), has determined that part of the required 
new energy generation capacity must be derived from renewable energy sources, and that 
the first tranche shall be 3725 MW while an additional 3200 MW is still being fully assessed. 
Specifically, the distribution of the first tranche to the various renewable energy sources for 
■  Renewables 0%
■  Coal 90%
■  Peak OCGT 0%
■  Nuclear 5%
■  Hydroelectricity 5%
■  Gas CCGT  0%
■  Renewables 9%
■  Coal 65%
■  Peak OCGT 0%
■  Nuclear 20%
■  Hydroelectricity 5%
■  Gas CCGT  1%
2010 2030
■ Coal 15%
■ Nuclear 23%
■ Hydroelectricity 6%
■ Gas CCGT 6%
■ Peak OCGT 9%
■ Renewables 41%
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electricity generation are wind (1850 MW), SPV (1450 MW), CSP (200 MW), biomass (12.5 MW), 
biogas (12.5 MW), landfill gas (25) and small hydro (75) (Modise, 2013).
Technology choices and jobs
The transition to a low carbon economy is linked to job creation potentials. One example is 
the plan to upgrade and accelerate the implementation of the “Working for Energy” program. 
Targeting workers in local cooperatives, small and medium enterprises and unemployed 
masses in local communities and townships, the program is designed to develop human 
capacity and labour-intensive employment opportunities in the renewable energy industry. 
Projects classified as labour-intensive include biomass from invasive alien plants and bush 
encroachment, biogas for rural energy sources, solar geyser fabrication and biogas generation 
from farm waste, municipal solid waste and wastewater.
The emphasis on job creation is a reflection of the government’s concern about the financial and 
potential political implications of decarbonization, addressing the challenge as both a national 
policy imperative and as a global team player, but warns that “it will be challenging to honor the 
commitment to reduce South Africa’s emissions without compromising the overriding priorities 
to create jobs, address poverty…[and] grow an internationally competitive economy, without 
substantial international assistance. However, it is in the country’s best interest that “an absolute 
global emissions constraint is put into eﬀect sooner rather than later” (NPC, 2011, p. 183). South 
Africa supports the global green agenda, but needs financing, technology and assistance from 
the international community to initiate and sustain the transition and reform process. 
The literature on clean energy and jobs
“One of the main challenges of climate change is the high level of uncertainty about the exact 
impacts, its costs and the outcome of final global agreements” (NPC, 2011, p. 183). Although 
creating jobs is not limited to climate change mitigation but is an overriding macroeconomic 
challenge, the nature of the transition process’s net job creation eﬀect is a political variable 
that can influence progress made on the green agenda. It is useful in this regard to review the 
literature on estimations of the reform’s employment eﬀects. The relatively recent initiation 
of the reform’s roll-out means that studies on the impact of the shift towards a low carbon 
economy on employment are limited. South Africa’s action plan first aims to integrate climate 
change constraints into energy planning tools, the IRP and the Integrated Energy Plan (IEP), 
given that the energy industry is the biggest polluter. On the one hand, meaningful estimates 
can now be drawn from the IRP based on the planning parameters therein, whereas the draft 
IEP is being finalized, and was only released for public comment in June 2013.85 Ideally, South 
Africa’s energy mitigation strategy should be driven by the IEP, considering the relatively high 
share of the combined contribution of Sasol and Eskom to South Africa’s total GHG emissions. 
However, the leading role of coal in energy generation and its contribution to GHG emissions 
makes the IRP a strong base document.
85 The purpose of the Integrated Energy Plan (IEP) as derived from the National Energy Act 2008 (Act No. 34 of 2008) is to guide the development of 
energy policies and the selection of appropriate technologies to meet energy demand. This would include decisions such as the types and sizes of new 
power plants and refineries to be built and the prices that should be charged for fuels (DTI 2013). Thus the IEP takes a larger view of the energy sector 
while the IRP targets the electric (power) industry.  
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Providing information on employment creation estimates when submitting project proposals is 
common practice in public tenders, but few studies have focused on formalizing or advancing 
a methodological framework to arrive at such estimates. Job estimates in the public and in the 
private sector associated with green investments (e.g. Tinte and Bischof-Niemz, 2013 and Table 
6.3) are based on heuristics, which in itself is not necessarily flawed. In fact, some cognitive 
science scholars argue that fast and frugal heuristics may, in many circumstances, actually 
provide better estimates than data-intensive algorithms (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). 
Nonetheless, since the accuracy of the estimates is an empirical matter, our review focuses on 
the methodological aspects of the sampled literature and their implication on the plausibility 
of the estimates. 
Another strand of the literature focuses on green investments and jobs in South Africa and 
is also based on heuristics (e.g. Borel-Saladin and Turok, 2013; Edkins et al., 2010; Maia et 
al., 2011; Montmasson-Clair, 2012). Edkins et al. (2010) simulate alternative renewable energy 
generation roadmaps for South Africa and compare employment and GHG emission outcomes 
under this scenario with a baseline. The study concludes fallaciously that “active renewable 
energy policy can result in higher employment and GHG savings” (p. iii). The study sets up 
a renewable energy-cum-energy demand system (building on renewable energy and energy 
eﬃciency) and compares the number of jobs created from this set up with those created from 
brown energy generation and no demand management, with the resulting demand being met 
by building a highly eﬃcient coal plant. For the results to be comparable, the treatment versus 
controlled setup should vary only with respect to the treatment, in this case, either clean 
energy alone or clean energy and specified emission constraints. As this involves a benefit-
cost analysis, policymakers should look at the job per dollar generated or the job and unit 
GHG emissions per dollar. Yet another study (Maia et al., 2011) estimates the net direct job 
creation expected in the formal sector of the economy, covering a wide range of economic 
activities that can be collectively described as environmentally friendly. The authors note 
that their estimates are only indicative of the potential employment benefits and that further 
studies, which incorporate the cost of investment in alternative forms of energy are necessary 
to adequately assess the trade-oﬀs. One example of the variety of heuristics applied in these 
empirical studies to arrive at estimates is the rule of analogy, which was applied in Maia et 
al.’s study to derive the employment potential of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology. 
In their example, the authors construe that a demonstration plan in Australia generated 550 
workers over three years and assigns the same number of construction workers for a similar 
CSS plan in South Africa. In estimating the employment potential in biodiversity conservation 
and ecosystem restoration, the authors use the data collected by the Department of Water 
Aﬀairs and Department of Environmental Aﬀairs under the Working for Water programme to 
calculate a baseline. The baseline is extrapolated to derive estimates of potential employment.
Rather than making a methodological or empirical contribution to the literature, Montmasson-
Clair (2012) describes the green economy landscape in South Africa and reviews some of the 
green employment estimates presented in the literature on South Africa. The author concludes 
that going green holds potential benefits for the labour market, but that its realization essentially 
depends on the ability to develop the technical and managerial skills of the targeted groups. 
Borel-Saladin and Turok (2013) critically review the literature on South Africa, address some 
shortcomings in the literature such as the incomparability of estimates and variations in the 
underlying assumptions, but regrettably conclude that “green economic activity does appear 
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to generate more local jobs than fossil-fuel-based industries”.86 The problem with Borel-
Saladin and Turok’s inference is that none of the studies on which their conclusion is based 
controlled for the influence of the energy source, i.e. brown versus green energy sources while 
controlling for other factors. Without such a control, it is spurious to then attribute diﬀerences 
in employment outcomes solely to energy type.
Volume I is unique among the literature on South Africa, because, in contrast to the other studies 
reviewed, it uses a data-intensive algorithm to estimate the employment eﬀects of investments 
in clean renewables within a specific period. The study is relevant because it compares 
estimates of the number of potential jobs generated by the same project in the given country 
from diﬀerent perspectives, albeit only in a limited way. This allows for a rough comparison 
of estimates of the number of potential jobs generated from investments in certain types of 
clean energy sources. Assuming that all necessary policies and processes are implemented 
correctly, the experts in the industry who, in fact, will be responsible for realizing the project’s 
objectives must estimate the necessary investments and resulting jobs. Their best estimates 
for the various types of renewable energy are presented in Table 6.3. These estimates have 
been derived from competitive bids that are open to the public and binding when accepted. 
Therefore, theoretical estimates in the literature on green investment and employment (see 
Volume I) can be assessed in the context of the numbers provided in the table.
Table 6.3: South Africa. Indicative private sector cost estimates of investments in renewables 
and resulting job creation up to 2030
SPVC1 SPVC2 CSP1 CSP2 Wind1 Wind2 Hydro1 Hydro2
MW allocation 632 417 150 50 634 563 N/A 14
Total project cost  
(US million dollars) 2,193.7 1,204.8 1,136.5 448.3 1,272.4 1,089.7 63.1
Local content 
share (percent) 28.5 47.5 21 36.5 21.7 36.7 66.7
Employment creation 
Construction 10,386 4,557 1,165 662 1,869 1,579 261
Operations 221 194 70 50 128 65 7
Source: Author’s compilation based on Modise (2013).  
Notes: i) SPVC1, SPVC2, CSP1, CSP2 refer to PV cell and concentrated solar power, respectively. The suﬃxes 1 and 2 refer to tender cycles 1 and 2 of 
the competitive bidding process. Ii) MW is megawatt. Iii) Total project cost is in millions of rand but has been converted into dollars using ZAR10 per 
dollar. The rand per dollar exchange rate has recently fluctuated between 7.5 and 11.0. iv) N/A means Not Applicable. v) The jobs are estimated for the 
duration of the project. 
As shown in Table 6.3, a total investment outlay of approximately $7.4 billion over a 20 year 
period is estimated to create 21,214 jobs that are mostly seasonal. As these estimates are 
derived from tender documents, which were not available for consultation, it is not feasible 
to determine the scope of the forecasted jobs; for example, whether or not indirect jobs were 
included. Indirect jobs refer to jobs created in the factor markets by excess derived-demand, 
assuming that those markets are at or close to capacity. These estimates on the number of 
jobs across diﬀerent generation technologies comprising the investment portfolio translate 
86 Borel-Saladin and Turok (2013), p.3.
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into 2,867 jobs per $1 billion expenditure. These estimates are diﬃcult to reconcile with 
the estimates in Volume I, which show that the annual employment generated from energy 
eﬃciency and renewable energy investments up to 2030 could amount to between 339,700 
and 455,500 jobs within South Africa. The comparison is diﬃcult because Volume I  include 
estimates of both direct and indirect employment created by the investment portfolio. Moreover, 
the composition of the two energy supply portfolios diﬀers. For instance, the cost estimates in 
Volume I allow for grid strengthening, which is an important driver in terms of moving into the 
league of utility-scale renewables energy supply. In general, renewable energy is a variable 
source of energy supply (highly “intermittent”), entailing potential elements of stress on the 
grid. Therefore, it is important to ensure that those variations do not adversely aﬀect the grid 
and equally that the selected renewables are resistant to adverse conditions on the grid. Other 
significant diﬀerences between the estimates being reviewed here exist and apply to other 
relevant studies as well. While the cost estimates of South African experts relate to the clean 
energy mix only, the estimates in Volume I include investments in energy management. The 
assumptions on the costs of capital, fuel prices, technology type, plant capacity and plant 
construction are not fixed and are a potential source of disparity. For instance, in SPVCs, aside 
from diﬀerences in environmental suitability and energy eﬃciency between crystalline silicon 
wafers and thin film on glass, additional cost disparities may arise from locational factors such 
as whether the system is located far from the grid or embedded in it.
The general literature (i.e. the literature not focused exclusively on South Africa) on renewable 
energy and jobs (e.g. Borenstein, 2012; Huntington, 2009) indicates that the electric power 
industry does not hold a comparative advantage in terms of job creation. “Investments in 
roads, ground transportation and health care are likely to stimulate employment considerably 
more than green electric power generation. Policymakers should look askance at the claimed 
additional job benefits from green energy” (Huntington, 2009, p.15). Therefore, one needs 
to be mindful when directly comparing employment estimates without first controlling for 
variations among the underlying parameters (as in the examples highlighted in the preceding 
comparative review of the literature on South Africa). 
As a critique of the general literature and taking into account that the energy industry does 
not have a comparative advantage in terms of employment generation, it could be argued that 
policymakers might be more interested in the costs of the various alternative energy supply 
configurations. Through such an exercise, light can be shed on the opportunity costs of various 
policy choices. The employment dimension enters the calculation only as spill-over benefits. 
To identify an optimal renewable energy policy for South Africa, analysts need to resolve the 
nonlinear programming problem of achieving low carbon energy supply subject to (1) the 
emissions reduction trajectory in accordance with the UNFCCC 2010 submission, (2) energy 
reliability, and (3) aﬀordability. Such a solution would be an invaluable assessment tool 
against which bids for energy supply could be benchmarked. Successful bidders would be the 
winners whose projects are consistent with the resulting solution set. For projects that are at 
parity, a tie-breaker could then be taken to be the employment creation potential as well as the 
nature (quality and duration) of the resulting jobs. 
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6.4 Public policy on emission reduction and job creation
The key public policies on South Africa’s green agenda are developed by the Department of 
Environmental Aﬀairs and the Department of Energy, whereas initiatives that link these policies 
to the economy form part of the gamut of supporting policies. Examples of such supporting 
policies are those that attempt to link the green agenda to employment and industrialization, 
and are just as crucial as key policies because they help promote de-carbonization eﬀorts and 
thus render them sustainable.87 To the extent that economic diversification and employment 
creation are important development goals for South Africa, any initiative that is linked to the 
green agenda and has the potential to promote employment and/or economic diversification is 
desirable. Industrial policy is presumed to be one of those desirable initiatives. South Africa’s 
major industrial policy framework is the Industrial Policy Action Plan. Initially promulgated as 
the National Industrial Policy Framework in 2007, it has undergone five amendments and is 
now referred to as IPAP 2013/14-2015/16 (hereinafter IPAP). The goal of IPAP is to “prevent 
industrial decline and support the growth and diversification of South Africa’s manufacturing 
sector” (DTI, 2013, p. 6). Its explicit inclusion of the green agenda is of particular relevance, 
because is in line with the national strategy on climate change, all spheres of government to 
include the green agenda in their respective action plans to the fullest extent possible. The 
IPAP describes green agenda initiatives as “qualitatively new areas of intervention” (DTI, 2013, 
p. 119). It should be noted, however, that the Department of Trade and Industry together with 
the Department of Public Enterprises developed the South African Renewables Initiative in 
early 2010. The objective of the initiative is to “define an industrial strategy for securing the 
economic gains from an ambitious program of renewables development, and to design and 
secure the financing and associated institutional arrangements” (DTI, 2010, p. 12).
Review of industrial policy
Two spheres of discourse will be examined, namely government policies (represented by 
policy initiatives of the Department for Trade and Industry), and private sector perspectives 
on the issues being considered. The initiation of substantive industrial policy on renewable 
energy goes back to a recent policy directive which stipulates the objective of a low carbon 
roadmap for the manufacturing sector and setting two clear milestones - to specify GHG 
mitigation objectives for the industrial sector by the third quarter of the fiscal year 2013/2014, 
and to issue a draft industrial policy roadmap to achieve the stipulated objectives by the 
second quarter of 2014/2015. Furthermore, the directive clearly identifies a cluster of 
leading government departments, namely the Department of Environmental Aﬀairs and 
the Department of Trade and Industry. Other relevant agencies involved in furthering these 
objectives are the Department of Energy and Department of Science and Technology. Also, 
the minimum local content requirements for renewable energy independent power producer 
partnerships (REIPPP) and small scale programmes have been targeted for upward revision, 
presumably to stimulate the development of associated industries in renewable energy. In this 
regard, the industrial policy strategy includes the identification of energy eﬃciency products 
to be developed in a competitive local manufacturing industry. Other measures range from 
setting aside $550 million for industrial financing of investments in the green economy and the 
establishment of an energy eﬃciency training centre in accordance with the planned roll out of 
87 Corroborating views from the Minister of Trade and Industry of South Africa can be found in DTI (2010), p. 3.
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energy management training and awareness programmes to be implemented in industry and 
the mining industry. As the majority of initiatives are being realized in real time (in 2013/2014), 
it is too early to evaluate the results.
However, enthusiasm for renewable energy is obvious, and the buy-in from citizens has been 
consistent. It only takes a quick drive through Alex Township in Sandton City (one of the largest 
and oldest townships in South Africa) located in Gauteng Province (the most populous province 
and wealthiest in terms of GDP) to see a sea of low-pressure solar water heater installations 
on private residential rooftops. These energy eﬃciency devices were procured, installed and 
maintained using domestic capacity based on other government initiatives, which predate 
the industrial policies under discussion here. These include, for example, energy eﬃciency 
funding initiatives by the Treasury Department and managed by Eskom. Eskom’s Standard 
Oﬀer Programme is a mechanism that pays large electricity users for verified energy savings. 
According to the program’s design, any “energy user, Energy Services Company (ESCo) or project 
developer that are able to deliver verifiable energy savings are invited to propose projects. If 
approved, the successful project implementer will be paid for verified energy savings at a fixed 
amount per kilowatt hour over a period of three years. The amount includes an initial payment 
of seventy percent of the total project incentive on completion” (M&G, 2012, p. 5). Under its 
Integrated Demand Management initiative, other Eskom energy eﬃciency programs include 
the High Pressure Solar Rebate Programme, the National Solar Water Heating Programme and 
the Residential Heat Pump Rebate Programme, some of which are now under review due to 
funding constraints.88 Rather than seek confirmation of policy successes at such an early stage, 
the lesson we can draw lies in the recognition of the opportunities this rich variety of initiatives 
oﬀer and which could serve as fertile ground for current industrial policies to trigger the desired 
industrial development.  
Outside of the industrial sector, the policy matrix consists of a gamut of incentives and yet 
more policy initiatives either under consideration at present and subject to public debate or 
being adapted to include the feedback from the public. Some of these incentives come in 
the form of subsidies, financing facilities and taxes. Tax incentives exist for energy eﬃciency 
investments, a carbon tax has been proposed, a carbon budget for certain commercial 
enterprises considered major polluters, and a carbon emissions cap which is being proposed 
as a more eﬀective means to reduce emissions than imposing penalties on major polluters. A 
$2 billion credit facility has been established for investments in green projects, a three-year 
$470 million solar water heater subsidy, a 70 percent annual subsidy for solar home systems 
and a 50 percent annual fuel tax rebate for biodiesel (Modise, 2013). These initiatives have not 
yet been evaluated in terms of the objectives set, but Eskom has reported significant energy 
savings from its Integrated Demand Management initiatives, which are a major component of 
the gamut of incentives.89 Despite these encouraging initiatives, the private sector continues to 
be less inclined to pursue such initiatives due to concern about the government’s reluctance to 
restructure the electric power industry to level the playing field and thus attract private players. 
Currently, it essentially remains a vertically integrated industry dominated by the state utility 
company Eskom. In particular, the configuration of power generation, energy trading, billing 
and distribution calls for reforms. Solar financing, for instance, continues to be problematic 
despite its tremendous growth in popularity and adoption. The problem is seen as structural 
and political. The preference for and trend towards solar energy is reflected in a variety of 
88 For more details on Eskom’s Integrated Demand Management, see www.eskom.co.za/idm. 
89 For instance, Eskom reports that a savings of 591 MW was realized during the the 12-month period ending March 2013 (Eskom, 2014).
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solutions such as rooftop, small-scale projects and oﬀ-grid installations. Oﬀ-grid installations 
reduce revenue from local distribution without any corresponding reduction in overhead costs 
and infrastructure fixed costs, thus raising the average price for residual customers. As local 
authorities derive a sizable share of their revenue from bulk purchases and retail distribution 
of electricity of which the resulting revenue cross-subsidizes other essential services, a push 
for reforms remains diﬃcult.
On the other hand, the successful introduction of feed-in tariﬀs is considered one of the most 
significant policy instruments to date for promoting growth in power generation.90 Approved 
and promulgated in 2009, feed-in tariﬀs require Eskom to pay a specified rate per kilowatt hour 
at rand values that vary across the types of renewables, but at tariﬀ rates which have generally 
exceeded the renewable energy industry’s expectations.91 Subsequently, changes have been 
proposed and implemented in line with adjustments in inflationary expectations. Some of the 
tariﬀ adjustments have been considerable, with up to 40 percent reduction in the applicable 
feed-in tariﬀs for certain renewable energy types. Equally of note and complementing feed-in 
tariﬀs is the generation levy on non-renewable electricity. Essentially, generation levy is an 
environmental tax imposed by South Africa’s revenue authority on electricity generation using 
non-renewable (fossil) fuels and environmentally hazardous (nuclear) sources.92 The conclusion 
is that as a result of the ongoing initiatives, the levels of investor interest and activity in the 
large-scale power generation segment have been remarkable. By way of evidence, analysts 
emphasize the active participation in bidding rounds of construction tenders for power 
generation. Another example of success in the utility-scale generation segment is the emergence 
of REIPPP, which has “resulted in competitive bids for grid-connected renewables in South 
Africa…and more than R100bn of private investment committed”.93 However, to accelerate the 
transition to a low carbon economy, an appropriate financing framework is necessary. In turn, 
attracting the necessary investment requires a significant degree of industrial reorganization, 
namely the establishment of an unbundled energy industry.  
Currently, the electric power industry is fully regulated, with electricity primarily being supplied 
by Eskom. Electricity generation and import is dominated by Eskom with fringe competition 
from municipalities and independent power producers (IPPs) arising from emerging renewables 
markets. The bulk of the generation of electricity is coordinated by the system operator, 
Eskom, as is transmission. Domestic bulk trading is virtually non-existent, although there is 
some cross-border activity under the Southern Africa Power Pool. The distribution and supply 
to end users is also dominated by Eskom with fringe participation by municipalities which 
purchase electricity from Eskom and supply industry, mining companies, small and medium 
enterprises as well as residences and agriculture.94 Establishing an independent national 
system operator would represent a major milestone in the restructuring process. Then, the 
generation, distribution, power trading and customer billing would be open for competition. 
In this respect, the proposed Independent System Market Operator Bill is an encouraging step 
towards industrial reorganization of the energy industry.
90 Renewable energy feed-in tariﬀ (“Refit”) is the price premium given to private sector electricity generators.  
91 For further information on the Refit structure, see for instance, ‘South Africa: South Africa - Feed-In Tariﬀ Cuts Proposed, www.mondaq. 
com/x/129234/Renewables/South+Africa+FeedIn+Tariﬀ+Cuts+Proposed (Accessed September 7, 2014). 
92 ‘Electricity Generation’, www.sars.gov.za/ClientSegments/Customs-Excise/Excise/Environmental-Levy-Products/Pages/Electricity-Genera-
tion-Levy.aspx (Accessed April 16, 2014).
93 ‘Urgent Reforms Are Needed for Responsive Power Sector’, www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2013/11/25/urgent-reforms-are-needed-for-responsive-pow-
er-sector (Accessed September 7, 2014).
94 See Bischof-Niemz (2013) for further details.
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The debate between the policy community and the private sector regarding the appropriate 
mix of incentives required to trigger the desired change in behavior towards environmental 
harm caused by economic activities that otherwise produce positive benefits to society has 
yet to be settled (Moodley, Mabugu and Hassan, 2005).95 According to economic literature, 
pricing externalities is the best initial response. Where property rights are well defined such as 
in the context of power generation or large-scale GHG emissions with clearly traceable origins, 
taxes on emissions or tradable permits are an option. However, policymakers have not yet 
brought forward convincing arguments against pricing externalities due to the lack of suﬃcient 
knowledge on which to base their policies. 
One example of this knowledge gap is the lack of sound cost estimates, that in comparing 
alternative energy mixes, take into consideration the market value of the power generated 
and its related externalities to be able to compare alternative energy mixes (portfolio of 
generating equipment) (Borenstein, 2012). Another example of the existing knowledge gap 
is the question of the appropriate tradeoﬀ, if any, between additional investments in energy 
eﬃciency versus renewable energy. Similarly, as has been noted elsewhere (e.g. Volume I) 
as well as in this study, the balanced costs of power generation from clean renewables as 
well as estimates on the number of jobs arising from investments in clean renewables vary 
considerably. Lacking sound evidence on these crucial decision parameters with which to argue 
in favor of tough public policy choices, the politically expedient response by policymakers has 
been to pursue populist policy interventions. “Instead of pricing externalities, the far more 
prevalent government response has been targeted program to promote specific alternatives 
to conventional electricity generation technologies…Such targeted programs also seem 
especially vulnerable to political manipulation” (Borenstein, 2012, p. 87). This vulnerability 
to political manipulation may explain why such targeted programs continue (see Bates, 2005) 
and suggests that even when sound evidence becomes available, policy choices may continue 
to be populist instead of eﬃcient, unless the political incentives under which such choices are 
made are modified as well.  
Case study in industrial policy implementation:  
Small-scale photovoltaic roll-out 
The potential for PV markets in South Africa as discussed in Bischof-Niemz (2013) will be 
further examined in this section. This particular case is relevant for the following reasons: PV 
markets are a proven viable and emerging segment of clean renewables with the potential for 
job creation. According to estimates in Tinte and Bischof-Niemz (2013) with regard to Eskom’s 
internal plan to roll out PV for its facilities, the proposed investment of $3 billion in capital 
expenditure will produce 250 GWh of green electricity annually, prevent a total of 4 million 
tons of CO2 emissions, create 1,500 direct permanent jobs and train 2,000 individuals in PV 
design and installation (as entrepreneurs). It will also test funding opportunities from financial 
institutions linked to green energy particularly from a prime borrower. Based on this attractive 
potential of the PV segment, we provide an overview of the PV market in South Africa to infer 
the future of projected investments for renewables.
95 ‘Global Experience Warns SA Against Imposing Carbon Tax’, www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2013/08/27/global-experience-warns-sa-against-impos-
ing-carbon-tax (Accessed September 7, 2014).
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Clearly, the involvement of both the private and the public sector as well as their constructive 
interaction is crucial for the success of the green agenda’s financing requirements.96 
Acknowledgement of the government of this imperative is manifested by defining an industrial 
strategy to secure economic gains from “an ambitious program of renewables development, 
including financing and associated institutional arrangements, that would not impose an 
unacceptable burden on South Africa’s economy, public finances or citizens” (DTI, 2010, p .4). 
The need for additional financing outside of the public sector is implicit in the government’s 
statement that “[t]he estimated incremental costs of an ambitious renewables program would 
have a net present value of about US$21 billion at current feed-in tariﬀ rates, or US$9 billion if 
they were reduced to a more cost competitive level. Such an additional burden to South Africa 
would not be appropriate and so currently prevents the more ambitious renewable targets 
being adopted and pursued” (DTI, 2010, p. 4).
According to Bischof-Niemz (2013), the IRP (2010) envisages an energy generation mix of 8.4 
GW in PV up to 2030, including a sizable share of embedded PV. The PV market is evolving in 
two distinct ways; competitive tenders driven by REIPPPP and self-generation and embedded 
generation. Although a rising trend in the already significant number of self-consumption PVs 
has been reported (e.g. Bischof-Niemz, 2013), feeding into the grid is either prohibited or 
where permitted, feed-in occurs at unattractive rates, which then discourages the growth and 
development of this market segment. How the challenge of further developing this segment 
is addressed will be crucial. First, the cost of capital expenditure for residential installations, 
which is generally high can be compensated by reducing the cost of capital. Second, a mismatch 
exists between the residential load profile and PV output. Household energy demand is highest 
in the mornings and evenings, while PV power supply rises steadily throughout the day to peak 
at midday and drop thereafter. Consequently, if excess supply is not sold, it becomes that 
much more diﬃcult to amortize the investment and literally 'kills the business case' (Bischof-
Niemz, 2013, p. 14). Such an outcome would be unfortunate in a potential market of 1 million 
households and 10,000 commercial properties, yielding an estimated aggregate generated 
power of 8 GHWh. 
Doing nothing will not only 'kill the business case', but will lead to adverse choices in the 
power market, which then creates further social inequality. Since some customers will install 
PVs either way, the high net worth customers and hence prime customers will choose their 
power supply outside of the market, thus increasing the cost for residual customers who cannot 
choose and are generally the poorer members in an already unequal society. Bischof-Niemz 
(2013) proposes a feasible mechanism to deal with incentive and participation constraints in 
a two-phased approach to overcome the obstacles to participation for residential customers. 
This approach requires the creation of a Central Power Purchasing Agency that would serve 
as the monopsonist for all energy spilled into the grid by embedded generators as well as 
the compensating agency on a net feed-in tariﬀ for all self-generation sources. The Agency 
would also compensate municipalities for lost revenue due to self-generation. This would be 
consistent with and a test of the government’s espoused intention (DEA, 2010) to socialize the 
cost (to legacy enterprises) of reforms associated with the transition to a low carbon economy. 
Moreover, the demise of the micro-utility segment implies that all indirect job estimates 
associated with the training of individuals in PV design and installation vanish. 
96 See, for instance, DTI (2010), p. 3.
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6.5 Conclusion 
This study reveals that South Africa is on the path towards transition to a low carbon economy 
in line with its commitments to the Copenhagen Accord, notwithstanding the country’s social 
burden in both being a developing nation and shouldering the legacy of apartheid. Embedding 
mitigation of climate change into its existing institutional arrangements such as the Cabinet 
Clusters, the National Planning Commission, the Forum of South Africa Directors-General, the 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Water and Environmental Aﬀairs, the Inter-Ministerial 
Committee on Climate Change, the Intergovernmental Committee on Climate Change and 
the multi-stakeholder National Committee on Climate Change signals determination for a 
coordinated and far-reaching response to minimize policy slippages.97 To reduce the risk of 
derailing, the international community should support the transition process. This entails 
that international resources (technical and financial support) be made available as envisaged 
under the UNFCCC to “complement domestic resources to finance the cost of the transition to 
a climate resilient society” (DEA, 2013, p. 43; DTI, 2013, p. 119). Drawing on several sources 
(DTI, 2010; Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre and BNEF, 2013; and Volume I), the scale of required 
investments expressed in monetary terms is clearly significant for a developing country. The 
immensity is even more telling when such resource requirements are considered in conjunction 
with important socio-economic indicators such as an average annual GDP growth rate of under 
3 percent over a 10-year period, a very high rate of unemployment and a public health burden 
caused by the prevalence of HIV-AIDS.
Modise (2013) speaks of a planned partial investment of $7.4 billion for renewables over 
the next 20 years. An aggregate expenditure of $148 billion is estimated in Volume I. Fifteen 
years ago, the government’s financing plan for renewables was estimated at $21 billion at the 
prevailing feed-in tariﬀ, or $9 billion if the plan was scaled down. Those figures were back 
then already considered an inappropriate “additional domestic burden to South Africa” and 
“so currently prevents the more ambitious renewables targets being adopted and pursued” 
(DTI, 2010, p. 4). Ultimately, financing constraints represent the biggest challenge, regardless 
of whether all technological requirements have been adequately addressed. “Renewables are 
more costly than traditional energy sources, and will remain so for some time to come” (DTI, 
2010, p. 3), but the cost diﬀerential is gradually narrowing. Also, as has been noted, investment 
in renewable energy is not one of the most robust or eﬃcient ways to invest in employment 
creation. Therefore, as both the balanced costs of power generation and employment creation 
continue to be subject to large variations in estimates with no normalization scheme, it is clear 
that additional research is necessary on these two important pillars of investment trends in 
renewables, particularly as they influence decarbonization which in turn aﬀects job creation. 
Other measures complementary to research eﬀorts include creating an enabling environment 
for sustainable financing of the rollouts of renewable energy and energy eﬃciency measures. 
Evidently, the transition to a low carbon economy within the framework of the New Growth Path 
(South Africa’s implementation strategy of its National Plan) cannot be funded from public 
resources alone, even with overwhelming job creation potentials, which is not even the case. 
South Africa’s commitment to infrastructure investments under the National Development 
Plan and the size of its social spending (NPC, 2011) suggest that private capital is necessary 
to achieve the low carbon transition, regardless of the employment potential of the planned 
investment. Any planned investment outlay still has to be funded before it can deliver on 
97 The term “Cabinet Clusters” refers to the diﬀerent functional groupings of ministerial functions for more eﬃcient intergovernmental relations.
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any of the promised benefits. Even ideal projects such as those that are self-financing often 
require bridging finance. Obviously, ‘cash is king’. Private financing requires governments’ 
credible commitment to respect pre-contractual obligations, an environment of accountability 
and a credible anti-corruption enforcement regime. The political economy analysis of the 
prospects of establishing such a regime in the immediate future lies outside the scope of 
this study. Nonetheless, the Government of South Africa is well aware that a viable financing 
mechanism requires a “blend of domestic commitments with concessionary resources and risk 
guarantee instruments channeled through inter-governmental co-operation. Provided within 
an appropriate institutional framework, such public resources would in turn leverage the far 
larger sums required from private finance at an aﬀordable cost to South Africa” (DTI, 2010, p. 
3). If this were to happen, the employment benefits may be non-trivial, regardless of what the 
various estimates in the literature suggest. The reason for optimism is that if investment in 
renewables were to be on full traction, there could be significant unanticipated job creation 
along new value chains (human creativity) from innovations. Economists call this phenomenon 
dynamic scale economies or learning by doing, which are considered important beams of 
industrialization.
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